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dimanche, 22 février 2015

Hellenismo

Rivista Hellenismo Trentesimo numero

 

Trentesimo numero della rivista online ‘Hellenismo’

Link documento pdf

Indice

Dalle scorse Lenaia ad Anthesterion …
Tre scritti sulla Giustizia: Dike, Nomos e Dikaiosyne
Hermes: cenni teologici e culto
Romano Ritu: Libagioni, I parte – Torte dolci e salate
Per un latino vivo e parlato – I parte
Il Dramma Sacro del mito di Horus dal Tempio di Behdet
Il regno di Baal. Alcune considerazione sui Ba’alin fenici nell’Africa punica

Appendice PDF
Proclo,Commento al Timeo

Appendice Iconografica
Per il mese dei Misteri Minori…

 

Calendario Religioso

Anthesterion

 

cal

Principali celebrazioni del mese

– II Δευτέρα Ἱσταμένου
Sacrificio a Dioniso (Erchia)

– III Τρίτη Ἱσταμένου
Incontro dei Thiasotai di Bendis a Salamina

– XI Ἑνδεκάτη
Anthesteria- Pithoigia, ‘apertura delle botti’

–  XII Δωδεκάτη
Anthesteria- Khoes, ‘boccali’
Sacrificio a Dioniso (Torico)

– XIII Τρίτη Μεσοῦντος
Anthesteria- Khytroi, ‘pentole'; Aiora/Aletis

– Dal XX Εἰκὰς a XXVI Πέμπτη Φθίνοντος
En Agrais Mysteria

– XXIII Ὀγδόη Φθίνοντος
Diasia

*** LINK DOCUMENTO ONLINE PDF ***

Ex: http://hellenismo.wordpress.com

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vendredi, 26 décembre 2014

Le meilleur régime: une querelle millénaire

 

Parlement-europeen-930-620_scalewidth_630.jpg

Le meilleur régime: une querelle millénaire

Proposer ou imposer un chef à sa Nation ne se fait jamais sans conséquences. Mais alors, quel système politique doit-on mettre en œuvre pour assurer la pérennité de ce (nouveau) Régime ? Et quel est le plus préférable ?

Dans son « Enquête » au sein du livre 3, Hérodote rapporte un dialogue entre trois « mages » au lendemain de la mort du roi de Perse, Smerdis, pour trouver quel serait le meilleur régime afin de gouverner le territoire. En réalité, ces « mages » ou encore appelés « servants » selon les textes, représentent les trois principaux régimes politiques.

  • Otanes, faisant l’apogée de la démocratie, commence par attaquer la monarchie par ces mots : « Je crois que l’on ne doit plus désormais confier l’administration de l’État à un seul homme, le gouvernement monarchique n’étant ni agréable ni bon ». En réalité, Otanes s’insurge sur le fait que ce « monarque » n’agirait qu’à sa guise, selon l’impulsion donnée par son caractère capricieux, tout lui étant alors permis. Otanes préconise un gouvernement choisi par le peuple ce qui régirait le « principe d’isonomie ». Ce principe consiste en une soumission à une même loi pour tous. L’isonomie est concrétisée sur l’égalité des droits civiques avec l’idée de partage effectif du pouvoir.
  • Mégabyse, favorable au système aristocratique, témoigne de son accord avec Otanes sur les dérives de la monarchie, régime tyrannique selon lui. Mais la démocratie ne vaut pas mieux en y regardant de plus près ! Mégabyse dira même que le système démocratique est bien pire que son opposant monarchique pour la simple et bonne raison que le tyran monarque sait ce qu’il fait, alors que la masse populaire ne le sait pas ! Pour lui, seul un gouvernement composé des hommes de savoir et d’éducation, peut se maintenir ! « Pour nous, faisons le choix des hommes les plus vertueux ; mettons-leur la puissance entre les mains : nous serons nous-même de ce nombre ; et, suivant toutes les apparences, des hommes sages et éclairés et ne donneront que d’excellents conseils ».
  • Darius quant à lui se positionne pour la monarchie. Prenant la parole en dernier, et ayant soigneusement écouté ses comparses, il critique immédiatement Otanes et Mégabyse : Pour lui, le meilleur gouvernement ne peut être autre que celui du meilleur homme seul ! « Il est constant qu’il n’y a rien de meilleur que le gouvernement d’un seul homme, quand il est homme de bien ». L’oligarchie n’est pour lui que l’étape précédent la monarchie, d’où sa faiblesse : « Chacun veut primer, chacun veut que son opinion prévale » de sorte que les nobles se battraient pour gouverner. Cette situation ne déboucherait que sur le recours à un roi pour rétablir l’ordre social. Mais la démocratie ne vaut pas mieux selon le « mage » ! « Quand le peuple commande, il est impossible qu’il ne s’introduise beaucoup de désordre dans un État ». Cela ne conduirait qu’à une tyrannie – justement – pour rétablir brutalement l’ordre. Pour Darius, la monarchie apparait comme seul régime valable, ou du moins comme le moins mauvais.

Cette introduction nous permet d’enchaîner sur l’étude desdits systèmes politiques, non pas pour vanter les mérites de l’un sur les autres, mais pour en comprendre leurs fondements, leurs principes et leurs idéaux.

La démocratie

aristotelessdgh.jpgL’une des meilleurs définitions a été donné par Aristote : « La liberté – ou démocratie – consiste dans le fait d’être tour à tour gouverné et gouvernant… »
La démocratie est le gouvernement du peuple, par le peuple et pour le peuple. Idéalement, la démocratie instaure une identité entre les gouvernants et les gouvernés. Les conditions nécessaires sont les suivantes :

  • L’égalité : C’est l’idée que tous les citoyens, sans distinction d’origine, de race, de sexe ou de religion, sont égaux en droit. Les mêmes règles doivent s’appliquer aux citoyens qui sont placés dans une situation identique.
  • La légalité : C’est l’idée d’une obéissance aux règles de droit. Les rapports entre les citoyens doivent être régis par des règles de droit qui, adoptées par tous, s’appliquent à tous.
  • La liberté : C’est l’idée de la liberté de participation aux affaires publiques. Tous les citoyens sont libres de participer au gouvernement soit par la désignation des gouvernants – élection – soit par la prise directe de décision – référendum. C’est également l’idée d’une liberté d’opinion, ce qui induit le respect de plusieurs courants politiques.

Outre Otanès que nous avons évoqué en introduction, Périclès fait également l’éloge de la démocratie où l’égalité serait son fondement. Dans ce régime il ne doit y avoir aucune différence entre les citoyens ni dans leur vie publique ni dans leur vie privée. Aucune considération ne doit s’attacher à la naissance ou à la richesse, mais uniquement au mérite !

La démocratie est un régime de générosité et de fraternité, reposant sur la philanthropie (du grec ancien φίλος / phílos « amoureux » et ἄνθρωπος / ánthrôpos « homme », « genre humain ») est la philosophie ou doctrine de vie qui met l’humanité au premier plan de ses priorités. Un philanthrope cherche à améliorer le sort de ses semblables par de multiples moyens.

Cependant et après étude de ces éléments, nous sommes en droit de nous poser la question suivante : l’élection démocratique d’un dirigeant le force t-il nécessairement à être philanthrope ? À moins que la réponse ne soit déjà dans la question…

L’Oligarchie

L’oligarchie est le gouvernement d’un petit nombre de personnes, le pouvoir étant détenu par une minorité. L’oligarchie est également une catégorie générique qui recouvre plusieurs formes de gouvernement.

La forme oligarchique la plus répandue est l’aristocratie. C’est un gouvernement réservé à une classe sociale censée regrouper les meilleurs. L’aristocratie repose ainsi sur une conception élitiste du pouvoir.

Outre les institutions de la république romaine, rappelons que le système politique spartiate était bel et bien orienté vers l’oligarchie notamment avec la gérousie.
La gérousie est une assemblée composée de 28 hommes élus à vie et âgés de plus de 60 ans. Ces derniers sont choisis en fonction de leur vertu militaire mais force est de constater qu’ils appartiennent pour la plupart aux grandes familles de Sparte.

Il est intéressant de noter que dans cet exemple que seuls les membres de cette assemblée possèdent l’initiative des lois. Dans un système oligarchique on ne laisse que peu de place à l’aléatoire puisque seuls les « meilleurs » accèdent aux fonctions législatives, encore faut-il convenablement définir ce que sont « les meilleurs » dans un régime politique.

La monarchie

La monarchie est la forme de gouvernement dans laquelle le pouvoir est exercé par un seul homme (roi, empereur, dictateur).
La monarchie absolue est un courant de la monarchie qui, elle-même est un courant de la monocratie. La monarchie absolue donc, est le gouvernement d’un seul homme fondée sur l’hérédité et détenant en sa personne tous les pouvoirs (législatif, exécutif et judiciaire). La souveraineté du monarque est très souvent de droit divin.

Outre Darius, Isocrate défend cette idée de monarchie comme forme d’organisation du pouvoir. Il pense trouver le chef dans Philippe de Macédoine (père d’Alexandre le Grand), car il y voit le règne de l’efficacité et l’avènement de la modernité.

xenophon05.jpgXénophon a réellement été l’initiateur du régime monarchique. « Ce qui fait les rois ou les chefs (…) c’est la science du commandement ». Le roi est comparable au pilote qui guide le navire. Xénophon décrit un homme qui détient une supériorité sur tous les autres, car il « sait ». On ne naît pas roi, on ne l’est pas non plus par le fait, ni encore par l’élection : on le devient ! La monarchie est un art qui, comme tous les autres arts, suppose un apprentissage, la connaissance des lois et des maîtres pour les enseigner.

L’éducation fait acquérir au roi un ensemble de talents et de qualités qui le rendront véritablement apte à exercer ses fonctions. Il ne doit pas imposer son pouvoir par la force, sinon il ne serait qu’un tyran, ce que Xénophon réprouve. Le roi devra être capable de susciter le consentement du peuple en se fondant sur la justice et la raison. Le chef est donc au service de ceux qu’il commande. « Un bon chef ne diffère en rien d’un bon père de famille ». Héritage grec oblige, Xénophon n’oublie pas de mentionner que le roi ne fera régner la justice qu’en respectant la primauté de la loi.

***

À l’étude de ces différents régimes proposant une gouvernance différente du territoire, sommes-nous en capacité de répondre à l’intitulé de cet article à savoir « Quel est le meilleur Régime politique ? » Chacun se fera son avis, chacun se fera son opinion ! Tout réside naturellement dans la capacité du « chef » à gouverner, mais aussi et surtout dans sa conception du pouvoir.

Napoléon Bonaparte a été très certainement l’un des empereurs les plus prestigieux de l’Histoire. Cependant était-il d’avantage un démocrate qu’un monarque ? Ou a-t-il réussi à faire ressortir une nouvelle façon d’exercer le pouvoir ? Pour approfondir le sujet, je vous invite à lire les articles de Christopher Lings et David Saforcada aux adresses suivantes :

Christopher Destailleurs

Nous avons besoin de votre soutien pour vivre et nous développer :

mercredi, 10 décembre 2014

Critique de la Révolution par Hegel : Périclès contre l’égalitarisme

Critique de la Révolution par Hegel : Périclès contre l’égalitarisme

Ex: http://anti-mythes.blogspot.com

 
Pericles_Pio-Clementino_Inv269_n2.jpgAlors que la Révolution française insuffle à l’Europe une énergie philosophique nouvelle, affirmant ressusciter l’esprit de la démocratie grecque, un soupçon germe déjà dans l’esprit de Hegel : cette filiation avec l’Antiquité ne repose-t-elle pas sur un malentendu ? Par la figure de Périclès, le philosophe révèle l’erreur d’interprétation commise par ceux qui se réclament de la démocratie athénienne. Présentée comme une révolution chargée de promesses égalitaires que Périclès se serait empressé de trahir, ne fut-elle pas plutôt la célébration de la liberté et de la vertu individuelles, dont Périclès s’avéra le plus admirable serviteur ?
 
Périclès a fait l’objet d’une disgrâce constante dans l’histoire de la philosophie, dont les traces subsistent encore fortement, même à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Lui préférant Sparte, les révolutionnaires français n’ont que modérément recours au modèle d’Athènes, et voient dans le destin tragique de cette cité le paradigme à ne pas suivre en ces heures de refondation politique intégrale – or, Périclès incarne en tout point cette corruption de l’idéal démocratique qu’ils entendent ne pas reproduire. En Allemagne, à la même époque, les détracteurs de l’entreprise révolutionnaire française puisent dans l’œuvre de Platon d’innombrables présages du destin qui attend, selon eux, le peuple français. Le philosophe grec, constatant l’échec absolu de la démocratie, et formulant une critique acerbe du régime qui avait, selon lui, corrompu la grandeur athénienne, assimilait entièrement sa décadence à la personnalité de Périclès. Ainsi, le nom de l’homme d’État est à la fois utilisé par ses opposants pour discréditer la Révolution, et mettre en garde contre le chaos dont ils la croient porteuse, et rejeté par ses défenseurs, qui se passeraient volontiers de l’encombrant exemple d’un homme en qui l’historiographie persiste à ne voir qu’un monarque déguisé, populiste et manipulateur de foules.
 
Hegel, fasciné par les bouleversements politiques qui ont lieu en France, expose dans ses Leçons sur la Philosophie de l’Histoire les raisons qui le poussent à rejeter en bloc l’analyse de Platon. Découlant d’une idée univoque selon laquelle la démocratie fut néfaste à Athènes, le philosophe grec formule un jugement partial et intéressé, puisqu’il s’agit avant tout de discréditer un régime après son effondrement, en s’appuyant allègrement sur l’impopularité de Périclès dans la mémoire de ses contemporains. Platon reproche notamment à l’homme d’État athénien d’avoir préféré la prospérité économique de la Cité, pour s’assurer le soutien des foules ainsi comblées, à la véritable poursuite de l’idéal de justice. Périclès serait également le corrupteur moral de la vie politique athénienne, ayant introduit un système de rétribution de l’exercice des charges publiques, explicitement accusé par Platon, dans le Gorgias, d’avoir précipité la décadence d’un régime déjà vicié. « Périclès a rendu les Athéniens paresseux, lâches, babillards et intéressés, ayant le premier soudoyé les troupes. » Il semble pourtant que ce système ait, bien au contraire, permis à un nombre sans cesse croissant de citoyens athéniens de prendre part à l’administration de la Cité. Hegel ne s’y trompe pas, et il annonce ne vouloir juger Périclès qu’à l’aune des récits produits par les historiens, c’est-à-dire en s’appuyant sur des textes certes pas neutres quant à leur substance, puisque trahissant inconsciemment leur époque, mais du moins plus impartiaux dans leurs intentions que ceux de Platon.
 
Le chef plutôt que la foule, le mérite plutôt que l’égalité
 
C’est naturellement chez Thucydide que Hegel trouve la source documentaire la plus utile à son entreprise, mais également chez Plutarque, bien qu’il ne souscrive pas aux critiques sévères que ce dernier adresse aux décisions politiques prises par Périclès. Recoupant les descriptions concordantes, Hegel brosse le portrait d’un homme dont la qualité première fut la modération. Jamais en proie aux excès de la colère ou de la peur, Périclès était avant tout un homme tempéré, qui n’agissait qu’avec précaution et mesure, en accord avec les vertus de son temps. Intègre, il est peu probable qu’il eût jamais cédé à quelque tentative de corruption que ce fût, étant doté d’une force de caractère implacable, qui le poussait à obéir aux principes qu’il s’était lui-même fixé. De Thucydide, Hegel retient surtout l’éloge de la culture de Périclès, « homme riche en esprit », signe d’une formation irréprochable. Or, pour le philosophe allemand, c’est justement la formation qui permet à l’individu d’entrer en contact avec l’universel tout en développant sa personnalité. « La personnalité ne doit pas être confondue avec la particularité, car la première sera d’autant plus grande qu’elle sera dégagée de la seconde et qu’elle aura davantage saisi, exprimé et réalisé là, la véritable essence de son époque ».
 
Périclès apparaît ainsi comme l’homme portant à leur plus parfaite harmonie les vertus individuelles permettant la bonne conduite de la vie collective de la Cité qu’il dirige seul. Là où les historiens n’avaient vu qu’une preuve supplémentaire du dévoiement de la démocratie au profit du pouvoir d’un seul homme, Hegel voit finalement dans le pouvoir de Périclès la résolution de l’inextricable tension qui parcourt la démocratie : tiraillée entre la liberté individuelle et la subjectivité, entre l’obéissance et la volonté, elle ne peut être que de courte durée sous sa forme institutionnelle. Il lui faut donc un homme d’État fort et vertueux, qui se distingue par ses qualités morales et intellectuelles, et qui s’impose aux foules par une maîtrise absolue du langage, ainsi que par une détermination sans faille. A l’opposé de la méfiance platonicienne à l’égard des sophistes et des démagogues, Hegel célèbre donc la fascination de la foule pour l’éminence d’un individu demeurant cependant entièrement soumis à elle, ne pouvant agir contre son gré ni la contrarier, sous peine de perdre immédiatement son affection et son appui.
 
C’est dans ce rapport quasi organique entre l’homme d’État et le tribunal perpétuel devant lequel il s’exprime que réside, selon Hegel, l’assurance la plus fiable d’une Cité administrée selon la volonté du peuple, sans corruption ni déformation. Le seul critère permettant de déterminer l’aptitude d’un homme à se distinguer et à diriger la Cité repose donc sur l’examen de ses qualités propres, loin des fantasmes abstraits d’une égalité supposée absolue entre tous les tempéraments, tous les caractères et toutes les individualités. Nourrissant ici une divergence très marquée avec la philosophie kantienne et la neutralité morale des talents qu’elle avait posée comme principe fondateur de l’égalité des individus, Hegel n’en vient pas pour autant à réhabiliter la conception aristocratique de la Cité chère aux platoniciens. Bien au contraire, il vante les mérites du procédé par lequel l’homme vertueux parvient à s’imposer comme tel auprès de ses pairs, à se faire reconnaître par eux et à les guider : le mérite.
 
Éloge de la liberté individuelle et critique de la liberté formelle
 
Il serait absurde de déceler dans la perspective hégélienne une quelconque tentative de justification des despotismes éclairés tels qu’ils se développèrent au cours du XVIIIème siècle, puisqu’elle célèbre avant tout l’individu libre que fut Périclès, et dénonce les « abstractions » dont se nourrissent les révolutionnaires français. Il convient de noter que, par ce terme péjoratif, Hegel ne critique pas leur tentative de fonder une anthropologie ex nihilo, grâce à une raison autosuffisante dont découleraient, purs et évidents, les principes éthiques régissant la cité – c’est là le reproche principal des contre-révolutionnaires français. Il s’en prend davantage aux libertés attribuées à l’homme, et dont il reproche, avec une justesse relativement visionnaire, le formalisme auquel elles sont condamnées. Car c’est bien là que se situe, selon lui, toute l’ambiguïté de la Révolution : ses grands principes, aussi nobles soient-ils, sont désincarnés, et ne porteront fatalement aucun fruit, lorsqu’ils ne s’avéreront tout simplement pas délétères.
 
Pour le comprendre, il suffit de se rappeler qu’à l’opposé d’Athènes et de Périclès se trouve le modèle lacédémonien, Sparte, Cité idéalisée dans l’imaginaire des révolutionnaires de 1789. Face aux richesses bourgeoises d’Athènes, à son exaltation de la beauté, des arts et du superflu, ainsi qu’à son attachement profond à l’individu, la frugalité spartiate, austère et rigoureuse, séduit bien davantage les figures les plus radicales comme Robespierre. Rien d’étonnant à cela, selon Hegel, qui voit dans ces deux périodes historiques la manifestation de la même tendance égalitaire destructrice. Entre l’égalité forcée des fortunes et des propriétés privées à Sparte et la dérive sanglante de la Terreur, le philosophe ne concède aucune différence : c’est la même « vertu rigide et abstraite » à l’œuvre, qui fait du Comité de Salut Public le nouveau directoire des Éphores, c’est à dire une aristocratie portée par des principes qui, sous couvert d’égalité, attire le peuple vers la médiocrité et noie l’individu dans la masse. Sans liberté individuelle, pas de développement de la subjectivité. Sans la prospérité économique, pas d’accès à ces luxes que représentent les arts, la science ou la pensée universelle. Hegel condamne les Spartiates comme les Jacobins en les accusant de travestir l’enchaînement de l’individu libre en une apparente promesse d’égalité vide de tout sens et intenable, comme le démontreront les événements à venir.
 
Si Périclès trouve grâce aux yeux de Hegel, ce dernier n’appelle en aucun cas à reproduire la tentative athénienne. L’analyse historique ne peut fournir autre chose qu’une éventuelle inspiration, mais ne constitue pas un idéal vers lequel il conviendrait de tendre. De même, s’il identifie les révolutionnaires français aux Spartiates, ce n’est que pour souligner l’essence abstraite et perverse des principes qui les guident, et non pour prophétiser le déclin de l’idée démocratique en France. C’est finalement à cette dernière que sont adressées les principales critiques que formule Hegel dans ses Leçons, ou, plus précisément, à l’ambiguïté de son nom, dont profitent les révolutionnaires pour se dispenser d’avoir à mettre en place l’égalité et la liberté effectives. Il ne s’agit pas de gouverner pour le peuple, ni même de permettre au peuple de gouverner directement – ce sont là des questions d’agencement presque secondaires, et qui, ironiquement, constituent l’horizon absolu de toute la philosophie politique contemporaine. Le projet dont il est question, bien plus vaste et ambitieux, concerne la marche de l’Histoire du monde : il s’agit de permettre à la raison de se réaliser. Et c’est précisément pour éviter que la démocratie, fût-elle bien réelle et permît-elle aux citoyens libres et égaux de déterminer leur avenir, ne se fasse plus nuisible encore en remettant le pouvoir à une masse d’individus ayant troqué leurs singularités et leur liberté contre l’égalitarisme médiocrement uniforme, que Hegel oppose aux révolutionnaires de 1789 la figure vertueuse et libre de Périclès, et avec elle le modèle athénien contre l’ombre égalitaire qui est en train de se lever sur l’Europe.
 

jeudi, 30 octobre 2014

Grèce : « Les murailles de feu »

Grèce : « Les murailles de feu »

Ex: http://fortune.fdesouche.com
Dans ce roman historique nous suivons le déroulement de la vie d’un jeune Grec, Xéon, dont la Cité, Astakos, va être détruite et la population massacrée. Confronté à cette situation terrible, lors de laquelle il perd ses parents alors qu’il n’est âgé que de dix ans, il prend la décision de devenir un guerrier et de rejoindre la Cité grecque la plus réputée sur ce point: Sparte.
 

Ce faisant, il va être mêlé à une fabuleuse page de l’histoire antique se déroulant en 480 avant notre ère, pendant l’invasion de la Grèce par le roi de Perse Xerxès, fils de Darius: la bataille du défilé des Thermopyles.

Six jours durant, sous le regard des dieux, cet étroit passage sera le théâtre de combats sans merci, lors de laquelle trois cents spartiates et quatre mille combattants grecs d’autres cités vont opposer une résistance farouche aux armées de l’empire perse.

Celles-ci rassemblant, selon l’historien Hérodote, deux millions d’hommes, traversèrent l’Hellespont, c’est-à-dire l’actuel détroit des Dardanelles, afin d’envahir et asservir la Grèce. Racontée par un survivant, c’est ce choc inégal – et, au-delà, toute l’histoire et la vie quotidienne de Sparte – que fait revivre Steven Pressfield dans ce roman traversé par «un formidable souffle d’authenticité».
L’objectif n’est pas seulement de rappeler cette page guerrière de l’histoire mais également de porter un regard sur la Grèce Antique, les Cités grecques et leur indépendance les unes par rapport aux autres, qui conduisait d’ailleurs celles-ci à se livrer des guerres incessantes.

Ainsi, nous apprenons les règles de vie très strictes et martiales de la Cité spartiate. La vie des hommes et des femmes n’était réglée que par rapport à l’organisation militaire et à la guerre, du moins en ce qui concerne ceux qui étaient considérés comme les Citoyens. Il n’y a apparemment aucun doute sur l’importance de cette Cité à cette époque et l’exemple qu’elle pouvait donner au reste du monde antique.

L’auteur a pris comme trame la vie d’un jeune homme qui ne pouvait prétendre devenir l’un de ces guerriers spartiates mais qui en revanche les a servis et approchés de près. Cette astuce permet à l’auteur de nous livrer à la fois une vision extérieure et une vision intérieure sur la philosophie martiale animant cette Cité, dressant ainsi un portrait saisissant, fruit d’une érudition certaine et d’une recherche documentaire approfondie.

La bataille du défilé des Thermopyles étant une glorieuse page de l’histoire de la Grèce (les trois cents spartiates étant morts jusqu’au dernier), cela donne au roman un souffle épique indéniable. En effet, trois cents Spartiates et leurs alliés y retinrent les envahisseurs pendant six jours. Puis, leurs armes brisées, décimés, ils furent contraints de se battre “avec leurs dents et leurs mains nues“, selon Hérodote, avant d’être enfin vaincus.

Les Spartiates et leurs alliés béotiens de Thespies moururent jusqu’au dernier, mais le modèle de courage que constitua leur sacrifice incita les Grecs à s’ unir. Au printemps et à l’automne de cette année-là, leur coalition défit les Perses à Salamine et à Platée. Ainsi furent préservées les ébauches de la démocratie et de la liberté occidentale.

Deux mémoriaux se dressent aujourd’hui aux Thermopyles. L’un, moderne, appelé “monument à Léonidas”, en l’honneur du roi spartiate qui mourut là, porte gravée sa réponse à Xerxes qui lui ordonnait de déposer les armes. Réponse laconique : Molon labe (“viens les prendre”).

L’autre, ancien, est une simple stèle qui porte également gravée les paroles du poète Simonide :

Passant, va dire aux Spartiates
Que nous gisons ici pour obéir à leurs lois.

Hérodote écrit dans ses Histoires : “Tout le corps des spartiates et des Thespiens fit preuve d’un courage extraordinaire, mais le plus brave de tous fut de l’avis général le Spartiate Dienekès. On rapporte que, à la veille de la bataille, un habitant de Trachis lui déclara que les archers perses étaient si nombreux que, lorsqu’ils décrochaient leurs flèches, le soleil en était obscurci. “Bien, répondit Dienekès, nous nous battrons donc à l’ombre.

«On finit ce livre essoufflé d’avoir combattu au coude à coude. C’est ce que j’appelle un roman homérique.» – Pat Conroy

Extrait 1: Le contraire de la peur (Trouvé sur le blog de notre lecteur Boreas)

medium_anciens_Grecs_sepia.jpgTandis que les autres chasseurs festoyaient autour de leurs feux, Dienekès fit place à ses côtés à Alexandros et Ariston et les pria de s’asseoir. Je devinai son intention. Il allait leur parler de la peur. Car il savait qu’en dépit de leur réserve, ces jeunes gens sans expérience de la bataille se rongeaient à la perspective des épreuves prochaines.

— Toute ma vie, commença-t-il, une question m’a hanté : quel est le contraire de la peur ?

La viande de sanglier était prête, nous mourions de faim et l’on nous apporta nos portions. Suicide vint, portant des bols pour Dienekès, Alexandros, Ariston, lui même, le servant d’Ariston, Démade et moi. Il s’assit par terre, près de Dienekès. Deux chiens, qui connaissaient sa générosité notoire à leur égard, prirent place de part et d’autre de Suicide, attendant des reliefs.

— Lui donner le nom de manque de peur, aphobie, n’a pas de sens. Ce ne serait là qu’un mot, une thèse exprimée comme antithèse. Je veux savoir quel est vraiment le contraire de la peur, comme le jour est le contraire de la nuit et le ciel est l’opposé de la terre.

— Donc tu voudrais que ce fût un terme positif, dit Ariston.

— Exactement !

Dienekès hocha la tête et dévisagea les deux jeunes gens. L’écoutaient-ils ? Se souciaient-ils de ce qu’il disait ? S’intéressaient-ils vraiment comme lui à ce sujet ?

— Comment surmonte-t-on la peur de la mort, la plus élémentaire des peurs, celle qui circule dans notre sang comme dans tout être vivant, homme ou bête ?

Il montra les chiens qui encadraient Suicide.

— Les chiens en meute ont le courage d’attaquer un lion. Chaque animal connaît sa place. Il craint l’animal qui lui est supérieur et se fait craindre de son inférieur. C’est ainsi que nous, Spartiates, tenons en échec la peur de la mort : par la peur plus grande du déshonneur. Et de l’exclusion de la meute.

Suicide jeta deux morceaux aux chiens. Leurs mâchoires happèrent promptement la viande dans l’herbe, le plus fort des deux s’assurant le plus gros morceau. Dienekès eut un sourire sarcastique.

— Mais est-ce là du courage ? La peur du déshonneur n’est-elle pas essentiellement l’expression de la peur ?

Alexandros lui demanda ce qu’il cherchait.

— Quelque chose de plus noble. Une forme plus élevée du mystère. Pure. Infaillible.

Il déclara que pour toutes les autres questions, l’on pouvait interroger les dieux.

— Mais pas en matière de courage. Qu’est-ce qu’ils nous apprendraient ? Ils ne peuvent pas mourir. Leurs âmes ne sont pas, comme les nôtres, enfermées dans ceci, dit-il en indiquant son corps. L’atelier de la peur.

» Vous autres, les jeunes, reprit-il, vous vous imaginez qu’avec leur longue expérience de la guerre, les vétérans ont dominé la peur. Mais nous la ressentons aussi fortement que vous. Plus fortement, même, parce que nous en avons une expérience plus intime. Nous vivons avec la peur vingt-quatre heures par jour, dans nos tendons et dans nos os. Pas vrai, ami ?

Suicide eut un sourire entendu. Mon maître sourit aussi.

— Nous forgeons notre courage sur place. Nous en tirons la plus grande part de sentiments secondaires. La peur de déshonorer la cité, le roi, les héros de nos lignées. La peur de ne pas nous montrer dignes de nos femmes et de nos enfants, de nos frères, de nos compagnons d’armes. Je connais bien tous les trucs de la respiration et de la chanson. Je sais comment affronter mon ennemi et me convaincre qu’il a encore plus peur que moi. C’est possible. Mais la peur reste présente.

Il observa que ceux qui veulent dominer leur peur de la mort disent souvent que l’âme ne meurt pas avec le corps.

— Mais pour moi, ça ne veut rien dire. Ce sont des fables. D’autres, et surtout les Barbares, disent aussi que, lorsque nous mourons, nous allons au paradis. S’ils le croient vraiment, je me demande pourquoi ils n’abrègent pas leur voyage et ne se suicident pas sur-le-champ.

Alexandros demanda s’il y avait quelqu’un de la cité qui témoignait du vrai courage viril.

— Dans tout Sparte, c’est Polynice qui s’en approche le plus, répondit Dienekès. Mais je trouve que même son courage est imparfait. Il ne se bat pas par peur du déshonneur, mais par désir de gloire. C’est sans doute noble et moins bas, mais est-ce que c’est vraiment le courage ?

Ariston demanda alors si le vrai courage existait.

— Ce n’est pas une fiction, dit encore Dienekès avec force. Le vrai courage, je l’ai vu. Mon frère Iatroclès l’avait par moments. Quand cette grâce le possédait, j’en étais saisi. Elle rayonnait de façon sublime. Il se battait alors non comme un homme, mais comme un dieu. Léonidas a parfois aussi ce type de courage, mais pas Olympias. Ni moi, ni personne d’entre nous ici. Il sourit. Vous savez qui possède cette forme pure du courage plus que tout autre que j’aie connu ?

Personne ne lui répondit.

— Ma femme.

Et se tournant vers Alexandros :

— Et ta mère, Paraleia. Ça me semble significatif. Le courage supérieur réside, il me semble, dans ce qui est féminin.

On voyait que ça lui faisait du bien de parler de tout cela. Il remercia ses auditeurs de l’avoir écouté.

— Les Spartiates n’aiment pas ces analyses, poursuivit-il. Je me rappelle avoir demandé à mon frère, en campagne, un jour qu’il s’était battu comme un immortel, ce qu’il avait ressenti au fond de lui. Il m’a regardé comme si j’étais devenu fou. Et il m’a répondu : « Un peu moins de philosophie, Dienekès, et un peu plus d’ardeur. » Autant pour moi ! conclut Dienekès en riant.

Il détourna le visage, comme pour mettre un point final à ces considérations. Puis son regard revint à Ariston, dont le visage exprimait cette tension que les jeunes éprouvent quand il leur faut parler devant des aînés.

— Eh bien, parle donc, lui lança Dienekès.

— Je pensais au courage des femmes. Je crois qu’il est différent de celui des hommes. Il hésita. Son expression semblait dire qu’il craignait de paraître présomptueux à parler de choses dont il n’avait pas l’expérience. Mais Dienekès le pressa :

— De quelle façon différent ?

Ariston jeta un coup d’œil à Alexandros, qui l’encouragea à parler. Le jeune homme prit donc son souffle :

— Le courage de l’homme quand il donne sa vie pour son pays est grand, mais il n’est pas extraordinaire. Est-ce que ce n’est pas dans la nature des mâles, que ce soient des animaux ou des humains, de s’affronter et de se battre ? C’est ce que nous sommes nés pour faire, c’est dans notre sang. Regarde n’importe quel petit garçon. Avant même qu’il ait appris à parler, l’instinct le pousse à s’emparer du bâton et de l’épée, alors que ses sœurs répugnent à ces instruments de conflit et préfèrent prendre dans leur giron un petit chat ou une poupée.

Qu’est-ce qui est plus naturel pour un homme que de se battre et pour une femme, que d’aimer ? Est ce que ce n’est pas l’injonction physique de la femme que de donner et de nourrir, surtout quand il s’agit du fruit de ses entrailles, ces enfants qu’elle a accouchés dans la douleur ? Nous savons tous qu’une lionne ou une louve risquera sa vie sans hésiter pour sauver ses rejetons. Les femmes agissent de même. Alors, observez ce que nous appelons le courage des femmes.

Il reprit son haleine.

— Qu’est-ce qui pourrait être le plus contraire à la nature d’une femme et d’une mère que de regarder froidement ses fils aller à la mort ? Est-ce que toutes les fibres de son corps ne crient pas leur souffrance et leur révolte dans cette épreuve ? Est-ce que son cœur ne crie pas : non ! Pas mon fils ! Épargnez-le ! Le fait que les femmes arrivent à rassembler assez de courage pour faire taire leur nature la plus profonde est la raison pour laquelle nous admirons nos mères, nos sœurs et nos femmes. C’est cela, je crois, Dienekès, l’essence du courage féminin et la raison pour laquelle il est supérieur au courage masculin.

Mon maître hocha la tête. Mais Alexandros s’agita. On voyait qu’il n’était pas satisfait.

— Ce que tu as dit est vrai, Ariston. Je n’y avais jamais pensé. Mais il faut dire ceci. Si la supériorité des femmes tenait à ce qu’elles sont capables de rester impassibles quand leurs fils vont à la mort, cela en soi-même ne serait pas seulement contre nature, ce serait aussi grotesque et même monstrueux. Ce qui prête de la noblesse à leur comportement est qu’elles agissent ainsi au nom d’une cause plus élevée et désintéressée.

320546spartitae2.jpgCes femmes que nous admirons donnent les vies de leurs fils à leur pays, afin que leur nation puisse survivre, même si leurs fils périssent. Nous avons entendu depuis notre enfance l’histoire de cette mère qui, apprenant que ses cinq fils étaient morts à la guerre, a demandé : « Est-ce que nous avons gagné ? » Et, quand elle a appris que nous avions gagné, en effet, elle est retournée chez elle sans une larme et elle a dit : « Dans ce cas, je suis contente. » Est-ce que ce n’est pas cette noblesse-là qui nous émeut dans le sacrifice des femmes ?

— Tant de sagesse dans la bouche de la jeunesse ! s’écria Dienekès en riant.

Il donna une tape sur les épaules des deux garçons, puis ajouta :

— Mais tu n’as pas répondu à ma question : qu’est-ce qui est le contraire de la peur ?

(…)

Je songeai au marchand éléphantin. Suicide était celui qui, dans tout le camp, s’était le plus attaché à ce personnage à l’humeur vive et gaie ; ils étaient rapidement devenus amis. À la veille de ma première bataille, tandis que le peloton de mon maître préparait le souper, ce marchand arriva. Il avait vendu tout ce qu’il avait et même sa charrette et son âne, même son manteau et ses sandales.

Et là, il circulait distribuant des poires et de petits gâteaux aux guerriers. Il s’arrêta près de notre feu. Mon maître procédait souvent le soir à un sacrifice ; pas grand-chose, un bout de pain et une libation ; sa prière était silencieuse, juste quelques paroles du fond de son cœur à l’intention des dieux. Il ne disait pas la teneur de sa prière, mais je la lisais sur ses lèvres ; il priait pour Aretê et ses filles.

— Ce sont ces jeunes hommes qui devraient prier avec autant de piété, observa le marchand, et pas vous, vétérans ronchonneurs.

Dienekès invita avec empressement le marchand à s’asseoir. Bias, qui était encore vivant, s’était moqué du manque de prévoyance du marchand ; comment s’échapperait-il, maintenant, sans charrette et sans âne ?

Éléphantin ne répondit pas.

— Notre ami ne s’en ira pas, dit doucement Dienekès, fixant le sol du regard.

Alexandros et Ariston étaient arrivés sur ces entrefaites avec un lièvre qu’ils avaient marchandé à des gamins d’Alpenoï. On se moqua de leur acquisition, un lièvre d’hiver si maigre qu’il nourrirait à peine deux hommes et certes pas seize. Le marchand sourit et regarda mon maître.

— Vous trouver, vous les vétérans, aux Murailles de Feu, c’est normal. Mais ces gamins, dit-il en indiquant d’un geste les servants et moi-même, qui sortions à peine de l’adolescence. Comment pourrais-je partir alors que ces enfants sont ici ? Je vous envie, reprit-il quand l’émotion dans sa voix se fut apaisée. J’ai cherché toute ma vie ce que vous possédez de naissance, l’appartenance à une noble cité.

Il montra les feux alentour et les jeunes et les vieux assis devant.

— Ceci sera ma cité. Je serai son magistrat et son médecin, le père de ses orphelins et son amuseur public.

Puis il nous donna ses poires et se leva pour aller à un autre feu, et encore un autre, et l’on entendait les rires qu’il déclenchait sur son passage.

Les Alliés étaient alors postés aux Portes depuis quatre jours. Ils avaient mesuré les forces perses sur terre et sur mer et ils savaient les dangers insurmontables qui les attendaient. Ce ne fut qu’alors que je pris conscience de la réalité du péril qui menaçait l’Hellade et ses défenseurs. Le coucher du soleil me trouva pensif.

Un long silence suivit le passage de l’éléphantin. Alexandros écorchait le lièvre et j’étais en train de moudre de l’orge. Médon bâtissait le feu sur le sol, Léon le Noir hachait des oignons, Bias et Léon Vit d’Âne étaient allongés contre un fût de chêne abattu pour son bois. À la surprise générale, Suicide prit la parole.

— Il y a dans mon pays une déesse qu’on appelle Na’an, dit-il. Ma mère en était la prêtresse, si l’on peut user d’un aussi grand mot pour une paysanne qui avait passé toute sa vie à l’arrière d’un chariot. J’y pense à cause de la charrette que ce marchand appelle sa maison.

On n’avait jamais entendu Suicide parler autant. Tout le monde croyait qu’il avait vidé là son sac. Et pourtant, il poursuivit. Sa prêtresse de mère lui avait appris que rien sous le soleil n’est réel ; que la terre et tout ce qu’il y a dessus n’étaient que des paravents, les matérialisations de réalités beaucoup plus profondes et plus belles au-delà, invisibles pour les mortels. Que tout ce que nous appelons réalité est animé par cette essence plus subtile, inévitable et indestructible.

— La religion de ma mère enseigne que seules sont réelles les choses qui ne peuvent pas être perçues par les sens. L’âme. L’amour maternel. Le courage. Ces choses sont plus proches des dieux parce qu’elles sont les mêmes des deux côtés de la mort, devant et derrière le rideau. Quand je suis arrivé à Lacédémone et que j’ai vu la phalange à l’exercice, j’ai pensé qu’elle pratiquait la forme de guerre la plus absurde que j’eusse vue.

Dans mon pays, nous nous battons à cheval. C’est la seule glorieuse manière de se battre, c’est un spectacle qui excite l’âme. Mais j’admirais les hommes de la phalange et leur courage, qui me semblait supérieur à celui de toutes les autres nations que j’avais vues. Ils étaient pour moi une énigme.

Mon maître écoutait avec attention ; il était évident que cette profusion de paroles de Suicide était pour lui aussi inattendue que pour tous les autres.

— Te rappelles-tu, Dienekès, quand nous nous battions contre les Thébains à Érythrée ? Quand ils ont flanché et pris la fuite ? C’était la première déroute à laquelle j’assistais. J’en étais horrifié. Existe-t-il quelque chose de plus bas, de plus dégradant sous le soleil qu’une phalange qui se désintègre de peur ? Cela donne honte d’être un mortel, d’être aussi ignoble en face de l’ennemi. Cela viole les lois suprêmes des dieux. Le visage de Suicide, qui n’avait été qu’une grimace de dédain, s’éclaira. Ah, mais à l’opposé, une ligne qui tient ! Qu’est-ce qui est plus beau, plus noble !

Je rêvai une nuit que je marchais avec la phalange, reprit Suicide. Nous avancions sur une plaine à la rencontre de l’ennemi. J’étais terrifié. Mes camarades marchaient autour de moi, devant, derrière, à droite et à gauche, et tous étaient moi. Moi vieux, moi jeune. J’étais encore plus terrifié, comme si je me désagrégeais.

Et puis ils se sont mis à chanter, tous ces moi, et, comme leurs voix s’élevaient dans une douce harmonie, la peur me quitta. Je me réveillai le cœur paisible et je sus que ce rêve venait des dieux. Je compris que c’était ce qui faisait la grandeur de la phalange, le ciment qui assurait sa cohésion. Je compris que cet entraînement et cette discipline que vous Spartiates aimez vous imposer, ne sert pas vraiment à enseigner la technique ou l’art de la guerre, mais à créer ce ciment.

Médon se mit à rire.

— Et quel ciment as-tu donc dilué, Suicide, qui fait qu’enfin tes mâchoires se desserrent avec une expansivité si peu scythe ?

Les flammes éclairèrent un sourire de Suicide. C’était, disait-on, Médon qui lui avait donné son surnom quand, coupable d’un meurtre dans son pays, le Scythe s’était enfui à Sparte et qu’il demandait à tout le monde de le tuer.

— Je n’aimais d’abord pas ce surnom. Mais avec le temps, j’en reconnus la profondeur, même si elle n’était pas intentionnelle. Car qu’est-ce qui est plus noble que de se tuer ? Pas littéralement, pas avec une épée dans le ventre, mais de tuer le moi égoïste à l’intérieur, cette partie de soi qui ne vise qu’à sa conservation, qui ne veut que sauver sa peau. C’est la victoire que vous, Spartiates, avez remportée sur vous-mêmes. C’était le ciment, c’était ce que vous aviez appris et qui m’a fait rester.

Léon le Noir avait écouté tout le discours du Scythe.

— Ce que tu dis, Suicide, si je peux t’appeler ainsi, est vrai, mais tout ce qui est invisible n’est pas noble. Les sentiments bas sont également invisibles. La peur, la cupidité et la lubricité. Qu’en fais-tu ?

— Oui, mais ils puent, ils rendent malade. Les choses nobles invisibles sont comme la musique dans laquelle les notes les plus hautes sont les plus belles. C’est une autre chose qui m’a étonné quand je suis arrivé à Sparte. Votre musique. Combien il y en avait, pas seulement les odes martiales et les chants de guerre que vous entonnez quand vous allez vers l’ennemi, mais également les danses, les chœurs, les festivals, les sacrifices. Pourquoi ces guerriers consommés honorent-ils la musique alors qu’ils interdisent le théâtre et l’art ? Je crois qu’ils sentent que les vertus sont comme la musique, elles vibrent sur des registres plus élevés, plus nobles.

Il se tourna vers Alexandros.

C’est pourquoi Léonidas t’a choisi parmi les Trois Cents, mon jeune maître, bien qu’il ait su que tu n’avais jamais fait partie des trompettes. Il croit que tu chanteras ici, aux Portes, dans ce sublime registre, pas avec ceci – et il indiqua la gorge – mais avec cela – et, de la main, il se toucha le cœur.

Puis il se ressaisit, soudain embarrassé. Autour du feu, tout le monde le regardait avec gravité et respect. Dienekès rompit le silence en disant, avec un rire :

— Tu es philosophe, Suicide.

— Oui, dit le Scythe en souriant, ouvre l’œil sur ça !

Un messager vint mander Dienekès au conseil que tenait Léonidas. Mon maître me fit signe de l’accompagner. Quelque chose avait changé en lui ; je le sentais à la manière dont nous traversions le réseau de sentiers qui s’entrecroisaient dans le camp des Alliés.

— Te rappelles-tu cette nuit, Xéon, où nous discutions avec Ariston et Alexandros de la peur et de son opposé ?

Je répondis que je me la rappelais.

— J’ai la réponse à ma question. Nos amis le marchand et le Scythe me l’ont soufflée.

Il parcourut du regard les feux du camp, les unités des nations assemblées et leurs officiers qui se dirigeaient vers le feu du roi, pour répondre à ses besoins et recevoir ses instructions.

— L’opposé de la peur, dit Dienekès, est l’amour.

Extrait 2: Qu’est-ce que la mort ?

Je me suis toujours demandé ce que c’était de mourir. Il y avait un exercice que nous pratiquions quand nous servions d’escorte et de souffre-douleur à l’infanterie lourde Spartiate. Cela s’appelait «le chêne», parce que nous prenions nos positions le long d’une rangée de chênes à la lisière de la plaine de l’Otona, où les Spartiates et les Néodamodes s’entraînaient l’automne et l’hiver.

Nous nous mettions en ligne par dix rangs, bardés sur toute notre hauteur de boucliers d’osier tressé, crantés dans la terre, et les troupes de choc venaient nous donner l’assaut ; elles arrivaient sur la plaine par huit rangs, d’abord au pas, puis plus rapidement et finalement en courant à perdre haleine.

Le choc de leurs boucliers tressés était destiné à nous épuiser et ils y parvenaient. C’était comme si l’on était heurté par une montagne. En dépit de nos efforts pour rester debout, nos genoux cédaient comme de jeunes arbres dans un tremblement de terre ; en un instant le courage désertait nos cœurs. Nous étions déracinés comme des épis morts sous la pelle du laboureur.

 

Sparte 02.jpg

 

Et l’on apprenait alors ce qu’était mourir. L’arme qui m’a transpercé aux Thermopyles était une lance d’hoplite égyptien, qui pénétra sous le sternum de ma cage thoracique. Mais la sensation ne fut pas ce qu’on aurait cru, ce ne fut pas celle d’être transpercé, mais plutôt assommé, comme nous les apprentis, la chair à hacher, l’avions res­senti dans la chênaie.
J’avais imaginé que les morts s’en allaient dans le déta­chement. Qu’ils considéraient la vie d’un regard sage et froid. Mais l’expérience m’a démontré le contraire.

L’émo­tion dominait tout. Il me sembla qu’il ne restait plus rien que l’émotion. Mon cœur souffrit à se rompre, comme jamais auparavant dans ma vie. Le sentiment de perte m’envahit avec une puissance déchirante. J’ai revu ma femme et mes enfants, ma chère cousine Diomaque, celle que j’aimais. J’ai vu mon père Scamandride et ma mère Eunice, Bruxieus, Dekton et Suicide, des noms qui ne disent rien à Sa Majesté, mais qui pour moi étaient plus chers que la vie et qui, maintenant que je meurs, me deviennent encore plus chers.

Ils se sont éloignés. Et moi, je me suis éloigné d’eux.

Extrait 3: [Polynice, un des meilleurs commandants spartiates, interroge le jeune Alexandros]

- Tu voulais voir la guerre, reprit Polynice. Comment avais-tu imaginé que ce serait ?

Alexandros était requis de répondre avec une parfaite brièveté, à la spartiate. Devant le carnage, ses yeux avait été frappés d’horreur et son cœur d’affliction, lui dit-on ; mais alors, à quoi croyait-il que servait une lance ? Un bouclier ? Une épée ? Ces questions et d’autres lui furent posées sans cruauté ni sarcasme, ce qui eût été facile à endurer, mais de manière froide et rationnelle, exigeant une réponse concise.

Il fut prié de décrire les blessures que pouvaient causer une lance et le type de mort qui s’en suivrait. Une attaque de haut devait-elle viser la gorge ou la poitrine ? Si le tendon de l’ennemi était sectionné, fallait-il s’arrêter pour l’achever ou bien aller de l’avant ? Si l’on enfonçait une lance dans le pubis, au-dessus des testicules, fallait-il la retirer tout droit ou bien prolonger l’estocade vers le haut, pour éviscérer l’homme ? Alexandros rougit, sa voix trembla et se brisa.

- Veux-tu que nous nous interrompions, mon garçon ? Cette instruction est-elle trop rude pour toi? Réponds de manière brève. Peux-tu imaginer un monde où la guerre n’existe pas? Peux-tu espérer de la clémence d’un ennemi? Décris les conditions dans lesquelles Lacédémone se trouverait sans armée pour la défendre.

Qu’est-ce qui vaut mieux, la victoire ou la défaite? Gouverner ou être gouverné? Faire une veuve de l’épouse de l’ennemi ou bien de sa propre femme? Quelle est la suprême qualité d’un homme? Pourquoi? Qui admires-tu le plus dans toute la cité? Et pourquoi? Définis le mot « miséricorde ». Définis le mot « compassion ». Sont-ce là des vertus pour le temps de guerre ou le temps de paix? Sont-ce des vertus masculines ou féminines? Et sont-ce bien des vertus?

De tous les pairs qui harcelaient Alexandros ce soir-là, Polynice n’apparaissait guère comme le plus acharné ni comme le plus sévère. Ce n’était pas lui qui menait l’ arosis et ses questions n’était ni franchement cruelles, ni malicieuses. Il ne lui laissait tout simplement pas de répit.

Dans les voix des autres, aussi pressantes que fussent leurs questions, résonnait tacitement l’inclusion : Alexandros était l’un des leurs et ce qu’ils faisaient ce soir-là et feraient d’autres soirs ne visait pas à le décourager ni à l’écraser comme un esclave, mais à l’endurcir, à fortifier sa volonté, à le rendre plus digne d’être un jour appelé guerrier, comme eux, et à assumer son rang de pair et de Spartiate.

Extrait 4. [L'armée perse s'avance, pour le premier affrontement]

Léonidas avait maintes fois recommandé aux officiers thespiens de veiller à ce que les boucliers, les jambières et les casques de leurs hommes fussent aussi brillants que possible ; et là, c’était des miroirs. Par-dessus les bords des boucliers de bronze, les casques rutilaient, surmontés par des crinières de queue de cheval qui, lorsqu’elles frissonnaient au vent, ne créaient pas seulement une impression de haute taille, mais dégageaient aussi une indicible menace.

Ce qui ajoutait au spectacle terrifiant de la phalange hellénique et qui pour moi était le plus effrayant, c’étaient les masques sans expression des casques grecs, avec leurs nasales épaisses comme le pouce, les jugulaires écartées et les fentes sinistres des yeux, qui recouvraient tout le visage et donnaient à l’ennemi le sentiment qu’il affrontait, non pas des créatures de chair comme lui-même, mais quelque atroce machine, invulnérable, impitoyable.

J’en avais ri avec Alexandros moins de deux heures auparavant, quand il avait posé son casque sur son bonnet de feutre ; l’instant d’avant, avec le casque posé posé à l’arrière du crâne, il paraissait juvénile et charmant, et puis quand il eut rebattu la jugulaire et ajusté le masque, toute l’humanité du visage était partie. La douceur expressive des yeux avait été remplacée par deux insondables trous noirs dans les orbites de bronze. L’aspect du personnage avait changé. Plus de compassion. Rien que le masque aveugle du meurtre.

 

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- Enlève-le ! Avais-je crié. Tu me fais peur !

Et je ne plaisantais pas.

Dienekès vérifiait à ce moment-là l’effet des armures hellènes sur l’ennemi. Il parcourait leurs rangs du regard. Les taches sombres de l’urine maculaient plus d’un pantalon, ça et là, les pointes de lances tremblaient. Les Mèdes se mirent en formation, les rangs trouvèrent leurs marques, les commandants prirent leurs postes.

Le temps s’étira encore. L’ennui le céda à l’angoisse. Les nerfs se tendirent. Le sang battait aux tempes. Les mains devinrent gourdes et les membres insensibles. Le corps sembla tripler de poids et se changer en pierre froide. On s’entendait implorer les dieux sans savoir si c’étaient des voix intérieures ou si on criait réellement et sans vergogne des prières.

Sa majesté se trouvait sans doute trop haut sur la montagne pour s’être avisée du coup du ciel qui précipita l’affrontement. Tout d’un coup, un lièvre dévala la montagne, passant entre les deux armées, à une trentaine de pieds de Xénocratide, le commandant thespien.

Steven Pressfield, Les murailles de feu, édité en mars 2007

jeudi, 11 septembre 2014

L’allégorie de la caverne au XXIème siècle

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L’allégorie de la caverne au XXIème siècle

Auteur : François Belliot

 

 

En repensant à l’allégorie de la caverne dans la République de Platon, j’ai été frappé par la ressemblance entre la situation des hommes enchaînés dans la caverne et condamnés à ne percevoir de la réalité que les ombres agités par des « marionnettistes », et celle des citoyens consommateurs abrutis par la propagande politique et commerciale que nous sommes devenus en ce début de XXIème siècle. Voici une version actualisée possible de « l’allégorie de la caverne ». Les deux personnages, Socrate, et Glaucon, sont conservés, et je colle largement à la trame utilisée par Socrate dans sa démonstration. J’ai conservé quelques morceaux intacts (dans la traduction sur laquelle je me suis basé). Pour que le lecteur comprenne pleinement l’approche, j’indique à la fin de l’article le lien renvoyant à la traduction de l’allégorie de la caverne sur laquelle je me suis basé.

Socrate : Je voudrais mon cher Glaucon, te montrer à quel point notre vision du monde est déterminée par l’éducation, et à quel point une éducation délibérément orientée dans une mauvaise direction, peut fausser le jugement dans des proportions étonnantes. Imagine un monde dans lequel les hommes vivent dans des villes ceintes de très hautes murailles et surplombées d’un dôme les isolant totalement de l’extérieur. Il y vivent depuis si longtemps qu’ils ont complètement oublié le souvenir de leur installation. Ils peuvent se déplacer, d’une ville à l’autre, mais uniquement dans des véhicules circulant dans un réseau souterrain. Ils ne peuvent donc s’aventurer en dehors des villes et des véhicules et voir de leurs propres yeux à quoi ressemble le « dehors ». A défaut de contact direct avec l’extérieur, les hommes de ce monde sont inondés d’une prodigieuse quantité d’informations sur le dehors diffusées par le biais de chaînes de radio, de télévision, de quotidiens, de magazines, et de livres. Ces médias présentent une diversité apparente : ils s’entendent pour exposer régulièrement leurs désaccords sur des points mineurs, donnant le sentiment aux hommes qu’ils peuvent choisir entre ces différents canaux d’information. Toutefois, sur la question la plus importante : « que se passe-t-il au dehors ? », ces médias sont unanimes pour peindre une réalité terrifiante, afin d’imprimer dans l’esprit des hommes que ces villes entièrement coupées du monde sont d’indispensables refuges. Sur toute la surface de la terre, dans toutes les villes, tous ces médias peignent le même tableau et adressent les mêmes mises en garde. Chaque fois qu’ils voyagent d’une ville à une autre, les hommes se rendent bien compte que l’information, malgré certaines particularités locales, est partout la même, ce qui renforce leur confiance en cette vision du dehors. Je dis « vision » car cette présentation du dehors est un mensonge organisé par une caste de marionnettistes qui sont parvenus, au fil des millénaires, à réduire le reste de l’humanité en esclavage. Au dehors, le monde est le même que celui dans lequel nous vivons, c’est à dire un monde vaste, magnifique, et peuplé d’innombrables espèces de plantes et d’animaux. Pour vivre l’existence libre et opulente à laquelle ils se croient seuls prédestinés, ces marionnettistes ont besoin du travail d’un grand nombre d’hommes, et comme en même temps ils les méprisent et ont horreur de se mélanger avec eux, ils ont mis au point ce complexe de gigantesques structures, dispersées un peu partout à la surface de la terre. Au sommet de chacune d’elles, à l’air libre, vit un petit groupe de marionnettistes qui assurent le fonctionnement de la structure. Ces marionnettistes ne se mêlent aux hommes d’en bas que pour les opérations de propagande destinées à conforter le formatage, et pour recueillir le fruit de leur travail. Dans les premiers temps, ils ont été contraints de recourir à l’extrême violence, mais par la suite ils se sont rendus compte qu’il était plus efficace de fabriquer le consentement de leurs esclaves, en leur enseignant une fausse histoire et en les abrutissant de propagande politique et commerciale. C’est ainsi qu’entrés avec des chaînes dans ces camps de concentration, ils ont fini par les considérer comme les derniers havres de liberté sur la terre. Du reste, les conditions de vie de ces hommes sont loin d’être atroces : ils vivent un peu entassés les uns sur les autres, ont peu de pièces dans leurs logements, mais ils mangent à leur faim, peuvent s’apparier avec qui ils l’entendent, et leur esprit est occupé par une multitude de divertissements en tous genres diffusés par les médias qui viennent adoucir la rudesse de leur quotidien. Pour donner encore plus d’assurance à leur emprise mentale, les marionnettistes ont créé et favorisé la diffusion d’une religion élevant le mensonge organisé en vérité éternelle, et promettant les pires châtiments envers ceux qui remettraient en cause la révélation.

Glaucon : C’est un monde terrifiant que tu me décris là, Socrate.

Socrate : C’est une fiction, Glaucon, rassure-toi. Des hommes réduisent en esclavage d’autres hommes depuis la nuit des temps, parfois sur une vaste échelle, mais personne n’a encore conçu un plan aussi machiavélique que celui-ci. Mon propos est simplement de te montrer combien il est difficile de se libérer d’une erreur, quand on y a cru pendant trop longtemps.

Glaucon : En tous cas ce sont d’étranges prisonniers.

Socrate : Et ils nous ressemblent pourtant. Dis moi… Penses-tu que ces hommes aient jamais vu autre chose que cette réalité du dehors complètement déformée par les médias qu’ils consultent quotidiennement et en lesquels ils se fient ?

Glaucon : N’oublies-tu pas internet dans ta liste de médias ? Avec internet, ils pourraient développer une forme d’autonomie.

Socrate : Non, les marionnettistes ont depuis longtemps interdit internet dans les villes. Les internautes vivant dans ces lieux confinés n’auraient de toute façon, comme tous les autres habitants, aucun moyen de savoir ce qui se passe « au dehors ».

Glaucon : Alors c’est impossible.

Socrate : Bref, pour tous ces hommes, le vrai n’est rien d’autre que l’ensemble de ces informations arrangées.

Glaucon : Absolument.

Socrate: imagine ce qui se passerait si l’un de ces hommes, étant parvenu grâce à un mélange de chance et d’ingéniosité à comprendre la manipulation, se mettait en peine de convaincre, dans un cadre privé, un individu absolument confiant dans ce système. La très longue imprégnation de cette « réalité », la perte d’habitude de l’esprit critique, les commandements « religieux » spécifiques instillés dès l’enfance, le caractère unanime de la vision du monde imposée dans les médias, tous ces conditionnements ne le rendraient-il pas incapable d’accepter une telle explication? Comment réagirait cet homme si cet aventurier lui disait que ce qu’il considère comme la réalité est un tissu de mensonges et d’illusions?

Glaucon : La vision du monde des marionnettistes lui semblerait plus vraie.

Socrate: Et si cet aventurier lui plaçait devant les yeux des preuves évidentes et lui expliquait de façon cohérente et détaillée le fonctionnement du dispositif, il se sentirait envahi d’un très profond mal-être et fuirait ou interromprait brutalement la conversation pour retourner vers ce à quoi il est habitué depuis toujours, trouvant ces illusions plus vraies.

Glaucon : Certainement.

Socrate : et si cet aventurier disposait de plus de temps pour lui expliquer. S’il disposait d’une période au cours de laquelle il pourrait exposer tranquillement ses preuves, dans le même temps où l’autre n’aurait plus accès aux informations diffusées dans les médias, dans un premier temps n’éprouverait-il pas les pires réticences à l’écouter et le suivre ? Ne serait-il pas dans un premier temps incapable de distinguer la moindre chose qu’il lui dit être vraie ?

Glaucon : Ce serait très difficile pour lui.

Socrate: En effet, il devrait s’habituer. Pour commencer il accepterait de remettre en cause quelques informations qu’il a lui-même jugées douteuses. Cette première prise de conscience ferait naître d’autres doutes sur d’autres aspects de la manipulation. Et c’est seulement après un long et éprouvant cheminement intérieur qu’il parviendrait à combiner ces différents aspects dans un cadre interprétatif permettant de comprendre la manipulation dans son ensemble. A la fin du parcours, il serait enfin en état de se mettre à penser par lui-même et passer au crible les mensonges des médias au moment où ils sont diffusés.

Glaucon : Effectivement.

Socrate: Et ne penses-tu pas, alors, qu’il s’estimerait heureux de ce changement ? Ne plaindrait-il pas ceux qui restent dans l’ignorance, qui continuent à croire à toutes les sottises débitées par les marionnettistes ?

Glaucon : Certainement.

Socrate: Tous les honneurs accordés à ceux qui croient avec le plus de ferveur aux informations sur le dehors, et qui œuvrent inconsciemment à la pérennisation de ce système, penses-tu que notre homme les désirerait ? Ne préférerait-il plutôt pas n’être qu’un laboureur dans la réalité, plutôt qu’un savant au royaume des apparences ?

Glaucon : Non seulement il ne voudrait plus jamais revivre comme avant, mais il en serait incapable.

Socrate : S’il retournait à la place qui était la sienne pendant la première partie de sa vie, et continuait à vivre comme avant, comme si rien ne s’était passé, ne serait-il pas profondément malheureux ?

Glaucon : Oui, certainement.

Socrate: S’il était amené à donner franchement son point de vue sur le mensonge organisé qu’il a mis à jour, ne ferait-il pas rire ? On penserait que ses recherches lui ont abîmé l’esprit, ont installé en lui une obsession, qu’il ne vaut même pas la peine d’y réfléchir un instant. Et s’il insistait et dévoilait tout le fond de sa pensée, ses semblables n’iraient-ils pas jusqu’à le calomnier et l’abandonner, voire le dénoncer et le mettre à mort ?

Glaucon : Sans doute.

Socrate: et s’il se mettait à s’exprimer trop publiquement, n’aurait-il pas à encourir les foudres des marionnettistes ?

Glaucon : Les marionnettistes ne sauraient en effet tolérer que leurs marionnettes accèdent à la conscience.

Socrate : Un homme sensé sait qu’il y a deux causes à l’aveuglement, lorsque les yeux passent de la lumière à l’obscurité, et lorsque les yeux passent de l’obscurité à la lumière. Le même aveuglement guette l’esprit. C’est pourquoi lorsque nous rencontrons quelqu’un qui s’exprime de manière confuse sur des sujets difficiles, il ne faut pas rire de lui, mais examiner si, venant de la lumière, c’est par manque d’accoutumance qu’il semble dans le noir, ou si montant vers la lumière, il est frappé d’éblouissement.

Glaucon : En effet.

Socrate : Il nous faut donc conclure que l’éducation n’est pas ce que certains affirment qu’elle est. Ils affirment que le savoir se situe quelque part, dans un domaine déconnecté de l’esprit, mais qu’ils sont capables de le faire entrer dans l’esprit ! Comme s’ils pouvaient faire entrer la vision dans des yeux aveugles !

Glaucon : C’est ce qu’ils affirment.

Socrate : Mon argumentation montre plutôt que la faculté d’apprendre et de se tromper est dans l’esprit de chacun.

Voici l’original, dans la traduction sur laquelle je me suis basé: http://www.cvm.qc.ca/jlaberge/103/TEXTES/Lectures/TE_Allegoriedelacaverne.pdf


- Source : François Belliot

dimanche, 17 août 2014

Agis IV, Sparta’s great reformer king

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Agis IV, Sparta’s great reformer king

All great cultures and nations that have arisen, and all those who are to come will one day decline and pass into history. This cyclical understanding is near universal. Societies do not decline however, entirely without an awareness of their decline. Like any organism that is sickly or wounded, society will show the symptoms of its decay, sometimes before it is too late and the course is not irreversible. History has given us many examples of men who, like canaries in a mine, warned of impending danger oftentimes losing their lives in the process. One of the finest examples is that of Agis IV, the Agiad king of Sparta. But first, a few remarks are necessary on the Spartan constitution and government before his time.

The Spartan constitution is perhaps one of the most unique in history. The Spartan state was for some time indistinguishable from the rest of the Greek poleis; its unique constitution was eventually decreed under one of the legendary sages of Greece, Lycurgus. Lycurgus aimed to make Sparta a militarized society that valued discipline, order and a strict hierarchy. The Spartan citizens were a warrior class able to form up at a moments notice to meet any threats. Spartans were known for their disdain for material wealth, their military prowess, and their system of a dual monarchy. Two kingly houses, the Argiad and the Eurypontid, traced their ancestry back to Hercules ruled Sparta for the length of its independent history, and were supported by five ephors, elected officials who were only permitted to remain in power for a year. Below these were a council of elders and a popular assembly. Sparta followed a strict hierarchy, only Spartan youths and a select few free men and helots were permitted to citizenship, and to be a Spartan meant to swear off trades or engage in any work outside of martial training and warfare, or travel outside of Sparta, unless on campaign or specifically permitted. The men were required to dine together from their adulthood to around their sixtieth year. Agricultural work, trade and craftsmanship were all done by either helots, the lowest class in the Spartan state, or perioeci, freemen without the privileges of citizenship. Despite its harsh nature, Spartan society proved resilient and Sparta remained one of the dominant states in Greece until the time of Alexander. Spartan soldiery enjoyed a reputation of near invincibility for most of this period, and even after its decline Spartans were highly prized as mercenaries.

Aristotle criticized the Spartan constitution in his Politics, writing that while it was suitable in war, it did not prepare Spartans to live in peace, and thus the very success of Sparta against Athens led to its ruin, through the influx of material wealth from its defeated foe. With no understanding of enjoying luxury in moderation, Sparta sunk into decadence. Its population had fallen perilously low, and the pool of citizens was shrinking to the point where only seven hundred families were considered Spartan, and of these only one hundred remained that possessed land. This was partially on account of a on the change in inheritance law, where before it would go to the son, after it could go to whomever one desired.

Agis was born into the wealthiest of the Spartan families and lived his early life in the luxury which Spartans had grown accustomed too, but was raised with a respect for Sparta’s great history, and its old ways which he resolved, before the age of 20 to adopt. He forsook the luxurious habits of his peers and donned the coarse cloak of the Spartans of old, and sought in every way to live by the laws of Lycurgus. He had his opportunity when he succeeded his father on the throne in 245 BC.

Those most opposed to Agis IV reforms were the older, established men who were used to their comfort and luxury and, to quote Plutarch,

The young men, as he found, quickly and beyond his expectations gave ear to him, and stripped themselves for the contest in behalf of virtue, like him casting aside their old ways of living as worn-out garments in order to attain liberty. But most of the older men, since they were now far gone in corruption, feared and shuddered at the name of Lycurgus as if they had run away from their master and were being led back to him, and they upbraided Agis for bewailing the present state of affairs and yearning after the ancient dignity of Sparta..”

Spartan women also tended to oppose his moves, as Spartan society gave them a unique control over the affairs of family estates, and thus, the riches of the family. They enlisted Leonidas II, the co king to their cause. Leonidas was himself given to luxury even beyond the rest, having been raised in the Seleucid court. He needed very little persuading in the matter and opposed Agis’ motions on the grounds of the disorder they would cause. Agis had key supporters, however, in his mother and grandmother, along with his uncle Agesilaus, and the ephor Lysander. With their assistance, he presented a motion to the council of elders calling for drastic reforms to bring Sparta back in accordance with the laws of Lycurgus, including a cancellation of all debts, redistribution of land into equal parts among the Spartans with the rest going to free men, the elevating of more of the free men to citizenship class to alleviate their dangerously low numbers. Agis IV gained even more fervent support when he vowed to redistribute and part with his own lands and wealth first and foremost, with his family doing the same. He managed to banish Leonidas on the grounds of both his foreign upbringing and foreign wife, both strictly forbidden by the laws of Lycurgus, and be replaced with his son in law, Cleombrotus, a man far more amendable to Agis’ aims.  Some in his camp around his uncle were eager to see Leonidas killed, but Agis, discovering this sent men to guard and escort Leonidas to safety. A more cunning, less morally scrupulous man than Agis would have no doubt allowed the conspirators to kill Leonidas, and be rid of a dangerous rival. This mercy would later contribute to his undoing.

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With the removal of Leonidas and the support of ephors, he pushed through his reforms until being summoned to war as part of his alliance with Aratas and the Achaean League. He collected an army and departed, eager to take an opportunity to display the reinvigorated spirit of Sparta.  His men, it is said eagerly marched behind the young king, and were marveled at by their allies for their discipline, order, and cheery disposition. While ultimately the campaign ended before any major engagement, Agis IV did Sparta no dishonor in this, fulfilling what was required of him by treaty and winning the respect of Aratas his fellow commander. Unfortunately, during his time away, he left the affairs of state in the hands of Agesilaus. While Agesilaus was a well regarded man, he had ulterior motives for supporting his nephew’s reforms; he had incurred significant debts that the reforms the king was pushing through would cancel out. He endeavored to push for the debt cancellation but delay the redistribution of land with the argument that the reforms should be carried out at a gradual pace, but once the first part was enacted, continually stalled on the second. This caused much chaos and disorder and left the Spartans yearning even for a return of Leonidas. At the same time, Lysander and Mandrocleides’ terms of office as ephors expired, and the new ephors were opposed to Agis’ designs.  Leonidas was able to return unopposed with mercenaries at his back. Agis and Cleombrotus sensed the danger and fled to sanctuaries of Athena and Poseidon respectively. Leonidas wasted no time deposing his son in law, exiling him rather than executing him at the behest of his daughter, leaving only Agis to deal with. Agis was protected for a time by some companions, who would escort him from the sanctuary to the public baths. This continued until these same companions persuaded by one Amphares, under pressure from Leonidas, betrayed him and dragged him to prison.

From his cell, Agis was ordered to defend himself and accused of bring disorder into Sparta.  Agis refused to denounce his conduct, insisting that he had acted of his own volition, with Lycurgus as his only inspiration. He stated that though he suffer the most severe punishment, he would not be made to renounce so noble an idea. He was sentenced to death accordingly, though those sent to execute him were reluctant to do so, for to spill the blood of a king and a man of such nature was a dishonor even to Leonidas’ hirelings.  One Damochares stepped forward for Leonidas and the ephors were eager that he be dispatched with haste as people had gathered by the prison, including Agis’ mother and grandmother demanding he be tried before the people, rather than Leonidas’ selected men.

Greek_Hoplite.jpgAgis was thus led to the execution chamber, and, according to Plutarch;

saw one of the officers shedding tears of sympathy for him. “My man,” said he, “cease weeping; for even though I am put to death in this lawless and unjust manner, I have the better of my murderers.” And saying these words, he offered his neck to the noose without hesitation.”

With this, Agis was executed via strangulation. His mother and grandmother were executed at the same spot after; both faced their end with bravery. Before her death, his mother is said to have uttered: “My son, it was thy too great regard for others, and thy gentleness and humanity, which has brought thee to ruin, us as well.”  Though Agis had failed, all was not lost to Sparta. Leonidas arranged for his widow to marry his son Cleomenes. Despite the circusmtances, the two developed mutual affection and the young Cleomenes was deeply impressed by Agis’ project. Upon taking the throne he enacted reforms himself, and led a resurgent Sparta against its enemies, becoming the last great king of Sparta.

Agis’s kingship only lasted four brief years yet he inspired one of his successor kings, Plutarch and countless others in later generations. Our interest in him comes from his embodiment of the ideal qualities of a true king. He wished to reform Spartan society and to bring it back into accordance with the laws of its illustrious past. His land reforms, redistribution and debt cancellation in other hands could have been seen as simply cheap populism meant to gain support and power. What separates Agis from a populist demagogue was his sincere desire to elevate Sparta spiritually. He wished to shake off its decadence and revive its old love of discipline, order and disdain for material gain. Sparta’s economic condition was of secondary importance. While his reforms would certainly have greatly improved the lot for its citizens and freemen, what was more important was they would restore Sparta’s honor and ensure its viability as a state long after his death.  He was more than happy to sacrifice wealth and even his life for this goal, when he could have at any point ceased or compromised. In his personal conduct as well he showed nobility to a fault- never resorting to foul means or dishonorable acts to see his plans through. Even at his end, Plutarch seems to imply the ephors gave him the opportunity to pass the blame to his uncle Agesilaus or the ephor Lysander for the chaotic state of affairs. He took full responsibility rather than speak against either man. He could have been forgiven for betraying Agesilaus to Leonidas, considering how much of the blame for his ruin rested on the shoulders of that man, yet he refused to do so, such was his character. If there were any faults in the man, it was naivety and good nature, and these can hardly be called faults.

jeudi, 24 avril 2014

300. Naissance d’une nation

300. Naissance d’une nation

par Thomas Ferrier

Ex: http://thomasferrier.hautetfort.com

 

300 La naissance d'un empire  FRenchLa suite attendue du film « 300 » de Zach Snyder, intitulée « l’Avènement d’un Empire » (Rise of an Empire), est récemment sortie sur nos écrans. A la musique, Tyler Bates a cédé la place à Junkie XL, qui nous propose une bande originale brillante, finissant en apothéose en mêlant  son dernier morceau à une mélodie de Black Sabbath.

Comme dans le premier film, c’est un récit qui nous est proposé, jusqu’à l’extrême fin. La reine spartiate Gorgo raconte ainsi la vie de Thémistocle, le héros athénien du film, jusqu’à ce que ses troupes interviennent d’une manière décisive à Salamine. Les nombreuses invraisemblances et les libertés prises avec l’histoire sont ainsi justifiées. Il faut les admettre pour profiter pleinement du message optimiste du film.

L’ouverture avec un Xerxès décapitant Léonidas mort correspond au récit traditionnel. Quant à la « naissance » du dieu-roi, concept contraire à la tradition zoroastrienne, grande oubliée du film, la jeunesse de Xerxès, assistant impuissant au parcours d’une flèche de Thémistocle perforant l’armure de Darius, son père, est narrée, ainsi que la manipulation dont il est la victime par Artémise, jouée par Eva Green, mégère inapprivoisée avide de sang vengeur.

A l’incendie de Sardes par les Athéniens, qui sera le véritable déclencheur de la guerre avec les Perses, le scénariste a préféré « accuser » Thémistocle, personnage tragique, à la fois responsable des malheurs de son peuple et vainqueur ultime de ses ennemis.

A la grandeur sobre et un peu égoïste de Léonidas dans le premier film, Thémistocle est un idéaliste, rêvant d’une Grèce rassemblée et même d’une nation grecque. Le voici émule avant l’heure d’Isocrate. Son discours sur la nécessaire unité de la Grèce au-delà des querelles de cités rappelle celui des véritables européistes, partisans d’une Europe-Nation. Gorgo est davantage souverainiste, estimant que Sparte a « assez donné », mais elle saura faire son devoir et venir en renfort. C’est ainsi que Spartiates et Athéniens unis écrasent la marine perse, tandis qu’Artémise meure dans les bras de son ennemi.

Et même le traître du premier film, le bossu Ephialtès, sert à sa manière la Grèce en invitant Xerxès à attaquer Thémistocle, alors qu’il sait que ce dernier a prévu un piège dans lequel les Perses vont s’engouffrer. Les Spartiates, à l’instar des Rohirrim menés par Gandalf dans « Les deux tours », arrivent à la rescousse, avec à leur tête une nouvelle Valkyrie, une Gorgo marchant l’épée dressée. Même si la Sparte historique traitait ses femmes avec une quasi égalité, on ne verrait pourtant jamais une femme au combat.

Si le message du premier film était celui opposant 300 Européens au monde entier, la dimension cosmopolite de l’armée perse a été adoucie. A l’exception d’un émissaire perse, vu dans le premier film, les généraux et soldats perses pourraient passer pour des Iraniens. En revanche, le message du second est offensif. Après la résistance, la reconquête. Certes, au bord de l’abîme, tout comme l’Europe ne s’unira qu’à proximité du tombeau, selon Nietzsche. La reconquête et l’unité. Tous les Grecs combattent désormais ensemble. Historiquement, c’est bien sûr faux. Thessaliens et Grecs d’Asie mineure étaient dans l’armée perse, et Thèbes jouait double jeu. La mort héroïque de Léonidas, habilement exploitée par Thémistocle, sert de mythe mobilisateur. La Grèce a eu ses martyrs. L'Europe n'a pas encore eu les siens.

Le message politique de Thémistocle, appliqué à la Grèce mais qui pourrait tout aussi bien l’être à l’Europe, est fort. La ruine d’Athènes, incendiée par Xerxès, est également un moment décisif du film. Bien que nous sachions que Salamine fut une victoire grecque, la dimension tragique de leur combat apparaît nettement. Monté sur un cheval de guerre qui saute de bâteau en bâteau comme s’il était Pégase, Thémistocle pourfend les ennemis de son épée, jusqu’à combattre et vaincre Artémise, tandis que Xerxès s’éloigne, sentant l’ombre de la défaite.

Le film est un hymne à l’unité de l’Europe, ce qui est bien surprenant pour une production américaine, au cœur même de l’assemblée d’Athènes. En pleine crise, la Grèce se retrouve à nouveau comme préfiguration de l’Europe de demain, qui reste à bâtir. Une Grèce qui lutte pour la démocratie autour d’Athènes, aidée d’une Sparte qui pourtant n’y croit guère. L’alliance d’Athènes et de Sparte, c’est l’alliance de l’Union Européenne et de la Russie face à un empire qui menace ses libertés, un empire qui a reçu l’aide de renégats (Artémise, Ephialtès) qui agissent contre leur propre peuple.

Thomas FERRIER (LBTF/PSUNE)

Aristote, « Politique ». Livre III – chap. IV

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« De même que chaque matelot est l’un des membres d’une communauté, ainsi en est-il disons-nous, du citoyen. Ces matelots ont beau différer par leur capacité (l’un est rameur, un autre pilote, un autre la vigie, un autre reçoit quelque autre dénomination du même genre), il est clair que la définition la plus exacte de la perfection de chacun n’est propre qu’à lui, mais qu’il y en aura également une qui sera commune et qui s’adaptera à tous : en effet, la sécurité de la navigation est leur tâche à tous, car c’est à cela qu’aspire chacun des matelots. Il en va donc de même des citoyens : ils ont beau être dissemblables entre eux, leur tâche, c’est le salut de la communauté. »

Aristote, « Politique ». Livre III – chap. IV.

mercredi, 23 avril 2014

Hercule, un Jésus européen ?

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Hercule, un Jésus européen?

par Thomas Ferrier

Ex: http://thomasferrier.hautetfort.com

« Hercules, the legend begins » est enfin sorti sur les écrans français après avoir connu un terrible échec commercial, il y a deux mois, aux Etats-Unis. On pouvait donc craindre le pire, malgré une bande annonce des plus alléchantes. Après avoir vu ce film, que j’ai pour ma part beaucoup apprécié, je m’interroge sur le pourquoi de cette descente en flammes et de ce qui a déplu à la critique.

Bien sûr, dans cette Grèce du XIIIème siècle avant notre ère, il y a de nombreux anachronismes comme des combats de gladiateurs ou encore la conquête de l’Egypte. Si de beaux efforts graphiques ont été faits, on se trouve dans une Grèce de légende, à mi-chemin entre la Grèce mycénienne et la Grèce classique. Et de même, la légende du héros, avec les douze travaux, est absente ou malmenée, alors que de nouveaux éléments s’ajoutent, comme une rivalité entre Héraclès et son frère Iphiclès. Tout cela a pu surprendre un public habitué à ces classiques.

Et pourtant de nombreuses idées audacieuses se sont glissées dans ce film et le rendent passionnant. Ainsi, la vie d’Hercule s’apparente par certains aspects à celle de Jésus. De nombreux films américains, à l’instar de Man of Steel, la comparaison implicite est patente. Dans « Hercules », elle est voulue mais détournée. Alcmène s’unit à Zeus sans que le dieu apparaisse, se manifestant par une tempête accompagnée d’éclairs. Cela ne vous rappelle rien ? De même, Hercule est fouetté et attaché par les deux bras dans une scène rappelant la crucifixion. Mais il en sort vainqueur, brisant ses liens, et écrasant grâce à deux énormes blocs de pierre attachés par des chaînes à ses bras tous ses ennemis. Enfin, il devient concrètement roi à la fin de son aventure, ne se revendiquant pas simplement « roi de son peuple » mais roi véritable.

Bien sûr, ce « Jésus » aux muscles imposants mais sobres, à la pigmentation claire et aux cheveux blonds, n’a pas la même morale. Fils du maître de l’univers, dont il finit par accepter la paternité, Zeus en personne, il tue ses ennemis, jusqu’à son propre père adoptif, combat avec une férocité qui en ferait l’émule d’Arès, et semble quasi insensible à la douleur. Une scène le présente même recevant sur son épée la foudre de Zeus qu’il utilise ensuite comme une sorte de fouet électrique pour terrasser les combattants qui lui font face.

Par ailleurs, la « diversité » est réduite à sa plus petite expression, limitée à des mercenaires égyptiens, crédibles dans leur rôle. Les Grecs en revanche sont tous bien européens, avec des traits parfois nordiques. Il n’est pas question comme dans « Les Immortels » ou « Alexandre » de voir des afro-américains en armure ou jouant les Roxanes. En revanche, on retrouve davantage l’esprit de Troie, l’impiété en moins. En effet, cette fois les athées ont le mauvais rôle à l’instar du roi de Tirynthe Amphitryon. Hercule lui-même, qui ne croit pas dans l’existence des dieux pendant une bonne partie du film, finit par se revendiquer explicitement de la filiation de Zeus et la prouver. En outre, Hercules rappelle par certains côtés le premier Conan, puisque le héros est trahi et fait prisonnier, puis s’illustre dans des combats dans l’arène d’une grande intensité, bondissant tel un fauve pour fracasser le crâne d’un ennemi, mais il reste toujours chevaleresque, protégeant les femmes et les enfants.

A certains moments, le film semble même s’inspirer des traits guerriers qu’un Breker donnait à ses statues. Kellan Lutz n’est sans doute pas un acteur d’une expression théâtrale saisissante mais il est parfaitement dans son rôle. Si les douze travaux se résument à étrangler le lion de Némée, à vaincre de puissants ennemis mais qui demeurent humains, et à reconquérir sa cité, son caractère semi-divin, même si le personnage refuse tout hybris, est non seulement respecté mais amplifié. En ce sens, Hercule apparaît comme un Jésus païen et nordique, mais aussi un Jésus guerrier et vengeur, donc très loin bien sûr du Jésus chrétien. Fils de Dieu, sa morale est celle des Européens, une morale héroïque.

Toutefois, bien sûr, certains aspects modernes apparaissent, comme la relation romantique entre Hercule et Hébé, déesse de la jeunesse qu’il épousera après sa mort dans le mythe grec, et le triomphe de l’amour sur le mariage politique. C’est bien sûr anachronique. Mais « la légende d’Hercule » ne se veut pas un film historique.

Enfin, la morale est sauve puisque dans le film, Héra autorise Zeus à la tromper, alors que dans le mythe classique elle met le héros à l’épreuve par jalousie, afin de faire naître un sauveur. Zeus ne peut donc être « adultère ». Cela donne du sens au nom du héros, expliqué comme « le don d’Héra », alors qu’il signifie précisément « la gloire d’Héra », expression énigmatique quand on connaît la haine de la déesse envers le héros. Pour s’exprimer, Héra pratique l’enthousiasme sur une de ses prêtresses, habitant son corps pour transmettre ses messages. C’est conforme à la tradition religieuse grecque.

Les défauts du film sont mineurs par rapport à ses qualités, graphiques comme scénaristiques, mais ce qui a dû nécessairement déranger c’est qu’il est trop païen, trop européen, trop héroïque, qu’il singe le christianisme pour mieux s’y opposer. Le fils de Dieu est marié et a un enfant (à la fin du film). Le fils de Dieu n’accepte pas d’être emmené à la mort mais triomphe de ses bourreaux. Le fils de Dieu devient « roi des Grecs ». Enfin le fils de Dieu apparaît comme tel aux yeux de tous et n’est pas rejeté par son propre peuple. Ce film ne pouvait donc que déranger une société américaine qui va voir des films où Thor lance la foudre, où Léonidas et ses « 300 » combattent jusqu’à la mort avec une ironie mordante, mais qui reste très chrétienne, très puritaine et hypocrite.

Thomas FERRIER (LBTF/PSUNE)

vendredi, 11 avril 2014

Jacqueline de Romilly: La grandeur de l'homme au siècle de Périclès

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Jacqueline de Romilly, La grandeur de l'homme au siècle de Périclès, Editions de Fallois, 2010.

Ex: http://cerclenonconforme.hautetfort.com

Helléniste française de renom international, membre de l’Académie Française, Jacqueline de Romilly est décédée en 2010. Quelques mois avant sa mort, elle écrivit (ou plutôt dicta) cet essai qui répondait à son triste constat quant à la réalité de notre époque : le niveau culturel baisse inexorablement et les textes antiques ne sont plus lus. Or, pour l’auteure, il est impératif de se ressourcer auprès de ces grands textes afin d’y trouver les réponses sur nous-mêmes et de préparer notre futur car « nous vivons une époque d’inquiétude, de tourments, de crise économique, et –par suite- de crise morale ». Cette louable préoccupation, qu’on retrouvait également chez Dominique Venner, explique pourquoi je me suis intéressé à cet ouvrage dont je vais tenter d’extraire plus bas les aspects qui m’ont le plus marqué.

1. Que signifie, pour les auteurs grecs de l’époque de Périclès (Vème siècle avant JC), cette idée, exprimée pour la première fois sans doute, de grandeur de l’homme ? 

romilly.jpgJacqueline de Romilly se base ici sur Sophocle et surtout Thucydide où elle décèle les éléments d’une sagesse politique tendant à des vérités valables pour le présent mais aussi l’avenir.

La grandeur de l’homme s’entend comme l’agrégat de plusieurs éléments: en plus de l’intelligence et de l’ingéniosité propres aux hellènes, c’est ce sentiment que la nature humaine dans ce qu’elle a de plus « humain » (égoïsme, paresse, passions –au mauvais sens du terme- diverses) se doit d’être dominée. « La grandeur de l’homme, nous dit effectivement J. de Romilly, c’est de s’élever contre sa nature ».

Dans sa Guerre du Péloponnèse, Thucydide faisait justement remarquer que nombre des acteurs politiques de l’époque étaient souvent mus par de bas mais très humains motifs personnels au lieu de rechercher avant tout le bien commun. Il soulignait par ailleurs que Périclès, à la différence de ceux-là, était honnête et incorruptible. Il disait la vérité au peuple et cherchait à le guider pour le bien de la cité. Voilà ce qu’est un dirigeant valable : un homme rempli de qualités morales qui fera rejaillir celles-ci chez le peuple qui a besoin de tels meneurs. Seul, le peuple ne peut en effet ni dominer sa nature ni tendre vers le supérieur car il lui manque des responsables exemplaires, disposant de hautes vertus, et donc, capables de le conduire vers davantage de grandeur. En effet, le peuple est trop marqué par sa nature profonde, sa légèreté et son manque de réflexion (il est ainsi capable de s’enthousiasmer facilement pour le premier démagogue venu), pour évoluer sans guides. Toute réussite politique est donc le fruit de la recherche du bien commun couplé à une morale forte. Elle implique la rencontre d’esprits éclairés et d’une base réceptive.

D’ailleurs, les points principaux de l’idéal politique de Périclès se retrouvent chez Thucydide (dans son oraison funèbre des morts, Livre II) : le respect des gens et de la loi, l’absence de trop de coercition, la participation à la vie publique (tout en ayant une vie privée), la célébration des fêtes, le respect des morts et de leur gloire passée, le courage et le dévouement à la cité. Cet ensemble de rites et de vertus cimentent la communauté dans la recherche du bien pour le plus grand nombre. Les citoyens sont donc fiers, responsables et peuvent mener un mode de vie éclairé par la liberté, ce qui les mène sur les chemins de la grandeur.

On pourrait par ailleurs ajouter à ce tableau idéal les idées que l’auteure n’évoque que trop rapidement : la morale qui perle à cette époque à propos de la solidarité, de l’indulgence et du pardon ou encore ce qu’on retrouve dans Socrate et Platon qui, d’un point de vue religieux, placent le but de l’homme dans son « assimilation à Dieu »…

2. En quoi la figure du héros tragique nous aide à mieux cerner ce qu’est la grandeur de l’homme ?

Se basant également sur les tragédies de la même époque se rapportant aux héros grecs, la grande helléniste nous montre un autre aspect de cette grandeur de l’homme à travers l’étude de leur sort.  Dans les tragédies d’Eschyle ou d’Euripide, les héros et leurs proches sont tous frappés de désastres et souffrent allégrement. Bien sûr, des personnages aussi différents qu’Œdipe ou Médée sont très souvent emportés par leurs passions, la première tue ses enfants pour se venger de Jason et le second (chez Euripide) tue toute sa famille. Pourtant, et ce point est fondamental, ils ne sont que des victimes de la volonté divine. Les dieux, par châtiment ou hostilité, inspirent démesure, folie ou actes insensés aux hommes et aux héros qui subissent cet « égarement » qu’ils craignent au plus haut point tant il est une menace pour leur dignité et leur grandeur. C’est un fait, l’homme (ou le héros qui est une sorte de demi-dieu) est fragile, voire minuscule face aux dieux.

Pourtant, même abattu ou humilié, le héros ne perd pas de sa grandeur. Le malheur le rend encore plus grand à nos yeux car il n’est pas synonyme d’abandon. Il prouve que le héros de la tragédie est prêt à tout pour atteindre son but : il accepte les épreuves et le sacrifice ultime : la mort.

Le spectacle répété des tragédies amenait ainsi le public à accéder à un monde de grandeur où se déroulait ce que Jacqueline de Romilly appelle « la contagion des héroïsmes ». La grandeur des héros pénétrait les habitudes de pensée des Grecs et influait sur leurs esprits et leurs idéaux. Savoir se sacrifier alors qu’on sait n’être que fragilité face aux dieux magnifie d’autant plus, chez l’homme, sa grandeur. D’ailleurs, l’exemple d’Ulysse qui fait face au courroux de Poséidon et à mille autres dangers le montre bien.

Les grecs n’étaient pas des optimistes béats et avaient bien conscience que l’homme mène une vie difficile où les épreuves et les pièges sont légions, avant tout à cause de sa fragilité et de sa nature intrinsèque. Pourtant, ils avaient fait le choix de dominer cela et de se vouer à un idéal supérieur, durable et beau, atteignable seulement par un travail constant sur soi impliquant efforts et triomphe de la volonté. Ils nous montraient un chemin, un élan intérieur, que nous devrions chacun essayer de suivre avec ardeur car tendre vers cette grandeur est un désir que nous nous devons de poursuivre en tant qu’Européens conscients de notre héritage et désireux de construire notre avenir. Car notre premier travail, il est à faire sur nous-mêmes. Et nous sommes notre premier ennemi.

Rüdiger

Note du C.N.C.: Toute reproduction éventuelle de ce contenu doit mentionner la source.

vendredi, 14 mars 2014

Spartan Women

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Spartan Women

Sarah B. Pomeroy
Spartan Women 
Oxford University Press, 2002

Ancient Sparta is known not only for its great warriors, but also for its unusual treatment of women. Further north in democratic Athens, modest women were rarely educated and mostly kept sequestered indoors. But in the militarist state of Sparta, the government insisted that both boys and girls be given an education from childhood. Boys were trained to be future warriors, and women to be the mother of warriors — a task that required a variety of skills.

Sarah B. Pomeroy, a professor at New York’s Hunter College and the Graduate Center at the City University, delves into the unique education and lifestyles of women in Sparta in Spartan Women. Although its primary focus is women, the reader will learn much in the book about the men in this city-state in the south-eastern Peloponnese, as well as about the lives of both men and women in classical Athens.

Women’s Education in Sparta

Compared to other Greek women, Spartans had vastly more free time to do what they wanted. One reason for this was because Sparta was highly dependent on the labor of slaves (called helots), and Spartan citizens were not allowed to engage in most forms of manual labor. This meant that even the women were free from much domestic drudgery. The men of Sparta were full-time warriors, and consequently, Spartan women were usually more cultured than the men. For example, girls were trained in singing, dancing, and playing instruments, and singing competitions often were held between individuals and rival choruses.

Pomeroy says that there is much reason to believe that literacy was common among women in Sparta. There are numerous references to women writing letters to their sons at war (usually these consisted of urging their sons to be brave warriors). And Spartan women also were encouraged in public speaking. In ProtagorasPlato even refers to the women of Sparta and Crete, who take pride in their educations and are skilled in philosophical debate. Common themes for women’s speeches included praising the brave and reviling cowards and bachelors. Another testimony to Spartan women’s education: The Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus said there were 17 or 18 women among Pythagoras’ 235 disciples; about one-third of the women were Spartans, while less than 1 percent were Spartan men.

Women could own land in Sparta, and by Aristotle’s time, they owned two-fifths of the land in Laconia. Another privilege of Spartan women, according to Pomeroy: “of all Greek women, Spartans alone drank wine not only at festivals, but also as part of their daily fare.” Although they could not vote, they participated in political campaigns and were said to have much influence over their husbands (according to Aristotle).

Spartan Women and Sports

Edgar Degas, “Young Spartans Exercising”

Spartan Women also details women’s role in sports, another area where they were able to receive training and to excel. Their training was similar to that of boys, but less intense. Women participated in trials of strength, racing competitions, wrestling, discus throwing, and hurling the javelin. Some athletic competitions were held in honor of female deities.

The encouragement of athleticism in women appears to be based on women’s role as mothers. According to Xenophon, Lycurgus (who created Sparta’s constitution) thought that having two physically healthy parents would be more likely to produce healthy offspring.

Young men and women often exercised in the nude, and there was even a “Festival of Nude Youths.” Confirmed bachelors, according to Plutarch, were banned from attending. For the others, it was a chance to view potential marriage partners.

Marriage in Sparta

Gustave Moreau’s depiction of Helen of Troy (Helen of Spara)

Spartan women were usually married at 18—later than other Greek women—and the marriages were unusual for Greece at the time. Unlike in Athens, where a 15-year-old girl might marry a man twice her age, Spartan couples were usually close to the same age. The men lived with other men in military groups until age 30, so there was no “nuclear family” until later in life. Husbands and wives were not encouraged to spend a lot of time together, the idea being that absence created stronger passions between the pair, and that the child resulting from a passionate union would be stronger.

The marriages in Sparta were “mostly monogamous.” Although couples were married, it wasn’t uncommon for a woman to have another man’s child than her husband’s, if the man could persuade the husband to allow it. As the population declined, men began fathering children with the helots (the children would be partial citizens); but the consequence was that their legitimate wives began having fewer children. There appears to have been no penalty for adulterous women, like in other parts of Greece where they could be punishable with death.

The Importance of Motherhood

Spartan Women spends many pages describing the role of motherhood in Sparta, since being a mother (particularly the mother of a brave warrior) was the highest honor for women. The only women who were permitted gravestones were priestesses and those who died in childbirth. Women spent much of their time actually involved with their children, since slaves did many of the domestic chores and families were provided with rations of food by the state. Women did work, but it was more as managers than as servants. Before the decline of Sparta, greed was considered a vice, so women’s pursuits were more centered on the arts and their children rather than accumulating material things. In fact, Spartan women were forbidden to wear gold or use cosmetics.

Because they were so involved with their children’s upbringing, women felt very responsible for their children’s successes (and failures) in life. Many of these attitudes can be found in Plutarch’s Sayings of Spartan Women, where he recounts women disowning and even killing cowardly sons.

One of Pomeroy’s most interesting discoveries involves the practice of infanticide. It’s a well-documented fact that deformed or weak babies would be thrown into a chasm on Mount Taygetos, a form of eugenics that ensured a strong military for the state, and that only worthy candidates would be awarded the land and education that was the right of every Spartan citizen. Pomeroy presents a valid case that female babies were not put to the same scrutiny as the males (except for obvious physical deformities). Not all male babies were capable of being warriors, but even the weakest female baby could grow into a mother of warriors.

Women and Religion in Sparta

Unlike most societies in ancient Greece, the private family religious cult was virtually unknown in Sparta. There are several main reasons for this: The first is because there was such an emphasis on community, so primary loyalty was to the state not the family. The militaristic nature of Sparta meant that transcendent values and actions were more important than biological ties (as evidenced by the willingness to kill family members). And finally, since married couples lived apart until the man was 30, and since children went away from home to be educated at a young age, the “family” as we think of it today was never very solidified.

Religion was important to women in Sparta, however. The popular cults for women included those of Dionysus, Eileithyia (a fertility goddess), Artemis, Hera, Helen of Troy, Demeter, Apollo, Athena, and Aphrodite. Spartan Women goes into details about each of these cults, and also discusses the role of women priestesses at various periods in the city-state’s history.

*  *  *

Spartan Women is scholarly and well-researched, yet written in an easy-to-understand style for a general audience. My only complaint is that much of the information is repeated at many places throughout the book — however, it is evidence of thorough research and ensures that you can read any chapter and receive all of the relevant information. I’d highly recommend it to anyone interested in the history of either Sparta or Athens, women’s roles in traditional societies, and women’s roles in pagan religions.

jeudi, 23 janvier 2014

Les Argonautes sont un exemple pour le monde d'aujourd'hui

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«Les Argonautes
sont un exemple pour le monde d’aujourd’hui,

perdu dans ses calculs mesquins»

Qui n’a entendu parler des 50 héros, menés par Jason, partis pour retrouver la Toison d’or ? Ils sont passés à la postérité sous le nom d’Argonautes (du nom de leur navire L’Argo)…

Entretien avec Dimitris Michalopoulos auteur deLes Argonautes

 

(Propos recueillis par Fabrice Dutilleul)

Pourquoi les Argonautes fascinent-ils toujours autant ?

Ils nous éblouissent même aujourd’hui, car ils étaient des héros au sens vrai du terme. Ils ont fait l’impossible : ils arrivèrent, en effet, au bout de la Mer noire, enlevèrent la Toison d’or en dépit des monstres qui y veillaient, échappèrent à leurs ennemis farouches, firent le périple de l’Europe et regagnèrent la Grèce via l’océan Atlantique. Autrement dit, ils sont un exemple pour le monde d’aujourd’hui, perdu dans ses calculs mesquins.

Comment êtes-vous parvenus à séparer ce qui appartient à la légende et ce qui appartient à l'histoire ?

En fouillant les sources grecques et latines ainsi que presque l’ensemble de la littérature contemporaine. À mon avis, il suffit de lire attentivement les textes anciens, pour comprendre très bien ce qu’il était vraiment passé pendant le voyage, voire la campagne, des Argonautes. 

Pensez-vous avoir fait un livre exhaustif ou y a-t-il encore, d'après vous, des choses à découvrir pour d'autres chercheurs ?

En ce qui concerne les Argonautes, non ! Je ne crois pas qu’il y a des choses à découvrir. En ce qui concerne toutefois les voyages des Anciens dans les océans et leurs campagnes en Amérique, oui… il y a toute une épopée à étudier et à écrire.

Y a-t-il encore un impact du voyage des Argonautes sur la Grèce actuelle… ou sur d'autres pays ?

Impact du voyage des Argonautes sur la Grèce actuelle ? Non, pas du tout (à l’exception, bien sûr, de quelques rares amateurs de l’Antiquité). À vrai dire, la Grèce d’aujourd’hui est plutôt hostile aux sciences de l’Homme, parmi lesquelles l’Histoire est toujours la prima inter pares. Or, c’est différent dans d’autres pays, oui ! En France et en Espagne, mais aussi dans des pays du Caucase, on m’a souvent posé la question : « Pourquoi a-t-on oublié les Argonautes, qui avaient parcouru l’Europe de l’est et laissé des traces presque  partout sur les côtes de notre continent ? » Je ne savais quoi répondre, car il me fallait faire toute une conférence sur la situation actuelle de la Grèce, ses liens brisés avec les Hellènes et les Pélasges  de l’antiquité etc. Voilà donc pourquoi je me suis mis au travail… et j’ai écrit mon livre sur les Argonautes et leur voyage.

Les Argonautes, Dimitris Michalopoulos, préface de Christian Bouchet, Éditions Dualpha, collection « Vérités pour l’Histoire », dirigée par Philippe Randa, 194 pages, 21 euros. 

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à renvoyer à : Francephi diffusion - Boite 37 - 16 bis rue d’Odessa - 75014 Paris - Tél. 09 52 95 13 34 - Fax. 09 57 95 13 34 – Mél. diffusion@francephi.com

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samedi, 07 septembre 2013

Nietzsche e o Mundo Homérico

Diane-Kruger-Helene-de-troie.jpg

Nietzsche e o Mundo Homérico

Por Carolina Figueroa León*
Ex: http://legio-victrix.blogspot.com
 
 
nag1.jpgNietzsche desde o princípio apresentou um apego ao mundo grego, uma idealização deste como estrutura social, ideológica e intelectual. Esta aproximação não é especificamente com a época clássica, mas com a época arcaica que é representada através dos poemas homéricos.
 
Tomando em conta que o ideal que surge neste período se baseia na luta de poder, na excelência de uma classe aristocrática que é representada através dos heróis e através da areté. Neste período em que o filósofo encontra a essência do grego, porque é o momento em que se desenvolve da melhor forma a condição inerente ao ser humano: o instinto e a vontade de poder. Portanto, ao tomar esta leitura deixamos de lado a visão de que estes poemas remetem necessariamente à época micênica, senão que por sua vez estão carregados de elementos ideológicos, morais e sociais correspondentes à época em que escreve Homero.
 
Para compreender como este ideal guerreiro baseado em uma moral agonística se encontra na sociedade aristocrática arcaica é necessário analisar a obra homérica, a qual se deve relacionar com o contexto do século VIII a.c. e desde aí contrastar com as posturas de Nietzsche, as quais se encontram em seus primeiros escritos mais filológicos como O Estado grego e A luta de Homero.
 
Portanto, é importante analisar o contexto histórico de enunciação destas epopeias, ver se este realmente se vê representado em ditas obras e finalmente analisar o problema a partir da leitura nietzschiana da cultura grega.
 
O mundo homérico e a moral agonística
 
O chamado mundo homérico é o que historicamente corresponde à época arcaica da cultura grega, em que se assentam as bases do crescimento e surgimento das grandes polis. Para Nietzsche é neste momento específico em que se daria o apogeu da cultura grega, não o mundo clássico que foi modificado pelo Romantismo e os filólogos classicistas: “Mas os gregos aparecem ante nós, já que a priori, precisamente pela grandeza de sua arte, como os homens políticos por excelência (...) Tão excessivo era nos gregos tal instinto (...) a expressão triunfal de tigres que mostravam ante o cadáver do inimigo; em suma, a incessante renovação daquelas cenas da guerra de Tróia, em cuja contemplação se embriagava Homero como puro heleno”[1].
 
Para começar esta análise é necessário nos remeter à época arcaica em si, para logo trabalha-la em comparação à homérica. A época arcaica é quando se destaca a imagem de um governo aristocrático precedente à democracia. Para autores como Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, este período é denominado a sociedade homérica, já que se baseia na mesma estruturação social que dão conta os poemas homéricos, posto que na cabeça da sociedade está o rei (Basileus) e este é secundado por aristocracia que na épica é representada na imagem dos heróis. Portanto, os pontos de reconstrução do ideal aristocrático se dão em Homero, quem logra encarná-los em seus poemas. Para Rodríguez Adrados isto se deveria a que o pensamento racional em que foi constituído esta aristocracia se baseia no mito principalmente.  Portanto, Homero plasma através de suas obras tal realidade, a qual se mescla com a mitologia existente de Micenas, mas por sua vez e com maior força aludindo a seu século [2].
 
Frente à utilização dos mitos como reconstrução de identidade e histórica, Rodríguez Adrados refere: “Se trata de uma sabedoria tradicional, de um espelho de conduta posto no passado e no aceitado tradicionalmente, que não tem porque ter uma coerência absolutamente rigorosa” [3].
 
Dentro deste tipo de sociedade vemos a imagem do homem que é similar aos deuses, com a única diferença que é mortal. Esta aristocracia por sua vez se caracteriza por uma moral agonística que se assenta nos valores como honra (time) e virtude ou excelência (aretê). Estes se encontram presentes já em grande medida na epopeia grega: “A moral da aristocracia grega é na epopeia essencialmente competitiva ou agonística” [4].
 
Esta imagem podemos percebê-la já que na maior parte do pensamento dos heróis, no caso da Ilíada, por exemplo: Glauco narra como seu pai Hipóloco o manda lutar a Tróia, o dizendo que é preferível que regresse morto, antes que derrotado e sem lograr ser o primeiro em batalha: “Me insto muitas vezes a ser o primeiro e me destacar entre os outros e a não desonrar a linhagem de meus pais que foram os primeiros em Feira e na vasta Licia” [5].
 
Frente a esta imagem da desonra da linhagem surge a noção de que o herói sempre deve ser virtuoso e é a partir deste elemento que surge o conceito de aretê. Esta excelência em primeiro momento se dá a nível de linhagem, já que sempre o herói é de uma família nobre. Esta traz o prêmio e a fama, o qual se demonstra através das botinhas que se recebia (Geras) logo depois da façanha.
 
A aretê que surge no ideal heroico é o que conforma a excelência da nobreza da sociedade arcaica, já que neste ideal assentam suas bases, que resgatam esses reis e heróis, porque são a representação de sua classe.
 
Finley também se refere á idéia que a aretê heroica é símbolo da nobreza quando nos afirma que isto se faz patente em Odisséia: “Particularmente na Odisséia, a palavra “herói” é uma expressão de classe para toda a aristocracia, e as vezes até parece compreender todos os homens livres”[6].
 
Podemos tomar o afirmado por Finley no seguinte fragmento da Odisséia: “Amanhã – indicou Atena a Telêmaco – convoca no ágora os heróis aqueus” [7]. É nesse sentido que a aretê se converte em um valor de ensinamento frente a esta sociedade. O que já é afirmado por Jeager em A Paideia [8] Para ele, o ideal de aretê é exemplificado através dos mitos heroicos. Precisamente neste sentido a educação do século VIII se baseia nas epopeias. Os cantos épicos se convertem em uma educação moral, em que se ensina que a aristocracia possui uma excelência que é natural. Mas apesar de ser uma condição imanente ao nobre, a aretê se deve demonstrar individualmente. Portanto, há que esforçar-se para conseguí-la, o que se vê na Ilíada quando nos narra que Aquiles foi treinado para vencer na arte da guerra por Fênix. O que nos apresente no canto IX quando Fênix trata de persuadir Aquiles para que volte a lutar com os aqueus: “O ancião cavaleiro Peleo quis que eu te acompanhasse no dia em que te enviar de Ptía a Agamenon. Todavia criança e sem experiência da funesta guerra nem do ágora (...) e me mandou que te ensinará a falar e a realizar grandes feitos (...) te criei até fazer-te o que és”[9].
 
Neste ponto vemos que não só importa a natureza especial do nobre, mas que há que desenvolvê-la e a partir disto é que se reconhece seu mérito.
 
Seguindo com as características desta excelência, surge a imagem da doxa, que se relaciona com a opinião que o resto possui do herói, é esta a que da posteridade e transcendência encarnada na Fama. Portanto, como antes mencionei, tal valor se representa através dos objetos materiais como os despojos de guerra. Portanto, a culminação desta doxa é a Glória ou kleos. Neste sentido ocorre a disputa entre Aquiles e Agamenon, já que ninguém dos dois pôde ficar sem uma escrava, que seja o exemplo tangível de seu triunfo. É por isso que a única forma para que Agamenon não perca sua honra ao entregar sua escrava a Apolo é remover a de Aquiles, posto que este é um igual.
 
Ao revistar este exemplo de Ilíada vemos que no mundo aristocrático não há uma diferença entre o parecer e o ser, ambos elementos são a mesma coisa, portanto, o que prima é a aparência principalmente. Devido a esta visão do homem é que surgiria a antes mencionada doxa que é a opinião, a que afirma o reconhecimento por parte do outro. Ao conseguir tal aceitação o herói pode chegar a tal (euphrosyne), que se representa através do despojo e do banquete “ O agathós ou homem destacado tem alguns meios de fortuna proporcionados. Isto se deduz do paralelismo que se estabelece entre a time ou honra de cada chefe e a parte de despojo que recebe”[10].
 
Outro ponto importante é o das riquezas, que também é outro componente da excelência. O qual se representa através das pertenças do oikos, tais como terras, gado, criados, escravos, etc. Todos estes bens se transmitem diretamente por via de herança. Daqui podemos desprender como nos afirma Rodríguez Adrados que, quando o nobre não pratica a guerra, desfruta da riqueza em seu lugar. Isto nos fica bastante claro na imagem do Banquete em Odisséia [11].
 
Para concluir este imaginário do mundo homérico me parece importante ressaltar que: “É uma sociedade voltada para o mundo, não a outra vida nem ao homem interior; mas com um ideal de heroísmo ao próprio tempo. O ideal se encarna no nobre, o homem superior ou excelente, cuja aretê é fundamentalmente competitiva, mas pode desembocar no sacrifício ou na alegria de um viver refinado” [12].
 
Diane-Kruger-Troie.jpgTomando esta citação compreendemos que a aristocracia se conforma a partir de sua riqueza, e devido a isto é fundamental entre os nobres fomentar vínculos com seus iguais, o qual se dá através da hospitalidade, já que se atende a alguém do mesmo valor moral e social. Neste sentido também se volta importante uma espécie de relação de parentesco dentro da que surge certo intercâmbio econômico representado em presentes (hedna). Na Odisséia se faz patente esta relação de hospitalidade através da narração da viagem de Telêmaco pelas cortes gregas, onde é bem recebido e por sua vez se atende tal como se formara parte da família, sem importar de onde venha, nem as fronteiras que os separam. Outro exemplo chave é o fato que conduz à Guerra de Tróia, a falta da hospitalidade de Paris (Alexandre) frente a Menelau ao raptar Helena.
 
A luta de Nietzsche
 
 O fascínio do filósofo pelo grego parte já de sua infância, na época em que vive com seu avô materno, quem o aproximará ao grego a partir das leituras de Homero que realiza. É neste ponto que o grego se converte em um refúgio para Nietzsche, quem detesta a educação petista na que cresceu, já que o grego se converte na antítese e anti-utopia frente á miséria de sua existência cotidiana cristã-protestante. A partir deste fascínio surge uma imagem do grego que irá contra o pensamento filológico de sua época, para quem a essência do grego se daria no século V ateniense, em pleno Classicismo. Para Nietzsche isto não é o grego, mas o pré-clássico, principalmente assentado no pré-socrático e em Homero.
 
O que se relaciona com as afirmações de Arsênio Ginzo em seu artigo “Nietzsche e os gregos”: “Nietzsche havia chegado cedo à conclusão de que a visão da Grécia transmitida pelo Classicismo alemão era instatisfatória. Já com anterioridade à publicação de O nascimento da tragédia, Nietzsche havia distanciado da imagem da Grécia dos clássicos alemães (...) A partir de 1869, quando começa sua atividade como professor em Basiléia, Nietzsche mostra claramente que resulta insatisfatória essa imagem da Grécia (...) A razão do rechaço nietzschiano consistia em que primeiro os clássicos e depois seus epígonos nos haviam transmitido uma imagem falsa da Antiguidade, uma <<falsa Antiguidade>>, idealizada, unilateral, domesticada” [13].
 
Este distanciamente o leva a afirmar que o centro de gravidade do grego já não é o século de Péricles, como afirmava o resto dos filósofos alemães de sua época, mas antes o século VI ou talvez antes: “Aqui se encontrariam a seu juízo os verdadeiros gregos, uma cultura grega todavia não falsificada nem debilitada, aqui residiria a <<origem criadora>> de uma cultura ocidental, a modo de referente paradigmático que lamentavelmente havia caído em esquecimento ou bem havia diluído seus perfis”[14].
 
Partindo desta imagem do grego contextualizada na época arcaica vemos que Nietzsche descobre neste o melhor exemplo da vontade de poder, a idéia de luta, de sobrepor-se ao outro, que define ao ser humano, o que estaria representado em Homero. E é neste contexto que se percebe a crueldade, a inveja, um gosto pela destruição, dando conta que a destruição é algo próprio do ser humano. Os gregos não forma deshumanos, mas os homems mais humanos dos tempos antigos. Aceitam, não inventam nada papra criar outra humanidade alternativa. A luta para Nietzsche é antes o fim da cultura e educação. E isto é o que afirma em seu texto A luta de Homero, onde a força do agon é o valor mais transcendente dentro da sociedade homérica. Esta imagem apontaria no pensamento do filósofo à noção de um grande desenvolvimento cultural, que só se havia logrado em tal sociedade. Ele não queria pensar na humanidade da antiga Grécia sem sua selvageria, na cultura em sua vigorosa natureza, nem na beleza de seu mundo sem todo o terrível e feio que formavam parte dele:
 
Assim vemos que os gregos, os homens mais humanos da antiguidade, apresentam certos traços de crueldade, de frieza destrutiva; traço que se reflete de uma maneira muito visível no grotesco espelho de aumento dos helenos (...) Quando Alexandre perfurou os pés de Batis, o valente defensor de Gaza, e atou seu corpo vivo ás rodas de seu carro para arrastá-lo entre as provocações de seus soldados, esta soberba nos parece como uma caricatura de Aquiles, que tratou o cadáver de Heitor de uma maneira semelhante (...)” [15]
 
Ao afirmar isto vai contra o otimismo do progresso que foi instaurado a partir do Iluminismo. Para Nietzsche o grego é a antítese do que odeia de sua época. Para ele os gregos seguem sendo o que haviam sido para os clássicos: paradigmas da humanidade, cultura do homem político, mas a imagem que tinha começou a oscilar entre a simplicidade da concepção clássico e o vigor, inclusive a atrocidade de uma cultura pagã, cujos valores representavam a antítese da história cristã.
 
É em meio a este ideal que começa a afirmar seu projeto de desmascaramento da cultura ocidental como uma luta, uma conquista e a partir disto se homologa com a sociedade homérica. Para ele tudo é visto como uma missão, os gregos eram construtores de cultura, de sua cidade, este não era um agon pessoal. De aí que Nietzsche não entenda o conceito de fama só como um reconhecimento egoísta que se comprova através dos bens materiais. E sim antes é outorgada pela coletividade. Por exemplo, a fama à que apela Aquiles tem que ver antes com a doxa, o que nos fica clarro através da idéia que os aqueus veem possível triunfo em Tróia se Aquiles não decide voltar a lutar. A partir deste exemplo podemos situar a idéia da individualidade que representa o herói para Nietzsche:
 
Cada ateniense, por exemplo, devia desenvolver sua individualidade naquela medida que podia ser mais útil a Atenas e que menos pudesse prejudica-la (...) cada jovem pensava no bem-estar de sua cidade natal, quando se lançava, bem à carreira, ou a tirar ou cantar; queria aumentar sua fama entre os seus; sua infância ardia em desejos de mostrar-se nas lutas civis como um instrumento de salvação para sua pátria (...)” [16] 
 
Analisando o texto O Estado grego de Nietzsche se visualiza seu ideal de um Estado orientado para a cultura, mas que deve ser fundamentalmente hierarquizado e fundamentado em base à escravidão. Nietzsche glorifica a pólis grega antiga como um arquétipo anti-socialista e anti-liberal. Uma sociedade hierarquicamente estruturada, cruelmente opressiva, cuja excelência cultural provém da implacável exploração dos escravos. Este ideal iria contra a organização burguesa da modernidade. Finalmente, quando conclui seu ensaio louva Platão como o grande teórico do Estado, mas o critica por ser o artífice da Idéia, que será o que ficará na criação do Cristianismo e uma filosofia metafísica. [17]
 
Outro dos pontos que resgata neste texto em relação á sociedade homérica é a noção de indivíduo excepcional que de desprende da imagem do herói, que possui virtude (aretê) e que é quem logra levar a cabo a culminaçãp da grande cultura e determinam o curso da história.
 
Em relação a esta idéia do homem excepcional podemos tomar em contra a noção do herói homérico seguindo as afirmações de Moses Finley em seu texto O mundo de Odisseu: “A idade dos heróis, tal como entendia Homero, foi, pois, uma época em que os homens superavam os padrões sucessivos de um grupo de qualidades específicas e severamente limitadas” [18].
 
A partir dessa noção de Finley podemos relacionar a visão do termo da individuação e por sua vez a imagem do gênio excepcional afirmada por Burckhardt.
 
Burckhardt em seus estudos relacionados com o Renascimento começa a afirmar que esta é a época em que surge a imagem do gênio, a idéia do desenvolvimento da individualidade do artista, elemento que romperia com o anonimato presente na arte da Idade Média. O que para ele se entenderia a partir do descobrimento do homem como homem. O artista agora aspira à fama terrestre, já não à espiritual tal como se via na Idade Média. Seu móvel é a glória, ser reconhecido por seus logros artísticos. Se perde totalmente a idéia medievalista do homem que vê a atividade terrestre como um passo ou preparação à vida celestial. O homem moderno ou renascentista para Burckhardt vê antes que a atividade que realiza  recai em seu presente e em suas glórias futuras, é antes um benefício imediato ao que pode ascender. É assim como Burckhardt afirma que este novo homem já não é passivo e receptivo, mas que antes se transforma em um grande criador. Um produtor de cultura. [19].
 
Esta idéia logo é aplicada por Nietzsche, quem entende a este gênio como um indivíduo excepcional que surge em toda sociedade como o artista ou militar. Tomando esta idéia, Nietzsche afirma o princípio de individuação que estará presente em sua obra O nascimento da tragédia. Este princípio se relaciona com a vontade individual que propõe Schopenhauer, a qual se relaciona com a denominada volição individual que é antes uma maniestação limitada da vontade que se daria a nível do mundo objetivo. Portanto, a vontade seria algo inconsciente que se manifesta no amor à vida de cada um dos indivíduos. A partir destas idéias afirma que o mais importante é entender que todos os fins que persegue o homem estão impulsionados por uma vontade que é original. A essência do mundo é a vontade, levada à vida mesma, sendo esta algo íntimo do ser, o que relacionamos com a noção do núcleo do indivíduo, com sua natureza humana [20].

nag2.jpg

 
E é neste sentido que se afirma que o Estado deve preocupar-se deste indivíduo excepcional, que afirma uma vontade natural de aspirar à glória, seguindo as afirmações de Burckhardt. Devido a sua genialidade, Nietzsche afirma que o resto do povo (laos) deve se submeter, já que graças a esta escravidão estes gênios podem ter o tempo suficiente para o ofício e em meio dele criar cultura:
 
Com o fim de que haja um terreno amplo, profundo e fértil para o desenvolvimento da arte, a imensa maioria, ao serviço de uma minoria e mais além de suas necessidades individuais, há de submeter-se como escrava à necessidade da vida a seus gastos, por seu plus de trabalho, a classe privilegiada há de ser subtraída à luta pela existência, par que crê e satisfaça um novo mundo de necessidades” [21].
 
Ao ofício a que se refere Nietzsche não é o que atualmente entendemos como Estado de não atividade, senão que pelo contrário tomando a noção de ofício grega em que os artistas só se dedicavam a produzir cultura. É a partir desta idéia que Nietzsche nos propõe que para os gregos o trabalho era vergonhoso e frente a isto os disse:
 
O trabalho é uma vergonha porque a existência não tem nenhum valor em si: mas se adornamos esta existência por meio de ilusões artísticas sedutoras, e lhe conferimos deste modo um valor aparente, ainda assim podemos repetir nossa afirmação de que o trabalho é uma vergonha, e por certo na segurança de que o homem que se esforça unicamente por conservar a existência não pode ser um artista” [22].
 
Neste texto também podemos ver que se desprende esta defesa da moral agonística grega, da luta, o uso da violência para poder criar cultura, de aqui que para ele a escravidão se converta em uma horrível necessidade:
 
Os gregos se revelaram com seu certeiro instinto político, que ainda nos estágios mais elevados de sua civilização e humanidade não cessou de advertir-lhes com acento bronzeado: “o vencido pertence ao vencedor, com sua mulher e seus filhos, com seus bens e com seu sangue. A força se impõe ao direito, e não há direito que em sua origem não seja demasia, usurpação violenta” [23]. 
 
Por sua vez através desta visão violenta, de destruição e força, Nietzsche nos afirma como exemplo Iliáda: “a expressão triunfal de tigres que mostravam ante o cadáver do inimigo; em suma, a incessante renovação daquelas cenas da guerra de Tróia, em cuja contemplação se embriagava Homero como puro heleno” [24].
 
Em relação à imagem do gênio extraordinário, Nietzsche toma Homero, o qual se afirma em seu texto Homero e a filologia clássica. Neste trabalho, apresentado na inauguração de sua cátedra de filologia em Basiléia, não se mete na questão homérica, senão que antes interessa o que este como figura em si simboliza. Deste ponto de vista para o filósofo, Homero se converte em um modo de viver, uma política, um ideal religioso e na criação de um panteão de deuses.
 
Resgata Homero como o indivíduo excepcional que logra sublimar  a tradição, posto que já não é o poeta quem possui uma vontade racional, portanto, nega o conceito de tradição homérica. Há para Nietzsche o desenvolvimento dinâmico de um poeta que se eterniza em um futuro. Para os filólogos da época, Homero recolhe uma tradição de muitos séculos, a concretiza e a escreve. Mas Nietzsche disse que Homero não é isso, que não há uma vontade, e sim uma dinâmica. Para ele a única forma de abordar Homero é através da arte, não da razão, escrevê-lo através da experiência: “a possibilidade de um Homero se faz cada vez mais necessária. Se desde aquele ponto culminante voltamos atrás, encontramos logo a concepção aristotélica do problema homérico. Para Aristóteles é o artista imaculado e infalível que tem perfeita consciência de seus meios e de seus fins; com isto se revela também com a ingênua inclinação a aceitar a opinião do povo que adjudicava Homero a origem de todos os poemas cômicos, um ponto de vista contrário á tradição oral na crítica histórica (...) é necessário perguntar-se se existe uma diferença característica entre as manifestações do indivíduo genial e a alma poética de um povo” [25].
 
A excelência da alma individual que não inventa nada, que eleva a outra categoria à alma popular. O que nos leva a entender que personagens como Homero não são mais uns, senão que sublimam, que são excepcionais e que levam a outra categoria a uma tradição, dado por sua individualidade, seu caráter excepcional: “Agora se compreende pela primeira vez o poder sentido das grandes individualidades e das manifestações de vontade que constituem o mínimo evanescente da Humanidade; agora se compreende que toda verdadeira grandeza e transcendência no reino da vontade não pode ter suas raízes no fenômeno efímero e passageiro de uma vontade particular; se concebem os instintos da massa, o impulso inconsciente do povo como a única primavera, como o único palanque da chamada história do mundo” [26].
 
Para Nietzsche. Homero não só recompilou a poesia oral, visto que sem a figura do bardo não existiria Ilíada Odisséia: “Nós acreditamos em um grande poeta autor da Ilídia e Odisséia; sem embargo, não acreditamos que este poeta seja Homero” [27]. Esta é uma visão muito distinta da que afirmam os estudiosos da questão homérica. Nietzsche afirma uma terceira visão, diferente da noção que foi afirmado, em que se vê Homero como um personagem qualquer. Nietzsche ao invés disso disse que suas obras são produto de uma excepcionalidade, o que se relacionaria com o princípio de individualidade que aparece em o nascimento da tragédia. De onde se desprende a idéia que os personagens individuais determinam o curso da história.
 
Como temos visto, Nietzsche é muito certeiro ao realizar uma leitura do mundo homérico, e tomar deste aquela idéia que através do ideal guerreiro se pode lograr antes de tudo produzir cultura, portanto, não é tão azaroso que em Grécia se tenha dado a grande formação da cultura de Ocidenten, o qual claramente só se pode conseguir a partir da guerra, a que eles chamavam polemos. Daqui que a educação que se recebera aludira exatamente a um ideal guerreiro baseado na noção de aretê, a qual se lograva tanto a nível de trabalho individual como por sua vez pelo simples fato de nascer nobre. Portanto, os gregos foram uma cultura que se educou e conformou na base da noção de uma moral agonística, em que sempre há um que é superior ao outro. Mas ambos heróis estão na mesma altura, já que ambos possuem as mesmas características de nobreza, entendida através do termo aristoi. Daqui que se repete potentemente a imagem de Heitor, quem Homero nos apresenta como o único herói que poderia competir com a potencialidade de Aquiles. Desde este ponto me parece interessante o resgate que realiza Nietzsche frente ao que o resto de seus contemporâneos haviam considerado dentro dos estudos filológicos o menos importante, o mais bestial, que não teria comparação com ao nível artístico do século V. E é neste sentido que depois da conclusão que se a sociedade arcaica não tivesse sido constituída a partir desta noção de agon, não se tivesse logrado mais adiante tais manifestações culturais tão magnânimas que nos tem deixado o século V ateniense.
 
***
 
*Carolina Figueroa León é bacharel em Humanidades e Ciências Sociais. Licenciada em Literatura Criativa da Universidade Diego Portais com um Menor em menção em Cultura Clássica. Estudante do Programa de Magíster em Estudos Clássicos da Universidade Metropolitana de Ciências na Educação (UMCE).
 
[1] Nietzsche, Friedrich, O Estado grego. (Obra Póstuma) Prólogo de um livro que não foi escrito, 1871, p. 6
 
[2] Ver Rodríguez Adrados, Francisco, La democracia ateniense, Editorial Alianza, España, 1998.
 
[3] Ibíd., p. 32
 
[4] Ibíd., p. 36
 
[5] Homero, La Ilíada, Canto VI, Editorial Plaza y Janés, Barcelona, 1961, p. 154
 
[6] Finley, M.I., El mundo de Odiseo, Fondo de Cultura Económica, España, 1995, p. 30
 
[7] Ibíd., p. 20
 
[8] Ver Jaeger, Werner. “Capítulo II: Cultura y educación de la nobleza homérica” en Paideia: los ideales de la cultura griega, Editorial Fondo de Cultura Económica. México, 2001, pp. 32-47.
 
[9] Homero, Op. cit., pp.226-228
 
[10] Rodríguez Adrados, Op. cit., p.39
 
[11] Ver Homero, La Odisea, Canto XVII. Se menciona um banquete no cual se encontram os pretendentes de Penélope.
 
[12] Rodríguez Adrados, Op.cit., p.38
 
[13] Ginzo, Arsenio, “Nietzsche y los griegos”, Polis. Revista de ideas y formas políticas de la Antigüedad Clásica, núm. 12, 2000, p.103
 
[14] Ibíd., p.106
 
[15] Nietzsche, Friedrich, La lucha de Homero. Prólogo para um libro que não foi escrito (Obra póstuma) (1871-72).
 
[16] Ibíd.
 
[17] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Op. cit., pp.1-9
 
[18] Finley, M. I., Op.cit., p.30
 
[19] Burckhardt, Jacob, La Civilización del Renacimiento en Italia, Vol. I (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), pp.143-174
 
[20] Véase Schopenhauer, Arthur, El mundo como voluntad y representación, 1844 (2º Edición, con los Suplementos).
 
[21] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Op. cit., 1871.
 
[22] Ibíd.
 
[23] Ibíd.
 
[24] Ibíd.
 
[25] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Homero y la filología clásica. Trabalho apresentado em Basilea no ano de 1869.
 
[26] Ibíd.
 
[27] Ibíd.

mardi, 07 mai 2013

Quel rôle les dieux grecs ont-ils joué dans la guerre de Troie ?

dieux-grecs-.jpeg

Quel rôle les dieux grecs ont-ils joué dans la guerre de Troie ?

Pierre Sineux

Ex: http://linformationnationaliste.hautetfort.com/

Au chant III de l'Iliade, Priam s'adresse à Hélène : "Tu n'es, pour moi, cause de rien, les dieux seuls sont cause de tout : ce sont eux qui ont déchaîné cette guerre" (III, 164-165). Les vieux Troyens, au demeurant, quand ils voient Hélène marcher sur les remparts, sont prêts à excuser tout à la fois Troyens et Achéens "si pour telle femme, ils souffrent si longs maux. Elle a terriblement l'air, quand on l'a devant soi, des déesses immortelles" (III, 156158). Hélène n'y serait pour rien ou plutôt, quand bien même y serait-elle pour quelque chose, ce serait la faute de cette part "divine" qui est en elle, cette beauté qui, précisément, la met du côté des dieux et matérialise une destinée de nature divine. Voyons les faits. Dans l'Iliade, il faut se rendre au chant XXIV pour trouver une allusion à l'événement qui déclencha la guerre de Troie alors que les dieux délibèrent au sujet du cadavre d'Hector, Héra, Poséidon et Athéna conservent leur rancune à l'égard de Troie et de Priam : "ils pensent à l'affront qu'en son aveuglement Pâris à ces déesses autrefois infligea : lors, dans sa bergerie elles étaient venues, mais il leur préféra celle qui lui fit don d'un objet de douloureux désir" (XXIV, 28-30). À Héra et à Athéna Pâris-Alexandre préféra Aphrodite qui lui fit don d'Hélène. Mais Pâris n'était en fait que l'instrument d'une querelle qu'aux noces de Thétis et de Pélée, Éris avait suscitée entre les trois déesses pour savoir laquelle des trois était la plus belle.

L'épisode figure dans les Chants Cypriens, une épopée perdue qui racontait les événements antérieurs à ceux qui sont évoqués dans l'Iliade, depuis les noces de Thétis et de Pélée jusqu'à la capture de Chryséis, la fille d'un prêtre d'Apollon, par Agamemnon. La guerre de Troie y apparaît en définitive comme le fruit d'un complot ourdi par Zeus et par Thémis. Zeus cherchait, en effet, à délivrer la terre du poids de tant de mortels ; Gaia, accablée par le nombre des hommes et par leur impiété, s'était plainte auprès de lui qui, d'abord, provoqua la guerre des Sept contre Thèbes puis qui, sur les conseils de Mômos ("Sarcasme"), maria Thétis à un mortel (ce sera Pélée et de l'union naîtra Achille) et engendra lui-même une fille très belle (de son union avec Léda naîtra Hélène). C'est ce qu'Euripide rappellera en faisant d'Hélène un instrument dont les dieux se sont servi pour dresser Grecs et Phrygiens les uns contre les autres "et provoquer des morts afin d'alléger la Terre outragée par les mortels sans nombre qui la couvraient" (Hélène, 1639-1642).

De l'origine de la guerre à l'histoire des batailles, tout, en apparence, dépend d'eux, l'idée même qui fait naître l'action puis le résultat d'une entreprise. D'emblée, à propos de la querelle entre Achille et Agamemnon, le poète le dit : "Qui des dieux les mit donc aux prises en telle querelle et bataille ? Le fils de Létô et de Zeus" (I, 8-9) : Apollon a vu l'un de ses prêtres, Chrysès, méprisé par Agamemnon (à qui il a refusé de rendre sa fille) et il descend des cimes de l'Olympe décocher, neuf jours durant, ses traits à travers l'armée jusqu'à ce qu'Achille appelle les gens à l'assemblée et que Calchas révèle l'origine de son courroux. On le sait, Agamemnon contraint de rendre sa captive, fera enlever Briséis, la "part d'honneur" d'Achille qui s'en va alors implorer sa mère. C'est précisément au moment où Zeus répond à la plainte de Thétis outragée en la personne de son fils qu'il fait parvenir un message à Agamemnon sous la forme d'un songe mensonger qui vient, alors que celui-ci est endormi, se poster au-dessus de son front : "Je suis, sache-le, messager de Zeus... Il t'enjoint d'appeler aux armes tous les Achéens chevelus – vite, en masse. L'heure est venue où tu peux prendre la vaste cité des Troyens. Les Immortels, habitants de l'Olympe, n'ont plus sur ce point d'avis qui divergent. Tous se sont laissé fléchir à la prière d'Héra. Les Troyens désormais sont voués aux chagrins. Zeus le veut" (Iliade, II, 26-33). Et puisqu'Agamemnon croit qu'il va le jour même prendre la cité de Priam, ignorant l'oeuvre que médite Zeus, il relance l'affrontement... Le monde homérique est donc peuplé de divinités en relation pour ainsi dire permanente avec les humains. Le dieu peut être favorable, défavorable, hostile ou bienveillant mais dans tous les cas de figures, il va de soi que son intervention est normale. On peut même aller jusqu'à dire que l'intervention des dieux est au coeur de la psychologie des héros d'Homère (Chantraine, 1952 : 48), ce que deux vers de l'Odyssée résument : "les dieux peuvent rendre fou l'homme le plus sage, tout comme ils savent inspirer la sagesse au moins raisonnable" (XXIII, 11-13).  

Si le dieu inspire la crainte ou la colère, donne l'élan de l'action, cela ne signifie pas que les héros sont dépourvus d'une volonté et d'un caractère qui leur sont propres. Causalité divine et causalité humaine coexistent, se doublent et se combinent comme le montre particulièrement la collaboration, voire la symbiose, qui se manifeste entre Athéna et Ulysse. Et lorsqu'à la fin de l'Iliade, Achille s'entend dire par Thétis que, selon la volonté de Zeus, il faut rendre le corps d'Hector, lui-même se laisse toucher par la pensée de son père que lui rappelle Priam, manque de se fâcher à nouveau, puis accepte... Dans de nombreux cas, au demeurant, ce sont les décisions prises par les héros et leurs actions qui poussent les dieux à intervenir : ainsi, quand Achille se bat avec Memnon, les deux mères divines, Thétis et Éos, entrent en scène. 

Ce rapprochement du divin et de l'humain commande en définitive la place des dieux dans l'épopée où le seuil que constitue l'immortalité tend à être sans cesse franchi. Achille est le fils de Thétis, Énée est le fils d'Aphrodite, Hélène est la fille de Zeus... Ces liens de parenté ne sont qu'un élément qui explique l'intérêt que les dieux manifestent à l'égard des hommes. Leur acharnement dans la lutte vient d'une façon générale de leur attachement pour certains mortels, leurs mérites ou leur piété – ou, inversement de leur aversion – et de la nécessité qu'il y a pour eux à exiger des honneurs de la part des hommes. Prenant parti pour les uns ou pour les autres – Héra, Athéna, Poséidon sont de tout coeur avec les Achéens, Apollon est tout entier du côté des Troyens, Aphrodite n'a d'yeux que pour Énée... – les dieux se retrouvent combattant les uns contre les autres.  

Or, précisément, tout à leur passion pour les affaires des hommes les dieux agissent et réagissent comme des hommes. Zeus a beau y faire, lui, le roi, l'aîné, le père souverain, il doit constamment rappeler à l'ordre sa famille prête à désobéir et à en découdre, ce qui ne manque pas de donner à l'épopée ici et là des allures de comédie. Et chacun de se quereller, de venir se plaindre à lui, de se moquer des uns et des autres. Et lui d'interdire aux dieux de se mêler de la guerre, de menacer de ses coups, de promettre le "Tartare brumeux" à ceux qui désobéissent. Lui-même craint sa femme, Héra, toujours prompte à le tancer : "... même sans cause, elle est toujours là à me chercher querelle en présence des dieux immortels, prétendant que je porte aide aux Troyens dans les combats" (Iliade, I, 518-521). Celle-ci peut le berner, en éveillant son désir puis en l'endormant (Iliade, XIV, 158-350) pour laisser Poséidon donner toute sa mesure dans le secours qu'il apporte aux Achéens. Ces histoires tout humaines dont l'épopée regorge mettent en lumière le caractère anthropomorphique des dieux et les limites de leurs pouvoirs.

On comprend alors que lorsque les dieux descendent de l'Olympe pour intervenir directement dans la mêlée, c'est sous une forme humaine, en prenant, le plus souvent, l'aspect d'un proche de la personne à qui ils veulent apparaître. Ce type d'épiphanie est fréquent : Aphrodite apparaît à Hélène sous les traits d'une ancienne servante mais elle est reconnue : sa gorge splendide, sa belle poitrine, ses yeux fulgurants sont ceux d'une déesse (Iliade, III, 396-398). Athéna vient au secours de Diomède qui la reconnaît et s'installe sur son char, saisissant le fouet et les rênes pour conduire les chevaux contre... le dieu Arès (Iliade, V, 839-842). Souvent, le dieu se cache dans une nuée aux yeux de la foule et ne se laisse voir que par le personnage à qui il veut se manifester : Apollon se fait reconnaître auprès d'Hector (Iliade, XV, 247-266) mais, au milieu des Troyens, il s'enveloppe d'un nuage (307). Parfois, lorsque le dieu apparaît sous les traits d'un proche, il peut laisser les mortels dans l'illusion : Apollon apparaît à Hector sous les traits de son oncle maternel, le vieil Asios, l'encourage à repartir au combat mais reste incognito (Iliade, XVI, 718). Les personnages d'Homère s'attendent à tout moment à rencontrer un dieu sous une forme humaine ; d'où la crainte, dans la bataille, de se trouver face à face avec un dieu : "Serais-tu quelque Immortel descendu des cieux ? Je ne saurais combattre une des divinités célestes" crie Diomède à Glaucos (Iliade, VI, 128). S'il arrive parfois que les dieux interviennent dissimulés, par une métamorphose, dans le corps d'un animal par exemple, la norme est bien une représentation anthropomorphique des dieux.  

On peut donc dire qu'en jouant leur rôle dans la guerre de Troie, les dieux révèlent, par la grâce du poète, leur anthropomorphisme, non seulement plastique mais fondamental : les dieux agissent et se conduisent comme des hommes. Autrement dit, la poésie épique donne une forme organique et visible à la sphère du divin et, en faisant des dieux les protagonistes d'un récit, elle leur attribue les qualités spécifiques aux individus : ils ont un nom, une "personnalité" et un caractère particuliers (Vegetti, 1993 : 388). Et pourtant... Les dieux sont bien différents. D'une certaine façon, ils apparaissent comme des héros dont l'areté (la valeur) aurait été poussée jusqu'à ses extrêmes limites : ils les surpassent par la beauté, la force, l'intelligence. L'éclat surgit dès qu'il est question d'un dieu. Laissons parler Thétis : "Zeus à la grande voix, assis à l'écart, sur le plus haut sommet de l'Olympe aux cimes sans nombre" (Iliade, I, 498-499). À cette image de la majesté divine, il faut ajouter ce trait qui change tout : les dieux sont immortels. Après avoir donné à Pélée des chevaux immortels qui pleurent la mort imminente de leur jeune maître Achille, Zeus se lamente : "Pauvres bêtes ! Pourquoi vous ai-je donc données à Sire Pélée - un mortel ! – vous que ne touche ni l'âge ni la mort ? Est-ce donc pour que vous ayez votre part de douleurs avec les malheurs humains ? Rien n'est plus misérable que l'homme entre tous les êtres qui respirent et marchent sur la terre" (Iliade, XVII, 443-447). Affirmation d'une supériorité qui fait des dieux des maîtres fondamentalement séparés des hommes.  

Nul doute que lorsqu'elle prend forme, l'épopée a pour toile de fond quantité de récits mythiques traditionnels sur les divinités et les puissances naturelles qui habitent et dominent le monde. Mais le plus remarquable est que pour faire le récit des derniers jours de la guerre de Troie, le poète, en sélectionnant, en mettant en œuvre et en réélaborant un immense matériau, a esquissé pour les siècles à venir la figure de ce qu'est un dieu grec.

Editions Klincksieck

vendredi, 15 mars 2013

What's Wrong with Democracy? From Athenian Practice to American Worship

zzAcropole-Athene-Grece.jpg

Reseña

 
Loren J. Samons II:
What's Wrong with Democracy?
From Athenian Practice to
American Worship.*
University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2004, 307 pp.


por Erwin Robertson

Ex: http://erwinrobertson.blogspot.com/

L. J. Samons II es especialista en Grecia clásica, autor de obras como Empire of the Owl: Athenian Imperial Finance (Stuttgart, 2000) y Athenian Democracy and Imperialism (Boston, 1998). En What's Wrong with Democracy? (“¿Qué hay de malo con la democracia?”) analiza críticamente la práctica política ateniense en los ss. V y IV, con la mirada puesta en la democracia norteamericana de hoy. Uno de esos casos, pues, en que el estudio del pasado se vuelve juicio sobre el presente... y a la inversa.

Los puntos de vista del autor son heterodoxos, por decirlo suavemente: cuestiona la “fe” en la democracia, el “culto” (american worship) rendido a un sistema de gobierno cuyas virtudes se dan por aceptadas sin que medie demostración racional. LJS cree que las (buenas) cualidades que tradicionalmente se asocian con la democracia vienen de la existencia de un cuerpo ciudadano con derechos y deberes, y del gobierno de la ley, cosas que pueden ser separadas de la democracia per se. Cree más: que los valores democráticos propiamente tales (que se puede resumir en el igualitarismo y la noción de que la voluntad popular, expresada a través del voto, es moralmente buena), que han llegado a ser los principios morales y sociales fundamentales de la sociedad norteamericana, ahora amenazan la forma constitucional representativa de su gobierno.

Los Fundadores de la constitución norteamericana (James Madison, por ej.) desconfiaban de la democracia “pura”, tal como se practicó en la Atenas clásica. Sólo en el curso del s. XX los norteamericanos llegaron a identificar a su gobierno como una “democracia” –señala LJS-, a la vez que se imponía la creencia de que era el mejor régimen posible; pero ello fue justo en el momento en que la palabra perdía mucho de su significado originario. Atenas, en un tiempo un modelo, ahora suele estar bajo crítica, no porque fuera demasiado democrática (como pensaban los Fundadores), sino porque no realizó suficientemente los ideales democráticos. Así y todo, porque era (en todo o parte) democrática, Atenas antigua se beneficia del prejuicio moderno favorable a la democracia. ¿Y si los aspectos más problemáticos fuesen justamente los democráticos? Es característico el tratamiento de la muerte de Sócrates, aduce LJS; como un accidente o una anomalía que no autoriza un juicio sobre el régimen político que lo condenó: ¡casi como si Sócrates hubiera cometido suicidio!

Se trata entonces de examinar la historia ateniense, tal como fue, a fin de ver si de ella se puede extraer lecciones para la política y la sociedad modernas. Por lo tanto, un primer capítulo de la obra proporcionará información general sobre el tema; sucesivos capítulos pasarán revista a otros tantos aspectos de la demokratía ateniense. “Democracia y demagogos: Elección, votación y calificaciones para la ciudadanía” es el título del capítulo 2. Al contrario de lo que se estima en las democracias modernas, LJS recuerda que el voto no era un procedimiento definitorio de la democracia (la regla democrática era el sorteo, como advertía Aristóteles) . Sin embargo, cargos importantes, como el de strategós, eran elegidos por votación. Característicos de la democracia ateniense fueron asimismo la ausencia de calificaciones de propiedad para la ciudadanía y el hecho de que los ciudadanos más pobres recibieran, en distinta forma, pagos del tesoro público. No obstante, la noción de ciudadanía en Atenas difería de la de los modernos regímenes democráticos, donde se asocia primeramente con derechos y privilegios, más que con las calificaciones que requiere o los deberes que implica. Además, muchas de las garantías que comporta se consideran “derechos humanos” (comillas de LJS), que no dependen –se dice- o no deberían depender de la forma particular de régimen o de la distinción entre ciudadanos y extranjeros. Por el contrario, en la democracia ateniense la ciudadanía significaba serias obligaciones, incluso ciertos patrones de conducta privada, recuerda el autor.

El capítulo sobre las finanzas públicas (“the People's Purse”) subraya el carácter excepcional de Atenas entre las ciudades griegas: en primer lugar, por su riqueza en mineral de plata y por la flota de guerra que ella permitió. Con el imperio y el tributo de los “aliados”, en el s. V, pudo manejar recursos financieros sin comparación en Grecia antigua. Fue igualmente inusitado que el ateniense común, al que no se pedían requisitos de propiedad para votar en la asamblea, comenzara a decidir entonces sobre materias financieras. LJS señala el empleo abusivo de esos recursos (así lo era a ojos de todos los demás griegos) en pagos a los propios ciudadanos y en un extraordinario programa de obras públicas. Cuando se agotaron las reservas, como durante la Guerra del Peloponeso, o cuando dejaron de existir las rentas imperiales, como en el s. IV, Atenas debió gravar a sus ciudadanos ricos. Es agudísima la observación de que, con todo, a la hora de gastar, los atenienses giraban sobre sus propias reservas; la deuda pública moderna consiste en traspasar la deuda de una generación a otra.

La política exterior del s. V está tratada en dos capítulos. Evidentemente, los temas son la construcción del imperio, las circunstancias que llevaron a la gran guerra inter-helénica que fue la Guerra del Peloponeso, y las de la guerra misma. Un interesante excursus aborda el problema de la causalidad histórica, a propósito de la Guerra del Peloponeso. Para el s. IV (tema del capítulo que sigue), el problema es el de la “Defensa Nacional”, no ya el de una política imperial. De una Atenas agresiva, se pasa a una Atenas a la defensiva que terminará por sucumbir ante Filipo de Macedonia. Con todo, el triunfo de Macedonia no era inevitable, como no había sido inevitable el triunfo de los persas –con fuerzas mucho mayores- siglo y medio antes.

En “Democracia y Religión”, último capítulo, LJS recuerda que la sociedad ateniense era una integral society, sin la separación entre las esferas política, religiosa y económica, propia de las sociedades modernas. En Atenas, lo puramente “político”, en el sentido limitado moderno –lo relativo al gobierno, a las elecciones y a las opiniones al respecto- era sólo una pequeña parte del conjunto social. Sin duda, las actividades militares y religiosas disfrutaban de una participación pública mucho más elevada que la votación en las asambleas. Más que de demokratía o de los ideales de “libertad e igualdad” –comillas de LJS-, los principios unificantes del cuerpo ciudadano ateniense provenían de las creencias comunes acerca de los dioses, de un sentimiento de superioridad nacional y de la conciencia de la importancia de cumplir los deberes hacia los dioses, la familia y la polis.

Ahora bien, la tesis central de LJS es que, mientras que los logros por los que se admira a Atenas –el arte, la tragedia, la filosofía- no tenían que ver con la democracia, fue el carácter democrático del régimen lo que estimuló los aspectos más negativos. Si el pueblo decidía sobre la distribución de fondos públicos a sí mismo, eso tenía que alentar el desarrollo de los demagogos: era fácil para un político asegurar la propia elección o el éxito de las propias iniciativas mediante la proposición de repartir más dinero público a una porción suficientemente amplia de los ciudadanos. Es cierto que Pericles (como muestra Tucídides) fue capaz de “conducir al pueblo más que ser conducido por él”, y de persuadirlo a tomar decisiones impopulares, pero correctas desde el punto de vista del dirigente (que era el de la grandeza imperial de Atenas). Capaz también de enfrentar a ese pueblo, corriendo el riesgo de destitución, multas, ostracismo y hasta de la pena capital; muy a la inversa del “timid modern statesman, afraid even to suggest that 'the American people' might be misguided”. LJS penetra en el mecanismo psicológico del voto y cree poder establecer que el ciudadano medio, en el momento de elegir, no preferirá a los candidatos que se vean muy superiores a él o que le digan lo que no quiere escuchar. Es lo que parece haber ocurrido después de la muerte de Pericles. En el s. IV, Demóstenes se verá en apuros para convencer a los atenienses a destinar los recursos (entonces escasos) a las necesidades de la defensa antes que al subsidio del teatro. El autor repara también en la perversión que, a su juicio, constituye la reverencia por el acto mismo de votar, antes que por el sentido de la decisión –el “proceso” es más importante que el “producto”-, con la conclusión práctica: “any immoral or unwise act –whether it is executing a great philosopher or killing civilians while making undeclared war on Serbia or Iraq- can be defended on the grounds that it reflects the results of the democratic process”.

Tempranamente (s. VI), Atenas mostró ambiciones imperiales; y si suele hacerse una lectura humanista y liberal del Discurso Fúnebre de Pericles, el autor muestra que su tono es “militaristic, collectivist..., nationalistic". La democracia sólo exacerbó esta política. Los atenienses fueron plenamente conscientes de que la guerra y del imperio generaban ingresos que los beneficiaban directamente, lo que estimuló los aspectos más agresivos e imperialistas de la política exterior. Es claro que el pueblo aprobó todas las empresas que implicaban someter, expulsar de su territorio o exterminar a otros griegos. Si la democracia no fue la causa de la Guerra del Peloponeso, lo menos que se puede decir –en opinión de LJS- es que no hizo nada por poner fin a la guerra. Con todo, los atenienses en el s. V por lo menos arriesgaban sus vidas, en el ejército y en la flota. Mas en el s. IV estaban menos dispuestos a sacrificios para fortalecer y proteger el Estado y llegaron a pensar que tenían derecho a recibir pagos, existiera el imperio que proveía de rentas o no, y estuvieran o no cubiertas las necesidades de la seguridad nacional. El dêmos desalentaba a los individuos ricos y capaces de entrar al servicio del Estado; es shocking la frecuencia con que los generales eran juzgados y multados o condenados a muerte. Cuando llegó la hora de enfrentar el creciente poder de Filipo de Macedonia, los atenienses nunca quisieron sacrificar la paga por la asistencia a la asamblea y el subsidio del teatro para sufragar los gastos militares necesarios. Prefirieron escuchar a los oradores que les tranquilizaban con la perspectiva de la paz, antes de decidirse a una política exterior que protegiera a sus aliados –mientras los tuvieron.

Llegados a este punto, puede uno preguntarse que puede inferirse del funcionamiento de la democracia ateniense para la democracia moderna. LJS se detiene en un aspecto. A diferencia de la democracia antigua, que reposaba sobre un conjunto de sólidos valores comunes, independientes de la misma democracia, la moderna (en particular, la norteamericana, para el autor) ha debilitado esos valores, o prescindido de ellos. La democracia ha sido elevada al nivel de creencia religiosa (the American religion). Los nuevos valores moralmente aceptados e indiscutibles son freedom (para cualquier cosa que uno desee), choice (respecto de lo que sea) y diversity (en cualquier plano). Estas palabras resuenan en los corazones de los ciudadanos del modo como antes resonaban “God, family, and country”. Mientras parece perfectamente aceptable en algunos círculos reprender a alguien por sostener opiniones políticamente “incorrectas”, el hecho de hacer ver a otra persona que sus actos son moralmente equivocados y socialmente inaceptables, es en sí mismo considerado grosero, si no inmoral. Pero ninguna sociedad con valores reales (es decir, no los valores vacíos de libertad, elección y diversidad, advierte LJS) puede subsistir bajo reglas que impiden la reafirmación de esos valores mediante la desaprobación pública y privada de los individuos que los violan.

Como conclusión, el autor compara las figuras de Pericles y Sócrates. No enteramente homologables, desde luego: Pericles era principalmente político (“statist”, dice LJS) y ponía el servicio del ciudadano al Estado por sobre otras cualidades; su declarado objetivo era la grandeza de su patria. Sócrates, principalmente “moral”: para él, no era el poder del Estado el fin que debía perseguir el individuo, sino el mejoramiento de la propia alma. Mas tanto el uno como el otro arriesgaron sus propias vidas al servicio de su patria, su piedad religiosa (demostrada en el culto público) estaba conforme a lo que pensaban sus conciudadanos, subordinaron la ganancia personal a sus ideas sobre justicia o servicio público y fueron, cada uno a su modo, líderes dispuestos a correr grandes riegos por decir lo que juzgaban era necesario decir. No fueron totalmente exitosos: “Both might have been surprised to learn that we have taken the Athenian political system, stripped away its historical and social context, and raised it from a simple form of government to the one remaining Form of virtue”.

Las tesis de What's Wrong with Democracy resuenan inusuales y hasta provocativas, no sólo en Estados Unidos. Aquí nos interesan particularmente en lo que tienen que ver con la historia griega antigua. En este sentido, la obra de LJS es un completo y muy documentado resumen sobre la historia política de la época clásica, recogiendo la discusión historiográfica relevante del último tiempo. Algunas observaciones podemos permitirnos a este respecto. Ciertamente, la democracia ateniense no era nada pacifista, ni humanitaria ni especialmente tolerante; pero tampoco lo era Esparta, cuyo régimen político es habitualmente considerado oligárquico (podemos aceptar que los espartanos, por razones que ellos bien sabían, no estaban tan dispuestos a ir a la guerra como los atenienses). Los “crímenes de guerra” –para emplear la terminología moderna- abundaron por lado y lado durante la Guerra del Peloponeso –como en toda guerra, sin duda. La democracia ateniense, no por confiar el gobierno a una muchedumbre no calificada, fue particularmente ineficiente; por el contrario, manejaron sus finanzas bastante bien (aunque seguramente la Guerra del Peloponeso tuvo un costo mayor del previsto por Pericles) y su política exterior no dejó mucho que desear, al menos en el s. V (Tucídides contrasta la eficacia ateniense con la lentitud espartana). La paga por las funciones públicas, vista como una forma de corrupción por algunas de nuestras fuentes –y LJS parece compartir la opinión-, era necesaria, si se quería que el régimen fuera efectivamente democrático (Aristóteles señalaba las condiciones para ello) y, además, imperial (la flota era maniobrada en gran parte por los propios ciudadanos). El autor, por fin, adopta el punto de vista habitual en gran parte de la historiografía de los ss. XIX y XX sobre la decadencia de Atenas en el s. IV, un punto de vista que ya ha sido contrastado (nosotros mismos nos hemos referido al tópico en “La decadencia de la Polis en el siglo IV AC: ¿'mito' o realidad?”, Revista de Humanidades, U. Andrés Bello, Santiago, vol. 13, 2006, pp. 135-149).

Como quiera que juzguemos las opiniones políticas del autor, las cuestiones que plantea no son irrelevantes. Sin duda se puede sacar lecciones prácticas del funcionamiento del sistema político ateniense; de fondo, empero, es la pregunta de si ha existido una sociedad que no se funde en un mínimo de valores estables compartidos –no sólo “procedimentales”. Atenas puede ofrecer respuestas a estas preguntas. Como siempre, el mundo clásico tiene algo que decir a las inquietudes del hombre contemporáneo.
 
 

*Publicado en revista Limes N° 21, Santiago, 2009, pp. 174-178.

jeudi, 08 novembre 2012

Lycurgus & the Spartan State

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Lycurgus & the Spartan State

By Mark Dyal

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

“And Theompopus, when a stranger kept saying, as he showed him kindness, that in his own city he was called a lover of Sparta, remarked: ‘My good sir, it were better for thee to be called a lover of thine own city.’” – Plutarch[1]

Lycurgus-9389581-1-402.jpgJust as Mussolini looked to Ancient Rome for the model of a healthy, organic society, the Ancient Romans looked to Sparta. In the first century (A.D.), as Rome continued its imperial ascent to near-hemispheric domination, the distance between the virtuous Republican nobility and the garish imperial nobility began to alert many to the potential for social degeneration. One of these was Plutarch, a Roman scholar of Greek birth.

Plutarch is best known for his series of parallel lives of the most virtuous Greeks and Romans, written to explain the particular virtues and vices that either elevate or subordinate a people. His “Life of Lycurgus,” then, is less a celebratory tale of the legendary king who transformed Sparta from typical Greek polis into the greatest warrior state in Western history than a description of that state. Its lessons are no less astounding to contemporary Americans than they were for Imperial Romans. And, while many Greek, Roman, and contemporary writers have explored the origins of warrior Sparta, Plutarch’s “Life of Lycurgus” remains the only necessary source on the subject.

Lycurgan Sparta was born of decadence. As the mentor of the young Spartan king Charilaus, his nephew, Lycurgus played a Cato-esque role. He imparted conservative and austere virtues to the young king, seeking to stem the love of money and ostentatious displays among the city’s nobility. When this tactic ran afoul of the Spartan elite, Lycurgus left the city and traveled around Greece and Asia. He discovered the Homeric epics and visited the Oracle at Delphi. There, Apollo’s priests told him that under his guidance a state would become the most powerful in Greece. So, with Apollo’s backing, he returned to Sparta and was given legal command of the city.[2] He immediately established a social system in which decadence would be impossible.

Lycurgus sought above all to end the vanity, weakness, and extravagance of the Spartan people. Politically, he devised a dually senatorial and monarchical governmental system that governed for the good of the state, not just its wealthiest citizens. Before Lycurgus, the kings of two royal families ruled Sparta, a model already designed to limit tyranny. In adding the senate, Lycurgus sought only further political stability,[3] understanding that democracy was only as valuable as its subjects were noble.[4]

So whereas the Athenians made democracy the reason of the state, Lycurgus made nobility the rationality of Spartan life. Individual Spartan lives were subordinated to that one ideal.[5] But what made Lycurgan nobility so extraordinary was, one, that it was attainable only by the bravest, strongest, and most accomplished warriors – and their women; and two, the lengths to which the state went in breeding this type of nobility.

Just as we have seen in Italian Fascist thought,[6] Lycurgus was interested in human instincts. Contextually speaking, however, we do not give the latter as much credit as the former. For Lycurgus was living at a time far removed from modern assumptions about the separation of mind and body. The Greek ideal, then, was possible precisely because the body was understood to be an outward manifestation of the mind. What is remarkable in Lycurgan Sparta, though, is the understanding of the link between instinct and conception; and it is this understanding that made warriors the most noble of nobles. In other words, Spartan training was not designed to create warrior bodies and concepts, but warrior instincts, of which the bodies were mere symptoms. Thus the importance placed on ethics and environment, as we will see below.

Lycurgus took one ideal and made it the aim of the state and its subjects. But while Greek nobility had become associated with hereditary wealth, creating a self-perpetuating system of luxury and quality (to which moderns owe much of the value of the Hellenic legacy, in particular) Lycurgus transvaluated nobility, making it instead something attainable only in violent service (and the preparation thereof) to the state. He felt more profoundly than other Greeks the relationship between nobility and the human form – conceptually and physiologically – and the idea of training these in concert. And, he reformed the Spartan state to become a factory of bodily nobility. It was his social and physiological reforms to this end that were critical to Sparta’s transformation, establishing, as they did, the messes, agōgē (meaning abduction but also leading and training), and eugenics that gave content to Sparta’s warriors.

Lycurgus’ first tasks, like establishing the senate, were designed to change the immediate political and social climate of the city. He redistributed all the land in Sparta so that each citizen family had a small plot of land to cultivate. He also banned coined money, instituting instead the trade in vinegar-soaked iron bars, thus making it virtually impossible to amass wealth.[7] Almost all forms of iniquity vanished from Sparta, Plutarch writes, “for who would steal or receive as a bribe, or rob or plunder that which could neither be concealed, nor possessed with satisfaction, nay, nor even cut to pieces with any profit?”[8] Elsewhere, Plutarch explains that wealth “awakened no envy, and brought no honor” to its Spartan bearer.[9]

Although most artisans left Sparta when there was no longer a way to trade their goods, Lycurgus compounded their misery by banishing any “unnecessary and superfluous” arts.[10] When not on campaign, Spartan men spent their time in festivals, hunting, exercising, and instructing the youth.[11] Within months of the Lycurgan monetary reforms, it was impossible to buy foreign wares, receive foreign freight, hire teachers of rhetoric, or visit soothsayers and prostitutes in Sparta. Although such restrictions were not motivated by the desire to protect or develop Spartan artisan crafts, locally produced housewares soon became sought after throughout the Greek world.[12] After establishing the limits of what would be permitted in Sparta, Lycurgus set his sights on educating toward nobility.

To ensure the unity and gastronomical fitness of Spartan men, Lycurgus created a mess system wherein men and youthful warriors dined together. Scholars have pointed to the messes as a crucial element of the Lycurgan reforms, and one that only made sense by Lycurgus’ understanding of the close relationship between mind and body. As Plutarch explains, the mess ensured more than social cohesion, providing a forum for the maintenance of the warrior himself:

With a view to attack luxury, [Lycurgus] . . . introduced the common messes so that they might eat with one another in companies, of common and specified foods, and not take their meals at home, reclining on costly couches at costly tables, delivering themselves into the hands of servants and cooks to be fattened in the dark, like voracious animals, and ruining not only their characters but also their bodies.[13]

The infamous agōgē operated with similar motivations. Breaking with Greek tradition – Xenophon explains that Lycurgus literally transvalued all Greek child rearing and education practices[14] – no private tutors or education were allowed in Sparta. The Spartan state, instead, educated all boys from age seven, regardless of his family’s status. In the agōgē boys were trained for discipline, courage, and fighting. They learned just enough reading and writing to serve their purpose as warriors, with their education “calculated to make them obey commands well, endure hardships, and conquer in battle.”[15] Likewise, the boys went barefoot and largely unclothed so that they may function better in rough terrain and in inclement weather. Clothes, Xenophon explains, were thought to encourage effeminacy and an inability to handle variations in temperature.[16]

As well as being scantily clad, boys in the agōgē were underfed and encouraged to steal food. This taught them to solve the problem of hunger by their own hands with cunning and boldness[17] and encouraged the development of warlike instincts.[18] To further this development, the boys were forced to live for a period in the mountain wilderness, without weapons, and unseen.[19] If boys were caught stealing, their agōgē superiors beat them. Kennell debates the legend that these beatings had fatal consequences. After all, a Spartan boy/young man was the focus of the entire social rationale, and would not be killed prematurely. Another part of the legend is not debatable, however: the boys were not beaten for having stolen, but for having been mediocre enough at it to be caught.[20]

Returning to the mess, the boys, as common responsibility of all male citizens of Sparta, were constantly surrounded by “fathers, tutors, and governors.”[21] At dinner, the boys were quizzed on virtues and vices, commanded to answer in a simple and honest style now called laconic (after Lacedaemon). Often these questions demanded that they pass judgment on the conduct of the citizenry. Those without response were deemed deficient in the “will to excellence,” as if any lack of response, whether out of respect or ignorance, was product of an insufficiently critical mind.[22]

In Lycurgan Sparta, the warriors governed because war, and the preparation for war, had made them the most virtuous. Lycurgus is credited with codifying the value of a life cleansed of all superfluous trappings. The life so essentialized not only became the perfect hoplite warrior, moving in concert with his cohorts, but also the most virtuous and reliable citizen. This is because Spartan war training was designed primarily to toughen the mind against fear, adversity, and pain, leaving clarity and the confidence of conquering any foe in any situation.[23]

Steven Pressfield’s Polynikes explains this conception of model citizen:

War, not peace, produces virtue. War, not peace, purges vice. War, and preparation for war calls forth all that is noble and honorable in a man. It unites him with his brothers and binds them in selfless love, eradicating in the crucible of necessity all that is base and ignoble.[24]

But what of Spartan men who did not meet these noble and honorable ideals? Xenophon explains that, in Sparta, the cowardly man was, in fact, a man without a city. He was shunned in all areas of public life, including the messes, ball games, gymnasia, and assemblies. This fact of life can be discerned in the “official” Spartan belief that honorable death was more valuable than ignoble life.[25] Xenophon sums the entire Lycurgan social system thus: to ensure “that the brave should have happiness, and the coward misery.”[26] Whereas in Fascist Italy, cowardly men might have been encouraged to “be courageous” in one’s own context, in Sparta, men had only one avenue to courage – war and training for war.

The agōgē has been central to academic and popular visions of Sparta from antiquity to modernity, and justifiably so. The Romans were so enchanted with the agōgē that Roman tourists traveled to Sparta just to visit its sites and temples (Artemis and the Dioscuri each played important roles in the boys’ religious instruction). Indeed, by 100 (A.D.) Rome had re-established the agōgē in Sparta and used it as a finishing school for noble Roman boys. It is only thanks to this period of the agōgē that we know anything about its Classical glory.[27]

And, even though we have been forced to speculate from the few anecdotes provided by Plutarch and Xenophon as to the content of agōgē training, we have a clear delineation of its purpose. As Plutarch explains it, the agōgē was a systematic training regimen in which boys and young men learned warring skills (including the discipline, sense of duty, and leadership already discussed) as well as “the most important and binding principles which conduce to the prosperity and virtue of a city.” These were not merely taught through lecture and regurgitation, but “implanted in the habits and training of [the boys],” through which “they would remain unchanged and secure, having a stronger bond than compulsion”.[28] As Lycurgus is thought to have summarized the agōgē’s rationale: “A city will be well-fortified which is surrounded by brave men and not by bricks.”[29]

Just as the content of the agōgē is speculative, it seems that so to is Lycurgus’ understanding of the links between conceptual and bodily vitality. For up to now, it has only been demonstrated that Lycurgus sought to defeat weakness and vice with strength and nobility. However, Lycurgus’ understanding of the body and mind is best demonstrated by the fate of Spartan women and infants.

As suggested above, sons were not the property of the father in Lycurgan Sparta, but the common property of the state. Unlike other Greek and Roman states, in Sparta the decision to raise a child rested with a council of elders who checked babies for health and stamina. If one was ill born and deformed it was discarded, as life “which nature had not well equipped at the very beginning for health and strength was of no advantage either for itself or the state.”[30]

In many cases, Spartan children were not even the product of random parentage, “but designed to spring from the best there was.” Eugenics. During his time of exile, Lycurgus noticed something peculiar about Greek men. In Athens, Plutarch explains, he saw men arguing over the particular breeding stock of certain dogs and horses. And yet, these same men sired children even though “foolish, infirm, or diseased, as though children of bad stock did not owe their badness to their parents.”[31] Marriages and births were carefully regulated, then, always with an eye to the physical and political wellbeing of the city.

Because of the Lycurgan exaggeration of the Greek educational ideal, Plutarch exclaimed that the education of Spartan children began before birth – an extraordinary concept, considering the 7th Century (B.C.) context. In reality it began prior to conception. Which brings us to Spartan women as mothers. Uniquely in the Classical Greek world, Spartan women exercised alongside men. They ran, wrestled, and threw the discuss and javelin, so that they might struggle successfully and easily with childbirth, and that their offspring would have a “vigorous root in vigorous bodies.”[32]

Lycurgus had a well-conceived eugenic rationale, believing that the human body would grow taller when unburdened by too much nutrition. Things that are well fed, he noticed, tend to grow thick and wide, both of which went against ideals of beauty and divinity. Thus, while leanness marked the human form as most beautiful, it also gave it a kinship with the divine. However, for mothers and their offspring, the benefits were also mundane, as mothers who exercised were thought to have lean children because the lightness of the parent matter made the offspring more susceptible to molding.[33]

After birth, infants were reared without swaddling so that their limbs would develop freely and robustly.[34] Boys in the agōgē wore a simple loin wrap, and men little more. The scores of near-naked men, boys, and unswaddled babies were joined by scores of near-naked women and girls. Perhaps Lycurgus’ most delicious transvaluation of decadent values is his command that in Sparta, the healthy condition of one’s body was to be more esteemed than the costliness of one’s clothes.[35] Nakedness and a strict code of physical beauty – that equated beauty with nobility – seem like potent stimuli to health; to say nothing of the belief that one’s commitment to beauty and nobility was of great benefit to oneself, one’s offspring, and one’s people.

Lycurgus believed that scant dress encouraged in women the habit of living with simplicity. More so, however, he wanted Spartan women to have an ardent desire for a healthy and beautiful body. And because the path to health and beauty led to the gymnasia and sports field, a beautiful female body ensured that the bearer of such possessed “bravery, ambition, and a taste of lofty sentiment.”[36]

Nowhere in the ancient world were women so integrated in the social and political rationale of a people. As a result of the Lycurgan reforms, Spartan girls were educated to similar principles and standards of courage, discipline, and honor, as the boys. They were literate. They performed public rituals to Artemis and Apollo. They were athletic enough to win medals at the Olympic games – even when competing against men. And they were known for their “vitality, grace, and vigor.”[37]

Meanwhile in Athens, girls received no education beyond the domestic duties of a wife and mother. And they lived sequestered lives, with no thought of how their physical degeneration might adversely affect Athens.[38] Thus the scandalous response provoked by Spartan women. For it is the state of women that provoked the idea that Spartan men were mere slaves to women.[39] But it is also the source of the sentiment, expressed so succinctly by Zack Snyder’s Gorgo, that “Only Spartan women give birth to real men.” Incidentally, the line comes from Plutarch and not Frank Miller.[40]

Lycurgus used political philosophy and physiology to fight degeneration. And while Sparta may seem a frightening place to modern men, this is precisely its value. For Sparta stands apart as the singular place that valued the bodily and conceptual nobility of its citizens above all else.

Plutarch described the legacy of Lycurgan Sparta as an example of what is possible when an entire people lives and behaves in the fashion of a single wise man training himself for war.[41] Wisdom, training, and war: three of the Classical traits most damned by modernity – at least as they were understood and practiced by Classical peoples. Above it was suggested that the lessons of Sparta would be read equally as shocking to a Roman as to an American. Yet, this is perhaps not quite true; and the reason is in the nature of Plutarch’s statement about Sparta acting as a single wise man. For, in effect, this was Plutarch’s explanation of the efficacy of the Lycurgan reforms. Just as his portrayal of Lycurgus’ seizure of power focused on Apollo’s blessing and the will of a handful of men, so here Plutarch sees no modern systemic rationale at work; but instead a natural path of choice for truly noble men.

For, according to Plutarch, what Lycurgus did was to establish a divinely sanctioned ethical aristocracy at the expense of a monetary aristocracy. This was an aristocracy into which one must be born, but also for which one must be born. Lycurgus incorporated each living Spartan into the aristocracy, by virtue of being alive. A Spartan boy would know himself worthy of the nobility being demanded of him simply because he had been selected at birth and progressed through the training of the agōgē. One can imagine that the harshness and forcefulness of Spartan life would have been accepted far more readily by one given a hereditary and ethical rationale for inclusion and acceptance than by liberated and atomized modern men.[42]

There is another aspect of Sparta that discomforts modern men even more than the equation of wisdom and war training, however: purity. In the 300 years of strict adherence to the Lycurgan reforms, no Spartan was allowed to live beyond Spartan territory. What’s more, no foreigners without a useful purpose were allowed to stay in Sparta overnight. None of them were allowed to teach vices.

For along with strange people, strange doctrines must come in; and novel doctrines bring novel decisions, from which must arise [disharmony within] the existing political order. Therefore [Lycurgus] thought it more necessary to keep bad manners and customs from invading and filling the city than it was to keep out infectious diseases.[43]

This desire for social purity also works as part of Lycurgus’ system of ethical and physiological transformation. For there is no reason to believe that noble men and women are made less so in an environment that provides only for their nobility. Imagine, instead, that the body becomes what its environment expects and demands of it. Harshness is the only thing productive of bodily vitality. Lycurgus believed that similar bodily harshness was also productive of conceptual nobility. So, instead of teaching such values in a cesspool and hoping that nature would provide a few prime examples each generation, Lycurgus took on nature, providing an environment that afforded Sparta the “good” in every citizen. This meets the definition of utopia, but unlike unnatural, modern, egalitarian utopia, Lycurgus’ Spartan utopia was hyper-natural. As was his ethical aristocracy.

The attainment of a high standard of noble living was a public duty. Youth were often the products of selective breeding, and it was demanded that all people be fit and vital. The greatest and most noble sentiments and characteristics available to man were attainable only through physical exertion and warlike action. Beauty was reserved for the worthy and actively denied the unworthy. In sum, it was demanded that men and women be as noble as was physically and conceptually possible.[44] And, while Fascist Italy did not go as far to promote the “eugenic improvement” of fascists, it too understood the relationship between ethics, behavior, and environment. Oddly enough, postmodern science agrees, even if it would use this knowledge to promote a global bourgeois community devoid of strife. Nonetheless, the next paper in this series will explain how the chemistry of the body is influenced by environment, opening great possibilities for placing the body directly at the center of a war against bourgeois modernity; and further, at the mercy of Nietzsche’s understanding of instincts, the body, and conceptual vitality.

Notes

[1] Plutarch, Lives (Volume One), trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914), 269.

[2] Plutarch 205–17.

[3] Plutarch 219–21.

[4] Xenophon, Scripta Minora, trans. E.C. Marchant (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 169.

[5] Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations, trans. Richard T. Gray (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 293.

[6] Giuseppe Bottai, “Twenty Years of Critica Fascista,” in A Primer of Italian Fascism, ed. Jeffrey T. Schnapp, trans. Schnapp, Sears, and Stampino (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 192.

[7] Plutarch 227–29.

[8] Plutarch 231.

[9] Plutarch 279.

[10] Plutarch 231.

[11] Plutarch 281.

[12] Plutarch 231.

[13] Plutarch 233.

[14] Xenophon 141.

[15] Plutarch 257.

[16] Xenophon 143.

[17] Plutarch 261.

[18] Xenophon 145.

[19] Nigel M. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 131.

[20] Kennel 179.

[21] Plutarch 259.

[22] Plutarch 263.

[23] Plutarch 267.

[24] Steven Pressfield, Gates of Fire (New York: Doubleday, 1998), 137.

[25] Xenophon 167.

[26] Xenophon 165.

[27] Kennell 117–39.

[28] Plutarch 241.

[29] Plutarch 267.

[30] Plutarch 255.

[31] Plutarch 253.

[32] Plutarch 245–47.

[33] Plutarch 261.

[34] Plutarch 255.

[35] Xenophon 161.

[36] Plutarch 247.

[37] Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece (New York: The Overlook Press, 2003), 36–37.

[38] Cartledge 36.

[39] Xenophon 163.

[40] Plutarch 247.

[41] Plutarch 297.

[42] Nietzsche 363.

[43] Plutarch 289.

[44] Xenophon 169.

 


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jeudi, 25 octobre 2012

Leonidas & the Spartan Ethos

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Leonidas & the Spartan Ethos

By Theodore J. O'Keefe

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

The Persian rider edged his horse cautiously forward. Just ahead the coastal plain dwindled to a narrow passage between the mountains and the sea, scarcely wider than a carriage track. Somewhere within the pass, the Greeks had massed to deny the Persians entry. It was the duty of the horseman to determine the size and disposition of their forces. Xerxes, his lord, the emperor of the Persians, knew that if his troops could force the pass, which the Greeks called Thermopylae, his armies could then stream unchecked into the heart of Greece.

The scout caught his breath as he sighted the Greeks in the western end of the pass. His trepidation gave way to surprise as he looked more closely. There were only about 300 of them, arrayed before a wall which blocked further access to the pass, and they were behaving most oddly. Some, stripped naked, performed exercises, like athletes before a contest. Others combed their long, fair hair. They gave their observer no notice.

Were these the vaunted Spartans? The Persian turned his horse and rode back to the imperial camp.

Xerxes received the scout’s report with undisguised amazement. The behavior of the Greeks seemed impossible to account for. Until now his advance down the northern coast of Greece had resembled a triumphal procession. City after city had submitted with the symbolic offering of earth and water. When at last the Greeks seemed disposed to stand and fight, their most gallant soldiers, the Spartans, were conducting themselves more like madmen than warriors.

The emperor summoned Demaratus, who had been a king of the Spartans until his involvement in political intrigues had forced him to flee to the Persian court. While Xerxes listened from his golden throne, Demaratus spoke of the Spartans:

“Once before, when we began our march against Greece, you heard me speak of these men. I told you then how this enterprise would work out, and you laughed at me. I strive for nothing, my lord, more earnestly than to observe the truth in your presence; so hear me once more. These men have come to fight us for possession of the pass, and for that struggle they are preparing. It is the common practice for the Spartans to pay careful attention to their hair when they are about to risk their lives. But I assure you that if you can defeat these men and the rest of the Spartans who are still at home, there is no other people in the world who will dare to stand firm or lift a hand against you. You have now to deal with the finest kingdom in Greece, and with the bravest men.”

The year was 480 B.C. During the previous three years Xerxes had assembled what promised to be the mightiest military force the world had ever seen, drawn from every corner of his far-flung realms. Modern historians are properly skeptical of the millions of soldiers and sailors meticulously enumerated by the great historian Herodotus, and of his endless catalogs of camel-riding Arabs, trousered Scythians, and frizzy-haired Ethiopians. Nevertheless, Herodotus’ account gives dramatic expression to the feeling of the Greeks that all the numberless, swarthy hordes of Africa and Asia were advancing on them.

Ten years before, the Athenians, who had aroused the wrath of Xerxes’ father and predecessor, Darius, by aiding their Ionian Greek cousins of Asia Minor in an unsuccessful revolt against their Persian overlords, had all but annihilated a Persian punitive expedition at Marathon, a few miles from Athens. It was Xerxes’ purpose to avenge that defeat and to crush the power of the impudent Hellenes, as the Greeks called themselves, once and for all.

There was more to it than that. Xerxes was a Persian, an Aryan, of the noble Achaemenid line, descended ultimately from the same race as the Hellenes. His ancestors had ranged the mountains and steppes of Iran and Central Asia, proud and free.

But as the Persians had increased their power and then wrested the great empire of the Near East from the Babylonians, their kings had fallen prey to the power and the regalia and the idea of empire. Once the Iranian leaders had regarded themselves, and been regarded, as first among Aryan equals. Now his fellow Persians, like all his other subjects, abased themselves at Xerxes’ feet. And like his imperial predecessors, Xerxes intended to make the remainder of the known world do the same.

As the Persian army moved ponderously across the great bridges with which the emperor had joined Europe and Asia at the Dardanelles, the Hellenes hesitated. Xerxes had accompanied the exertions of his engineers with a diplomatic campaign. While his engineers built the Dardanelles bridges and dug a canal across the Acte peninsula in Thrace by which his fleet could circumvent the stormy cape, his diplomats worked to promote defeatism in Greece. Argos and Crete promised to stay neutral, and the priestess of Delphi muttered gloomy oracles of Persian conquest.

The delegates from the Hellenic city-states who gathered at the Corinthian Isthmus in the spring of 480 were at first divided as to their course of action. The Peloponnesians were for guarding only their southern peninsula, while the Athenians and their allies on the neighboring island of Euboea pressed for an expedition to the north of Greece. Eventually the congress of diplomatic representatives agreed to dispatch a joint force of Athenians and Peloponnesians to the Vale of Tempe, in northern Thessaly, which seemed a fit place to bar the Persians’ way from Macedonia into Greece.

At Tempe, to their dismay, the Hellenes found that other passes afforded the invader entry into Hellas from the north. As the Greek contingent retreated to the south, the northern Greeks abandoned their determination to resist and submitted to the Persian emperor.

As Xerxes’ forces began to advance south from Macedonia into Greece, the Greeks were thrown into something of a panic. Following their first contact with the numerically superior Persian fleet, the Greek navy fled down the straits between Euboea and the Greek mainland. Only the loss of a considerable number of the Persian ships in a storm off the Artemisian cape at the northern tip of Euboea emboldened the Hellenic fleet to sail northward to face the enemy once more. In the meantime the Athenians made plans to evacuate their population to the islands of Salamis and Aegina to the southwest.

One force remained in the field to confront the Persians with determined opposition: Leonidas, king of the Spartans, had occupied the crucial pass at Thermopylae.

The gateway from northern to central Greece, Thermopylae stretched more than four miles between the towering wall of Mt. Oeta and the waves of the Malian Gulf. At both its eastern and western extremities, the pass contracted to a narrow, easily defended pathway. For much of the intervening distance, the pass billowed out into a broader expanse. Here there were a number of thermal springs, both salt and sulfur, from which Thermopylae derived its name, which means “hot gates.”

The garrison which held Thermopylae was at first considerably larger than the 300 Spartans whom the Persian scout had glimpsed at the western entrance to the pass. Behind the wall, which the Greeks had hastily rebuilt after occupying the pass, and along the ridge of Mt. Oeta, Leonidas had stationed nearly 7000 troops. About half of them were men from Sparta’s neighbor cities in the Peloponnesus. The rest were Boeotians from Thebes and Thespiae in central Greece, or hailed from nearby Phocis and Locris.

Although their Greek allies were many times more numerous, Leonidas and his Spartan guard formed the backbone of the Hellenic defense force. In recognition of the peril attending their mission, the 300 consisted exclusively of men with living male heirs, so that names and bloodlines would be carried on if they fell. Leonidas and his men were the elite of an elite, and on their example would depend the conduct of the other Greeks at Thermopylae.

What manner of men were the Spartans, that Xerxes hesitated to pit his myriads against their hundreds?

The origins of Sparta are shrouded in the mists of Greek antiquity, but it is certain that Sparta was founded by the Dorians. The last wave of Hellenic migrants from the north, the Dorians swept their Greek predecessors, the Achaeans, westward into Attica and Asia Minor. From the time of the Dorian migrations, the traditional division of the Hellenes into Dorians, Ionians, and Aeolians begins to take shape.

The Dorians were probably more Nordic in type than the other Greek tribes. As the great classicist Werner Jaeger wrote, “The Dorian race gave Pindar [the great poet of Thebes] his ideal of the fair-haired warrior of proud descent.” As Jaeger implies, the Dorians—above all those in Sparta—placed a premium on the preservation and improvement of their native stock.

One branch of the Dorians invaded the district of Laconia in the southeastern Peloponnesus. In the words of the great historian J. B. Bury, “The Dorians took possession of the rich vale of the Eurotas, and keeping their own Dorian stock pure from the admixture of alien blood reduced all the inhabitants to the condition of subjects. . . . The eminent quality which distinguished the Dorians from the other branches of the Greek race was that which we call ‘character’; and it was in Laconia that this quality most fully displayed and developed itself, for here the Dorian seems to have remained more purely Dorian.”

The city of Sparta arose from the amalgamation of several neighboring villages along the Eurotas. The Spartans gradually came to wield political power over the other Dorians in Laconia, the so-called perioeci, who nevertheless retained some degree of self-government and ranked as Laconian, or Lacedaimonian, citizens.

Not so the racially alien helots, the pre-Dorian inhabitants of Laconia, whom the Spartans reduced to serfdom and denied all political rights. The helots bore their servitude grudgingly and threatened constantly to revolt and overthrow their masters. To contain the helots’ revolutionary inclinations, the Spartans organized periodic campaigns, containing something of the spirit of both the fox hunt and the pogrom, in which their young men were given free rein to wreak havoc and eliminate the more truculent and dangerous of their serfs.

During the eighth century, the Dorians conquered the Messenians, who had occupied the remainder of the southern Peloponnesus. A century later, they suppressed a Messenian uprising only after a long and difficult war. From that time on, constrained to manage their own helots and the unruly Messenians as well, the Spartans evolved a unique ethos involving both the preservation of their racial integrity and a comprehensive system of military education and organization.

To a greater extent than any state before or since, the Spartans safeguarded and improved their biological heritage with an uncompromising eugenics program. Marriage outside the Spartan racial community was forbidden, nor was immigration tolerated. There were penalties for celibacy and late marriage, while men who fathered several children could be exempted from standing watch at night, and even from paying taxes.

The Spartans required that the newborn be presented for inspection by officers of the state. Sickly or deformed offspring were left to die.

According to the ancient biographer Plutarch, Lycurgus, the legendary lawgiver of Sparta, made even further provisions for healthy progeny, which continued to be adhered to in classical times. After describing the chaste upbringing of young Spartans of both sexes, Plutarch continues:

After guarding marriage with this modesty and reserve, he [Lycurgus] was equally careful to banish empty and womanish jealousy. For this object, excluding all licentious disorders, he made it, nevertheless, honorable for men to give the use of their wives to those whom they should think fit, so that they might have children by them. . . . Lycurgus allowed a man who was advanced in years and had a young wife to recommend some virtuous and approved young man, that she might have a child by him, who might inherit the good qualities of the father, and be a son to himself. On the other side, an honest man who had love for a married woman upon account of her modesty and the well-favoredness of her children, might, without formality, beg her company of her husband, that he might raise, as it were, from this plot of good ground, worthy and well-allied children for himself. And indeed, Lycurgus was of a persuasion that children were not so much the property of their parents as of the whole commonwealth, and, therefore, would not have his citizens begot by the first-comers, but by the best men that could be found; the laws of other nations seemed to him very absurd and inconsistent, where people would be so solicitous for their dogs and horses as to exert interest and to pay money to procure fine breeding, and yet kept their wives shut up, to be made mothers only by themselves, who might be foolish, infirm, or diseased; as if it were not apparent that children of a bad breed would prove their bad qualities first upon those who kept and were rearing them, and well-born children, in like manner, their good qualities.

As might be gathered, the women of Sparta were regarded, first of all, as the mothers of Spartan children. The young women were educated for childbearing. They engaged in vigorous gymnastic exercises and dances, often while nude, to the scandal of the other Greeks, although the Spartan women were proverbial for their chastity. Doubtless in consequence of heredity as well as a carefully cultivated physical fitness, the women of Sparta were accounted the most beautiful in Hellas.

Despite the emphasis on their role as mothers, Sparta’s women were the freest in Greece. Indeed, they were accused of dominating the Spartan men. When Gorgo, the wife of Leonidas, was so taunted, she summed up the situation of the Spartan women succinctly: “We rule men with good reason, for we are the only women who bring forth men.”

The men of Sparta were raised to be soldiers. They left the management of commercial affairs and the trades to the perioeci and devoted themselves exclusively to the business of government and war. Each Spartan citizen supported himself from a hereditary plot of land, farmed by the helots, which could not be alienated by sale or division.

Between the ages of seven and twenty the Spartans received their soldierly training. They acquired far more than a mechanical mastery of military skills. Their instructors strove to inculcate in their cadets an absolute devotion to Sparta, the ability to endure any hardship, and an unwavering courage on the battlefield.

To keep the young men on their mettle, the Spartan training system played off the exigencies of discipline against the defiant and adventurous spirit of youth. Young Spartans were compelled to steal their food, yet subjected to severe punishment if they were caught, a seeming paradox epitomized in the story of the Spartan boy who let the fox he concealed under his cloak tear at his vitals rather than give himself away. The Spartan school was a cruel but effective one, for it caught its students up in the enthusiasm of constant challenge and danger.

When he reached the age of 20 the young Spartan became a full-fledged soldier. For the next ten years he lived the barracks life with his comrades. Allowed to take a wife, he saw her only during brief and furtive visits. In times of peace, the young men were instructors to the Spartan boys.

On his thirtieth birthday the Spartan was invested with the remainder of his civic rights and duties. Thenceforth he attended the apella, the assembly of the people, and could vote on measures proposed by the two kings or by the ephoroi, Sparta’s five-man judiciary. The Spartan could at last establish his own household, although still bound to dine in common with his peers.

The principal fare at these communal messes was a black broth much favored by the Spartans, although the other Hellenes found it hard to stomach. (After sampling it a visitor from opulent Sybarisis supposed to have exclaimed, “Now I know why Spartans have no fear of death!”)

The Spartans spiced their meals with a dry and pithy wit renowned through Hellas as much for its substance as for its sting. As Plutarch tells it, Lycurgus replied to a Spartan who had advocated democracy, “Begin, friend, and set it up in your family.” Or, as the Spartan women are supposed to have said when handing their sons their shields before they marched to battle, “With it or on it.”

Spartan law reinforced its citizens’ contempt for luxury by banning private ownership of gold and silver. The result, according to Plutarch, was that “merchants sent no shiploads into Laconian ports; no rhetoric-master, no itinerant fortune-teller, no harlot-monger, or gold- or silver-smith, engraver, or jeweler, set foot in a country that had no money; so that luxury, deprived little by little of that which fed and fomented it, wasted to nothing and died away of itself.” Like the Spartans’ wills, their coins were made of iron.

Sparta’s military life did not stifle the minds and spirits of its citizens. Early in its history Sparta was a leading center of poetry and music. Terpander and Alcman brought the lyre and lyric from Asia Minor to the banks of the Eurotas. Lame Tyrtaeus, Lacedaimon’s native son, shaped his country’s ethos with his martial songs. Choral songs and dances carried on, in which the Spartan men melodically affirmed their patriotism, and the Spartan maidens urged them on to future deeds of valor. Rightly Pindar sang of Sparta:

“Councils of wise elders here, /And the young men’s conquering spear, / And dance, and song, and joy appear.”

It was not so much the Spartans’ works of art as the Spartan ideal which won the admiration of great Hellenic thinkers such as Plato. There was something noble in the stem simplicity of the Spartan way of life. Sparta’s fundamental laws, the rhetroi, which Lycurgus was said to have received direct from “golden-haired Apollo,” were few, unwritten, and to the point. Their purpose, to mold men of character in the service of the common good, struck a responsive chord through allHellas.

It is not difficult to detect in the wistful praise the Hellenes paid to Sparta a longing for the values and uses of their Indo-European forebears. Outside of Sparta these had all too often been forgotten amid the lures of Oriental luxury, or lost forever due to mixing of Hellenic blood. The Spartans, just as they transformed the rough-hewn, wooden longhouses of their northern ancestors into gleaming Doric temples, developed from their innate, racial outlook a guide and bulwark for their state.

And, of course, it was on the battlefield that the Spartan arete, or manly excellence, found its chief expression. The Spartans asked not how many the enemy were, but only where they were. They were ignorant of surrender, but knew well how to die.

But let Plutarch speak once more: “It was at once a magnificent and a terrible sight to see them march on to the tune of their flutes, without any disorder in their ranks, any discomposure in their minds, or change in their countenances, calmly and cheerfully moving with the music to the deadly fight. Men in this temper were not likely to be possessed by fear or any transport of fury, but with the deliberate valor of hope and assurance, as if some divinity were attending and conducting them.”

Such were the men who faced Xerxes and his host atThermopylae.

Xerxes waited for four days, in the hope that the Greeks would abandon their position, as they had in Thessaly. His attempt at psychological warfare was lost on the Spartans. When a fearful Greek from the surrounding countryside informed the Spartan Dieneces that “so many are the Persian archers their arrows blot out the sun,” Dieneces was unperturbed: “If the Persians hide the sun, we shall have our battle in the shade.”

On the fifth day, seething with anger at the Greeks’ impertinence, Xerxes sent forth an assault force of Medes and Cissians, Iranian kindred to his own Persians.

Xerxes’ troops stormed the western gate to Thermopylae with a valor exceeding their skill in combat. The Spartans met and overwhelmed them in the narrow space between the rocks and the water. Well armored, wielding their long spears expertly, the Spartan heavy infantry was more than a match for the Iranians with their short swords and wicker shields. The Spartans cut them down by the hundreds at close quarters.

From a neighboring hill, seated on his throne of gold, Xerxes watched the fighting, fuming at what he deemed his soldiers’ incompetence. To bring the matter to a quick end, he ordered his elite guard, the King’s Immortals, forward to the deadly pass. Again the Spartans outfought the emperor’s men.

All at once the Spartans turned and fled, seemingly in panicky confusion. With a shout, the Immortals rushed forward in disarray. But the Spartans were all around them in an instant, and they cut the emperor’s picked troops to pieces. According to Herodotus, Xerxes, watching from his hill, “leapt to his feet three times, in terror for his army.”

The next day’s fighting went no better for the Persians. The Greek allies took turns spelling the Spartans at the western approach, and once again the Hellenes reaped a bloody harvest. As the sun set over the western mountains, the waters of the gulf lapped crimson at the heaps of Persians on the shore.

That night, as Xerxes puzzled bitterly how to break the death grip of the Greeks on Thermopylae, a traitor came forth from a local district, looking for a rich reward. The information he gave the emperor was the doom of the men of Thermopylae.

Ephialtes the Malian revealed to Xerxes the existence of a path over the hills and along the crest of Mt. Oetato the rear of Thermopylae. The path was not unknown to Thermopylae’s defenders, and Leonidas had stationed the Phocian troops along Mt.Oela’s ridge to ward off enemy attempts to flank his forces in the pass.

At dawn the next morning, the Phocians heard the sound of marching feet advancing through the fallen leaves which carpeted the floor of the oak forest below the summit of Mt. Oeta. As the Greeks sprang to arm themselves, the Immortals, their ranks reinforced, rushed up the mountainside. The Phocians retreated to the highest point on Mt. Oetaunder a hail of Persian arrows, but the emperor’s picked troops disdained to close with them. Swerving to the left, they made their way down the mountain to a point east of Thermopylae’s rear approach. The Hellenes in the pass were trapped between two Persian forces.

Leonidas learned of the threat from his lookouts along Mt. Oeta and stragglers from the Phocian contingent. He quickly took stock of the changed circumstances. It was evident to the Spartan king that the pass could not be held much longer. The Greeks to the south had need of the troops engaged in Thermopylae’s defense.

But there were other considerations. Leonidas and his 300 men were first of all Spartans. The laws and customs of their native city bade them to conquer or die at the posts assigned them, whatever the superiority of the enemy’s numbers. And there was an oracle, made known at the outset of the Persian invasion, which prophesied that Sparta or a Spartan king must fall in the coming conflict.

Leonidas dismissed the allied troops, all but the men of Thebes and Thespiae. The remainder of the Peloponnesians, as well as the Phocians and Locrians, made their way across the hills between the Persian armies, to fight again another day.

The next morning, after Xerxes had poured a libation to the rising sun, his men stormed Thermopylae from both sides. Scornful of their own lives, Leonidas and his men surged out to meet the Persians on the open ground before the narrow entrance to the pass. Godlike the Spartans swept forward, cutting a swath through the enemies’ ranks. Again they exacted a fearful toll, as the Persian officers drove their men on from the rear, making liberal use of their whips.

The Hellenes fought with reckless courage and with grim determination. When their spears splintered and broke, they fought on with their swords. Leonidas fell, and a fierce struggle raged over the body of the Spartan king. Four times the Persians were repulsed, and many of their leaders, including two of Xerxes’ brothers, were slain.

Gradually the remaining Spartans, bearing the fallen Leonidas, fell back to a small elevation within the pass. There they made a last stand. Beside them fought the brave citizens of Thespiae. The Thebans covered themselves with disgrace by throwing down their arms and submitting abjectly to Xerxes.

After a short but furious resistance, the Spartans and the Thespians were annihilated by the swarming Persian infantry. When all was still, and Xerxes walked among the dead on the battleground he had until then avoided, the Persian emperor was stricken with anger at the tenacity which Leonidas had displayed in thwarting his imperious will. He ordered the Spartan king beheaded, and his head fixed on a stake.

Once more Xerxes summoned Demaratus.

“Demaratus,” he began, “you are a good man. All you said has turned out true. Now tell me, how many men of Lacedaimon remain, and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?”

“Sire,” Demaratus replied, “there are many men and towns in Lacedaimon. But I will tell you what you really want to know: Sparta alone boasts eight thousand men. All of them are the equals of the men who fought here.”

When Xerxes heard this he paled. The memory of Demaratus’s words must have been much with him during the next few months, until Leonidas’ Spartan comrades avenged him at the climactic battle of Plataea and drove the Persian horde forever from Hellenic soil.

The Greeks erected several monuments at Thermopylae, bearing suitable inscriptions. A lion marked the spot where Leonidas perished. But it was the marker the Spartans raised to the memory of their 300 countrymen which best evokes the spirit of their people. With laconic brevity it read:

“Wanderer, if you come to Sparta, tell them there / You have seen us lying here, obedient to their laws.”

Source: Kevin Alfred Strom, ed., The Best of Attack! and National Vanguard Tabloid (Arlington, Va.: National Vanguard Books, 1984), pp. 127-130.

 


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jeudi, 26 juillet 2012

The Homeric Gods

The Homeric Gods

By Mark Dyal 

Ex. http://www.counter-currents.com

[1]

Athena

Walter F. Otto
The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion [2]
Translated by Moses Hadas
North Stratford, N.H.: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001

“My goal is to create total enmity between our current ‘culture’ and Antiquity. Whoever wants to serve the former must hate the latter.”—Friedrich Nietzsche[1]

“Every religion and every worldview is entitled to be judged not by the levels where it is flattened, coarsened, and, for want of character, is like any other, but by the clear and large contours of its heights. It is only there that it is what it truly is and what others are not.”—Walter F. Otto[2]

Along with Homer, Nietzsche, Evola, and Schmitt, a name with which every New Right thinker should be familiar is Walter F. Otto. Otto (1874–1958) was a German philologist who held positions in Switzerland and Germany, becoming one of National Socialist Germany’s leading scholars of the Classical world. From 1933 to 1945 he was a member, and administrator, of the Scientific Committee of the Nietzsche Archive in Weimar—at the time a sacred site amongst the Nazi “Nietzsche cult.”

Besides writing few books that have been translated in multiple languages, Otto and his blend of Nietzschean and Homeric political philosophy, helped lay the foundation for the contemporary manifestation of the Counter-Enlightenment, which we call the New Right. Indeed, Otto was part of the political evolution of many European New Right thinkers—Guillaume Faye, Alain de Benoist, and Pierre Krebs, to name but three; yet he remains virtually unknown in America, even among scholars.

In Europe, though, the Classical inheritance is lived and understood differently than in America. As Krebs explains, the vitalist natural spirit of the Homeric/Greek religion has stood in continual opposition to Asiatic/Judaic metaphysics since the dawn of the Homeric Age, some 3000 years ago.[3] In America, what we stood to inherit from the Greeks has been, at worst, perverted by Judeo-Christianity’s war on European nobility, and at best, subsumed within the multicultural system of racial and cultural commodity fetishism.

In other words, the Classical world matters to Europeans because they still live in the geographical and geopolitical world of the Greeks and Romans; while in America, bored bourgeois consumers think about Greece and Rome only when Hollywood promotes some democratic and ethically Christian version of a formerly noble tale of heroism and glory.

[3]Thus, it is to the North American New Right’s credit that the Classics and pre-Christian paganism is discussed at all. But even as we occasionally discuss them, they still seem foreign to the essential discourse of creating and being a new American Right. While there are Nazis, Norse pagans, atheists, and Christians—always quick to de-Jew Jesus—aplenty, Olympian, Roman, or even Augustan reform, pagans are seldom identified. Given the lack of Classical feeling in the American psyche, one must assume that these pagans simply do not exist here. Even in the European New Right’s best explanation of paganism, Alain de Benoist’s On Being a Pagan, Athena and Apollo—the most well developed and useful Homeric deities—are never brought to life.[4] Nor is one given a sense of what one would actually believe and do as a result of associating with these gods.

Collin Cleary sensed the “lack of gods” in Benoist’s On Being a Pagan and took offense with its overtly Nietzschean humanism and “moral relativism.”[5] Although the gods are present in The Homeric Gods, Otto’s project, like Benoist’s, is entirely and inherently Nietzschean. In fact, to properly understand Otto’s book, one should begin with Nietzsche, and not Homer.[6]

But this is understandable, assuming that one comprehends why Nietzsche is so central to how and why we know the Greeks today. As the first epigraph makes clear, Nietzsche uses the Greeks (and Romans) as a counter-valuation to the modern Judeo-Christian world. From his first notebooks and lectures to his last written words, Nietzsche’s ideal human types are Greek, nay, Homeric in origin. For it was these men that fought, struggled, killed, and died in a life-affirming quest for glory.

Nietzsche’s ideal form of life, which glorifies warfare, strife, and beauty, is Greek. Indeed, Nietzsche’s naturalization of morality can be found 2200 years prior in Herodotus’Histories. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra virtually summarizes the first book of Histories when he says that, “No people could live that did not first esteem; but if they want to preserve themselves, then they must not esteem as their neighbor esteems.”[7] For while Herodotus included the narratives that brought war to the barbarian peoples of the east, he did so to show that, while each people is motivated by what is good, the only good that matters is that of the Greeks.[8]

Even if Herodotus understood that each of Greece’s enemies had their own moral and ethical system, these systems did not apply to Greeks. The world beyond Greece simply did not exist in moralistic/altruistic terms. This is similar to the motivational thrust of Nietzsche’s critique of Judeo-Christian morality: it might be good for a certain human type, but not for us.

This “us” is a key to understanding why Nietzsche is often embraced by the Left (and New Right thinker Collin Cleary) as a moral relativist, for it assumes a preexisting knowledge of each of Nietzsche’s “mature” works that the large majority of his postmodern readers simply do not have.[9] Everything from Book Five of The Gay Science to the last notebook of the Nachlass is written for a fictitious audience of like-minded “free thinkers” who already embrace Nietzsche’s transvaluative project.

Thus, he never naturalizes morality “in general” but always in contrast to what is useful for a particular (heroic, strong, courageous, harsh) audience. Ultimately, moralities are important because every form of life has one, or some such system of valuation and evaluation; and each morality is the basis of a particular human type—one of which is democratic, soft, lazy, smug, complacent, flabby, in a word, decadent. But, because that human type is the optimal embodiment of its morality, the form of life’s truth regime also promotes its optimal status.

And again, because Nietzsche explains that truth is unknowable without valuation (thus linking truth and morality), and that there are as many truths as there are forms of life, i.e. perspectives, historically speaking, the Left embraces him as a general relativist;[10] just as it critiques Herodotus (and the Greeks) as ethnocentric and xenophobic, and Homer as a violence-obsessed savage.[11]

Otto’s The Homeric Gods embraces this generalization of Nietzsche and sets the Homeric gods in opposition not only to Judeo-Christianity but also to the bourgeois form of life in general. What makes Otto’s book unique and useful is that he actually uses Homer and other archaic and Classical sources to explain the gods. Thus, Judeo-Christian and modern notions of sin, soul, piety, and redemption are nonexistent.

Writing in the Nietzschean spirit, he celebrates the absence of “the holy” in the Homeric Greek worldview. “The somber religious reverberation, that melody of ineffable exaltation and consecration . . . seems to be wanting . . . This religion is so natural that holiness seems to have no place in it” (p. 3).

What we miss, then, is the “moral earnestness” that Judeo-Christianity, as the paradigm of religion, commands us to expect in a religion. Instead, we have gods that are “too natural and joyous to reckon morality as the supreme value” (p. 3). We have, as well, two key points to understanding how the religion works.

First, there is no communion between the gods and man. There is no sacrifice of the self, no intimacy, no oneness of god and man. Man and the gods are separated by each one’s nature.

Second, there is no promise of redemption in the religion. There is no need or desire to redeem man from his earthy existence because love of life and the natural capacities of man are the basis of Homeric religious feeling. As Faye said, “like Achilles [and Odysseus], the original European man does not prostrate himself before the gods, but stands upright.”[12] But as Otto explains, this is because the gods demand instead that one stands and fights—that one makes oneself worthy of the gods’ attention by courageous and heroic action. Otto brings this point home by reminding his readers that, while in the Old Testament, “Yahweh fights for his people, and without making any defense they are delivered from the pursuing Egyptians,” in Homer, “a god whispers a saving device to a baffled warrior at the right instant, we hear that he rouses spirit and kindles courage, that he makes limbs supple and nimble, and gives a right arm accuracy and strength” (p. 6). Man is not miraculously delivered by his God but is, instead, given the inspiration to command his own destiny.

The interaction between gods and man and between man and nature, then, is not only dependent upon man but upon nature. In other words, there is little to no magic, only the divinity of man in nature.

The faculty which in other religions is constantly being thwarted and inhibited here flowers forth with the admirable assurance of genius—the faculty of seeing the world in the light of the divine, not a world yearned for, aspired to, or mystically present in rare ecstatic experiences, but the world into which we were born, part of which we are, interwoven with it through our senses and, through our minds, obligated to it for all its abundance and vitality. (p. 11)

Speaking of its essence, the divine is a vital force that flows through each living thing. However, it is not “made divine” in the sense of the “holy spirit.” There is no need to feel universally connected to, or prohibited from attacking or devouring, one’s brothers-in man. For in nature, all life consumes and devours, but is still part of the richness of the world—a very Nietzschean naturalism this is! Homeric religion, in sum, dismisses morality, promises no redemption, and makes life itself divine.

It is in the descriptions of the gods, themselves that we find the true “plan” that the Homeric religion holds for man: that our divine nature demands that man act, and often heroically. “The gods belong on the side of life. In order to encounter them the living must move, go forward, be active. Then the gods encompass the living with their strength and majesty and in sudden revelation even show their heavenly countenance” (pp. 265–66). It matters not so much that man be patient, pious, or priestly, but that he not act cowardly, brutishly, or without dignity. “The purpose and goal of the Greeks,” Otto quotes Goethe, “is to deify man, not to humanize deity” (p. 236). Even as man in all of his nature is deified, Homer still presents a perfected vision of this nature.[13]

[4]Anyone who has read Homer (or Otto) can hardly disagree that Athena is the most extraordinary of the Homeric deities. Her role in the life of Achilles and Odysseus alone is enough to inspire men to war in hopes of garnering her attention. “First of all it is the warriors whose courage she kindles. Before battle begins they sense here inspiriting presence and yearn to perform heroic deeds worthy of her . . . the spirit of the goddess causes all hearts to thrill with battle glee” (p. 45).

Athena’s association with Heracles insured that she was the deity of choice for virile, athletic warriors, and his glory set the standard for Greek (and Roman) heroic endeavor. Remember correctly, though, that Heracles did not succeed through fury alone. Under Athena’s guidance, prudence and dignity are also necessary. Thus do we see her counseling Odysseus in moments which call not only for force but also shrewd calculation.

While her most celebrated recipients are, indeed, warriors and heroes, Athena’s influence can be seen across a wide spectrum of Greek life. She is a warrior, but she is also the goddess of wisdom. Moderns hear this, and their bourgeois form of life immediately informs them of a contradiction; for how can war and wisdom be unified and idealized to the point of divinity? That this unity is no contradiction, however, says all one needs to know of these Greeks and how far we have fallen from their glorious and heroic ideals.

[5]War and wisdom are related, through Athena, by the type of human perfection needed to be victorious at either. Precision. Precision under pressure. Precision under pressure of death. Precision under pressure of death when only the perfect movement or thought will preserve life and achieve one’s glory. Wisdom can only be gained in similar circumstances—through heroic or precise, pressure-filled, action.

Thoughts gained while sheepishly static and immobile, Nietzsche reminds us, are seldom heroic. Thus warriors in need of the perfect throw of a spear or slice of a sword, in the only instant that will kill their opponent, are united with artisans, artists, precision craftsmen—shipwrights, metalworkers, potters, weavers—and anyone needing intelligence and the will to decisiveness at every moment.

While Athena loves others beside the great heroes and warriors, her spirit and approach does not change circumstantially. She always desires “boldness, the will to victory, and courage,” but these are not fully useful without “directing reason and illuminating clarity” (p. 53). “Whenever in a life of action and heroism great things must be wrought, perfected, and struggled for, there Athena is present. Broad indeed is the spirit of a battle-loving people when it recognizes the same perfection wherever a clear and intelligent glance shows the path to achievement” (p. 53). Broad indeed is the spirit of a battle-loving people when it recognizes the same perfection wherever a clear and intelligent glance shows the path to achievement. Otto has just explained the crux of the Classical inheritance: the will to perfection. Stand alone in postmodern America and ponder the magnitude of a cultural impulse to perfection. Now also consider Otto’s National Socialist audience and one also begins to sense what National Socialism and Fascism were really up to—and how deep was the Fascist critique of modernity.[14]

[6]

Apollo

The perfection attainable through Athena is immediate. The precision to which she inspires is corporeal. She is “the heavenly presence and direction as illumination and inspiration to victorious comprehension and consummation. To Hermes belongs what is clandestine, twilight, uncanny; Athena is bright as day. Dreaminess, yearning, languishing, are alien to her” (pp. 53–54). Similarly obvious is the contrast between Athena and Apollo:

In Apollo we recognize the wholly masculine man. The aristocratic aloofness, the superiority of cognition, the sense of proportion, these and other related traits in a man, even music in the broadest sense of the word, are, in the last analysis, alien to a woman. Apollo is all these things. But perfection in the living present, untrammelled and victorious action, not in the service of some remote and infinite idea but for mastery over the moment—that is the triumph that has always delighted woman in a man, to which she inspires him, and whose high satisfaction he can learn from her. (p. 55)

Apollo is an archer, thus the will to precision is also present in him. But while Athena is immediate and near, Apollo is rational and distant. “In the figure of Apollo,” Otto explains, “man honors the nobility of serenity and freedom, the rays of the sun, which furnish light not for mysteries of the soul but for virile realization of life and worthy achievement” (p. 252). Once again, Otto makes sure we fully comprehend the cultural impetus of these deities. For like Athena, Apollo promotes a world of meaningful action and a life “capable of freedom, which neither follows impulses blindly nor is subjected to the categorical demands of a moral legislation. It is not to dutifulness or obedience that decision is allowed but to insight and taste; thus everywhere the intelligent is bound up with the beautiful” (p. 253).

It was the genius of the Greeks to promote the most exceptional and exemplary capabilities of man as divine; and not only divine but also natural. Thus man did not supplicate himself to a God, or, as Collin Cleary fears for neo-pagans, merely invoke the name of a deity. Instead he made himself worthy. “Wherever a great heart throbs and rages, wherever a liberating thought flares up, there Athena is present, summoned rather by heroic readiness than by humble supplication. From her own lips we hear that she is attracted by prowess, not by good will or devotion to her person” (pp. 238–239). In this we see that the agonic pulse that ran through the Greek world was more than just a will to prepare for war. It was also a means for men to maintain worthiness of the gods. For a perfect throw, a perfect hull, or a perfect word is still perfection and “for the Greeks, this is the prime meaning of insight and intelligence. Without these the truly divine is inconceivable” (p. 247).

Perhaps nothing separates modern man from the Greeks as much as his aversion to thinking about the human in terms of perfection. The artistic embodiment of the Homeric deities served as an optimal status criterion of the form and content of human perfection. Extremely elevated standards were maintained in physiognomy, creativity, and discernment, always with a view to the interconnectedness of warfare, wisdom, and beauty. Grandeur, prowess, dignity, and nobility seem available for all who act heroically and with nobility. However, this is only so because it is not the mediocrity of the rabble that is being elevated to the pinnacle of human worthiness.

Only a modern would think to celebrate (or even care about) the Helots and slaves that toiled in the shadow of greatness. Indeed, the moderns who glorify the non-victorious and the failures—the majority—at the expense of the heroic and life affirming few, dwell in eternal darkness compared to these Greeks.

Instead this is a religion (and form of life) for masters. This is the religion of those who value glory over justice. And, “for a spirit which craves glory rather than prosperity, the justice of divine sway is a different thing from what the husbandman or commoner intent on possessions and gain might wish it to be” (p. 258). Achilles, the bravest and “most loved by the gods” of the Greeks at Troy, has a short life, but it is a life filled with the greatest imaginable glory. As Otto deftly explains, only a spiritually poor age would think to reduce the human capacity for heroic action to a search for bourgeois comfort, safety, and happiness. Likewise, only a spiritually impoverished religion would feel it necessary to make God an arbiter of justice. While the “history of religions” (i.e., modern theology which makes Asiatic monotheistic religions the paradigm of religiontout court) considers it a deepening of divine providence to give God the power of justice, Otto explains that it as a sign of decadence (p. 257).

The Homeric gods, as mentioned above, are solely deities of life. Death, the only fate of man, is controlled by the furies—the archaic deities more closely related to elemental forces than the more spiritual Olympians. It is not fated that a man does anything but die. What he does with his life is up to him, including meting out justice. (In his Oresteia, Aeschylus presents a dramatic account of Athena and Apollo arguing successfully against the furies for the right of man to justice.) While the gods are powerless against death and care nothing for justice, they often work with a man’s fate to allow a maximum amount of honor and glory. For a form of life that spiritualizes life, honor, and glory, a “call to justice is . . . a sign of the de-deification of the world” and evidence of a mobbish right to prosperity and slavish assumption that someone may be blamed for one’s suffering a lack of prosperity (p. 258).

It is important to remember that Homer was the basis of Classical Greek culture. The deities and heroic men and women he described originated the shared values, mores, and conditions of possibility of the many Greek peoples. Homeric models of heroism and nobility became the boundary marker between the Greek and the barbarian. The metaphors used by the nobility and freemen alike came from Homer, as did the bases of truth, beauty, and good reasoning. The Homeric Gods gives ample reasons why this was so. With its Nietzschean undertones (Nietzsche is only mentioned once in the book) and its clear delineation of what separates the Homeric from the Judaic, Otto’s study must have been intended to bolster the Fascist reawakening of Classical feeling in European man; for it paints a picture of the very type anti-humanist (Nietzschean) humanism that characterizes so much of Fascist political mythology and philosophy. What makes Otto’s The Homeric Gods so important, in this light, is its sheer monumentality. It explains that Greek humanism was anything but secular, and deified the greatest potentials of human life. It places life clearly in the control of man, with the understanding that greatness is only achievable through actions worthy of the gods. The book is designed to inspire—to make Athena’s touch be felt again—and to give notice that bourgeois modern men will be unforgivingly outmatched by those seeking glory rather than comfort.

The Homeric Gods is no substitute for the remarkable experience of reading or hearing Homer’s epics. However, it is a companion that will deepen one’s experience of Homer so much that Dominique Venner’s suggestion that his epics act as a “European bible” will make perfect sense.[15] Of course, heroic men of the Homeric ideal have no need of a bible—just as the Nietzschean ideal would chafe at the blasphemy of suggesting Zarathustra as a bible. If bible is a strong word—intended only for the weakest ears, that is—perhaps Homer can instead act as guidebook of the European peoples’ capacity for greatness.

In any case Homer, and Homeric religion, is exemplary, and demonstrate a system of valuation at extraordinary odds with modern bourgeois man. Perhaps modernity has destroyed man’s ability to act as heroically as the ideals and deities of Homer would expect of their heirs. Certainly it has delimited his freedom to do so. But, “history,” Nietzsche advised in a notebook entry, “must speak only of the great and unique, of the model to be emulated.”[16] That, as Venner explains, is exactly what we have in Homer: “To be noble and brave for a man, to be gentle, loving, and faithful for a woman. [Homer] bequeathed a digest of what Greece offered thereafter to posterity: nature as model, the striving towards beauty, the creative force that strives always to surpass, excellence as the ideal of life.”[17]

Notes

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, Writings from the Early Notebooks, ed. Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas. Trans. Ladislaus Löb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 203.

[2] Walter F. Otto, The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, Trans. Moses Hadas. Reprint Edition (North Stratford, NH: Ayer Company Publishers, 2001), p.12.

[3] Pierre Krebs, Fighting for the Essence: Western Enthnosuicide or European Renaissance? Trans. Dr. Alexander Jacob (London: Arktos, 2012), pp. 46–47.

[4] Alain de Benoist, On Being a Pagan, ed. Greg Johnson, trans. Jon Graham (Atlanta: Ultra, 2004).

[5] Collin Cleary, “Paganism Without Gods,” in Summoning The Gods, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2011), pp. 62–80.

[6] I assume everyone has read and re-read both The Iliad and The Odyssey. If not, drop everything, get an audiobook, and listen to these epics.

[7] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert B. Pippin. Trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 42.

[8] Herodotus, The Landmark Herodotus: The Histories, ed. Robert B. Strassler. Trans. Andrea L. Purvis (New York: Pantheon, 2007), pp. 112–15.

[9] There is no distinction to be made between postmodern and Left.

[10] Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990).

[11] Elizabeth Vandiver, Heroes in Herodotus: The Interaction of Myth and History (New York: Peter Lang, 1991).

[12] Guillaume Faye, “Mars and Hephaestus: The Return of History,” trans. Greg Johnson, in North American New Right, Volume 1, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2012), p. 239.

[13] Space and necessity permit only a focus on Athena and Apollo. The Homeric Gods offers chapter-length examinations of Athena, Apollo, Artemis, Aphrodite, and Hermes; while Ares, Poseidon, and Hephaestus also feature heavily.

[14] Zeev Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution, trans. David Maisel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[15] Dominique Venner, “Homer: The European Bible,” trans. Greg Johnson, in North American New Right, Volume 1, ed. Greg Johnson (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2012), pp. 220–36.

[16] Nietzsche, Early Notebooks, 95.

[17] Venner, 226.

 


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mercredi, 04 juillet 2012

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics
Part 1: The Aim & Elements of Politics

Posted By Greg Johnson

Part 1 of 2

Author’s Note:

The following introduction to Aristotle’s Politics focuses on the issues of freedom and popular government. It is a reworking of a more “academic” text penned in 2001.

250px-Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575.jpg

1. The Necessity of Politics

Aristotle is famous for holding that man is by nature a political animal. But what does this mean? Aristotle explains that,

even when human beings are not in need of each other’s help, they have no less desire to live together, though it is also true that the common advantage draws them into union insofar as noble living is something they each partake of. So this above all is the end, whether for everyone in common or for each singly (Politics 3.6, 1278b19–22).[1]

Here Aristotle contrasts two different needs of the human soul that give rise to different forms of community, one pre-political and the other political.

The first need is material. On this account, men form communities to secure the necessities of life. Because few are capable of fulfilling all their needs alone, material self-interest forces them to co-operate, each developing his particular talents and trading his products with others. The classical example of such a community is the “city of pigs” in the second book of Plato’s Republic.

The second need is spiritual. Even in the absence of material need, human beings will form communities because only through community can man satisfy his spiritual need to live nobly, i.e., to achieve eudaimonia, happiness or well-being, which Aristotle defines as a life of unimpeded virtuous activity.

Aristotle holds that the forms of association which arise from material needs are pre-political. These include the family, the master-slave relationship, the village, the market, and alliances for mutual defense. With the exception of the master-slave relationship, the pre-political realm could be organized on purely libertarian, capitalist principles. Individual rights and private property could allow individuals to associate and disassociate freely by means of persuasion and trade, according to their own determination of their interests.

But in Politics 3.9, Aristotle denies that the realm of material needs, whether organized on libertarian or non-libertarian lines, could ever fully satisfy man’s spiritual need for happiness: “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (1280a31), and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (1281a2). Aristotle’s clearest repudiation of any minimalistic form of liberalism is the following passage:

Nor do people come together for the sake of an alliance to prevent themselves from being wronged by anyone, nor again for purposes of mutual exchange and mutual utility. Otherwise the Etruscans and Carthaginians and all those who have treaties with each other would be citizens of one city. . . . [But they are not] concerned about what each other’s character should be, not even with the aim of preventing anyone subject to the agreements from becoming unjust or acquiring a single depraved habit. They are concerned only that they should not do any wrong to each other. But all those who are concerned about a good state of law concentrate their attention on political virtue and vice, from which it is manifest that the city truly and not verbally so called must make virtue its care. (1280a34–b7)

Aristotle does not disdain mutual exchange and mutual protection. But he thinks that the state must do more. It must concern itself with the character of the citizen; it must encourage virtue and discourage vice.

But why does Aristotle think that the pursuit of virtue is political at all, much less the defining characteristic of the political? Why does he reject the liberal principle that whether and how men pursue virtue is an ineluctably private choice? The ultimate anthropological foundation of Aristotelian political science is man’s neoteny. Many animals can fend for themselves as soon as they are born. But man is born radically immature and incapable of living on his own. We need many years of care and education. Nature does not give us the ability to survive, much less flourish. But she gives us the ability to acquire the ability. Skills are acquired abilities to live. Virtue is the acquired ability to live well. The best way to acquire virtue is not through trial and error, but through education, which allows us to benefit from the trials and avoid the errors of others. Fortune permitting, if we act virtuously, we will live well.

Liberals often claim that freedom of choice is a necessary condition of virtue. We can receive no moral credit for a virtue which is not freely chosen but is instead forced upon us. Aristotle, however, holds that force is a necessary condition of virtue. Aristotle may have defined man as the rational animal, but unlike the Sophists of his day he did not think that rational persuasion is sufficient to instill virtue:

. . . if reasoned words were sufficient by themselves to make us decent, they would, to follow a remark of Theognis, justly carry off many and great rewards, and the thing to do would be to provide them. But, as it is, words seem to have the strength to incite and urge on those of the young who are generous and to get a well-bred character and one truly in love with the noble to be possessed by virtue; but they appear incapable of inciting the many toward becoming gentlemen. For the many naturally obey the rule of fear, not of shame, and shun what is base not because it is ugly but because it is punished. Living by passion as they do, they pursue their own pleasures and whatever will bring these pleasures about . . . ; but of the noble and truly pleasant they do not even have the notion, since they have never tasted it. How could reasoned words reform such people? For it is not possible, or nor easy, to replace by reason what has long since become fixed in the character. (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1179b4–18)

The defect of reason can, however, be corrected by force: “Reason and teaching by no means prevail in everyone’s case; instead, there is need that the hearer’s soul, like earth about to nourish the seed, be worked over in its habits beforehand so as to enjoy and hate in a noble way. . . . Passion, as a general rule, does not seem to yield to reason but to force” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1179b23–25). The behavioral substratum of virtue is habit, and habits can be inculcated by force. Aristotle describes law as “reasoned speech that proceeds from prudence and intellect” but yet “has force behind it” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a18). Therefore, the compulsion of the appropriate laws is a great aid in acquiring virtue.

At this point, however, one might object that Aristotle has established only a case for parental, not political, force in moral education. Aristotle admits that only in Sparta and a few other cities is there public education in morals, while “In most cities these matters are neglected, and each lives as he wishes, giving sacred law, in Cyclops’ fashion, to his wife and children” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a24–27). Aristotle grants that an education adapted to an individual is better than an education given to a group (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180b7). But this is an argument against the collective reception of education, not the collective provision. He then argues that such an education is best left to experts, not parents. Just as parents have professional doctors care for their childrens’ bodies, they should have professional educators care for their souls (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180b14–23). But this does not establish that the professionals should be employees of the state.

Two additional arguments for public education are found in Politics 8.1:

[1] Since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that everyone must also have one and the same education and that taking care of this education must be a common matter. It must not be private in the way that it is now, when everyone takes care of their own children privately and teaches them whatever private learning they think best. Of common things, the training must be common. [2] At the same time, no citizen should even think he belongs to himself but instead that each belongs to the city, for each is part of the city. The care of each part, however, naturally looks to the care of the whole, and to this extent praise might be due to the Spartans, for they devote the most serious attention to their children and do so in common. (Politics, 8.1 [5.1], 1337a21–32)

The second argument is both weak and question-begging. Although it may be useful for citizens to “think” that they belong to the city, not themselves, Aristotle offers no reason to think that this is true. Furthermore, the citizens would not think so unless they received precisely the collective education that needs to be established. The first argument, however, is quite strong. If the single, overriding aim of political life is the happiness of the citizens, and if this aim is best attained by public education, then no regime can be legitimate if it fails to provide public education.[2]

Another argument for public moral education can be constructed from the overall argument of the Politics. Since public education is more widely distributed than private education, other things being equal, the populace will become more virtuous on the whole. As we shall see, it is widespread virtue that makes popular government possible. Popular government is, moreover, one of the bulwarks of popular liberty. Compulsory public education in virtue, therefore, is a bulwark of liberty.

2. Politics and Freedom

Aristotle’s emphasis on compulsory moral education puts him in the “positive” libertarian camp. For Aristotle, a free man is not merely any man who lives in a free society. A free man possesses certain traits of character which allow him to govern himself responsibly and attain happiness. These traits are, however, the product of a long process of compulsory tutelage. But such compulsion can be justified only by the production of a free and happy individual, and its scope is therefore limited by this goal. Since Aristotle ultimately accepted the Socratic principle that all men desire happiness, education merely compels us to do what we really want. It frees us from our own ignorance, folly, and irrationality and frees us for our own self-actualization. This may be the rationale for Aristotle’s claim that, “the law’s laying down of what is decent is not oppressive” (Nicomachean Ethics, 10.9, 1180a24). Since Aristotle thinks that freedom from the internal compulsion of the passions is more important than freedom from the external compulsion of force, and that force can quell the passions and establish virtue’s empire over them, Aristotle as much as Rousseau believes that we can be forced to be free.

But throughout the Politics, Aristotle shows that he is concerned to protect “negative” liberty as well. In Politics 2.2–5, Aristotle ingeniously defends private families, private property, and private enterprise from Plato’s communistic proposals in the Republic, thereby preserving the freedom of large spheres of human activity.

Aristotle’s concern with privacy is evident in his criticism of a proposal of Hippodamus of Miletus which would encourage spies and informers (2.8, 1268b22).

Aristotle is concerned to create a regime in which the rich do not enslave the poor and the poor do not plunder the rich (3.10, 1281a13–27).

Second Amendment enthusiasts will be gratified at Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of a wide distribution of arms in maintaining the freedom of the populace (2.8, 1268a16-24; 3.17, 1288a12–14; 4.3 [6.3], 1289b27–40; 4.13 [6.13], 1297a12–27; 7.11 [4.11], 1330b17–20).

War and empire are great enemies of liberty, so isolationists and peace lovers will be gratified by Aristotle’s critique of warlike regimes and praise of peace. The good life requires peace and leisure. War is not an end in itself, but merely a means to ensure peace (7.14 [4.14], 1334a2–10; 2.9, 1271a41–b9).

The best regime is not oriented outward, toward dominating other peoples, but inward, towards the happiness of its own. The best regime is an earthly analogue of the Prime Mover. It is self-sufficient and turned inward upon itself (7.3 [4.3], 1325a14–31). Granted, Aristotle may not think that negative liberty is the whole of the good life, but it is an important component which needs to be safeguarded.[3]

3. The Elements of Politics and the Mixed Regime

Since the aim of political association is the good life, the best political regime is the one that best delivers the good life. Delivering the good life can be broken down into two components: production and distribution. There are two basic kinds of goods: the goods of the body and the goods of the soul.[4] Both sorts of goods can be produced and distributed privately and publicly, but Aristotle treats the production and distribution of bodily goods as primarily private whereas he treats the production and distribution of spiritual goods as primarily public. The primary goods of the soul are moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city.[5] The principle of distributive justice is defined as proportionate equality: equally worthy people should be equally happy and unequally worthy people should be unequally happy, commensurate with their unequal worth (Nicomachean Ethics, 5.6–7). The best regime, in short, combines happiness and justice.

But how is the best regime to be organized? Aristotle builds his account from at least three sets of elements.

First, in Politics 3.6–7, Aristotle observes that sovereignty can rest either with men or with laws. If with men, then it can rest in one man, few men, or many men. (Aristotle treats it as self-evident that it cannot rest in all men.) The rulers can exercise political power for two different ends: for the common good and for special interests. One pursues the common good by promoting the happiness of all according to justice. Special interests can be broken down into individual or factional interests. A ruler can be blamed for pursuing such goods only if he does so without regard to justice, i.e., without a just concern for the happiness of all. When a single man rules for the common good, we have kingship. When he rules for his own good, we have tyranny. When the few rule for the common good, we have aristocracy. When they rule for their factional interest, we have oligarchy. When the many rule for the common good, we have polity. When they rule for their factional interest, we have democracy. These six regimes can exist in pure forms, or they can be mixed together.

Second, Aristotle treats social classes as elemental political distinctions. In Politics 3.8 he refines his definitions of oligarchy and democracy, claiming that oligarchy is actually the rule by the rich, whether they are few or many, and democracy is rule by the poor, whether they are few or many. Similarly, in Politics 4.11 (6.1) Aristotle also defines polity as rule by the middle class. In Politics 4.4 (6.4), Aristotle argues that the social classes are irreducible political distinctions. One can be a rich, poor, or middle class juror, legislator, or office-holder. One can be a rich, poor, or middle class farmer or merchant. But one cannot be both rich and poor at the same time (1291b2–13). Class distinctions cannot be eliminated; therefore, they have to be recognized and respected, their disadvantages meliorated and their advantages harnessed for the common good.

Third, in Politics 4.14 (6.14), Aristotle divides the activities of rulership into three different functions: legislative, judicial, and executive.[6]

Because rulership can be functionally divided, it is possible to create a mixed regime by assigning different functions to different parts of the populace. One could, for instance, mix monarchy and elite rule by assigning supreme executive office to a single man and the legislative and judicial functions to the few. Or one could divide the legislative function into different houses, assigning one to the few and another to the many. Aristotle suggests giving the few the power to legislate and the many the power to veto legislation. He suggests that officers be elected by the many, but nominated from the few. The few should make expenditures, but the many should audit them (2.12, 1274a15–21; 3.11, 1281b21–33; 4.14 [6.14], 1298b26–40).

In Politics 3.10, Aristotle argues that some sort of mixed regime is preferable, since no pure regime is satisfactory: “A difficulty arises as to what should be the controlling part of the city, for it is really either the multitude or the rich or the decent or the best one of all or a tyrant? But all of them appear unsatisfactory” (1281a11–13). Democracy is bad because the poor unjustly plunder the substance of the rich; oligarchy is bad because the rich oppress and exploit the poor; tyranny is bad because the tyrant does injustice to everyone (1281a13–28). Kingship and aristocracy are unsatisfactory because they leave the many without honors and are schools for snobbery and high-handedness (1281a28–33; 4.11 [6.11], 1295b13ff). A pure polity might be unsatisfactory because it lacks a trained leadership caste and is therefore liable to make poor decisions (3.11, 1281b21–33).

4. Checks and Balances, Political Rule, and the Rule of Law

Aristotle’s mixed regime is the origin of the idea of the separation of powers and “checks and balances.” It goes hand in hand with a very modern political realism. Aristotle claims that, “all regimes that look to the common advantage turn out, according to what is simply just, to be correct ones, while those that look only to the advantage of their rulers are mistaken and are all deviations from the correct regime. For they are despotic, but the city is a community of the free” (3.6, 1279a17–21).

It is odd, then, that in Politics 4.8–9 (6.8–9) Aristotle describes the best regime as a mixture of two defective regimes, oligarchy and democracy–not of two correct regimes, aristocracy and polity. But perhaps Aristotle entertained the possibility of composing a regime that tends to the common good out of classes which pursue their own factional interests.

Perhaps Aristotle thought that the “intention” to pursue the common good can repose not in the minds of individual men, but in the institutional logic of the regime itself. This would be an enormous advantage, for it would bring about the common good without having to rely entirely upon men of virtue and good will, who are in far shorter supply than men who pursue their own individual and factional advantages.

Related to the mixed regime with its checks and balances is the notion of “political rule.” Political rule consists of ruling and being ruled in turn:

. . . there is a sort of rule exercised over those who are similar in birth and free. This rule we call political rule, and the ruler must learn it by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander . . . Hence is was nobly said that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. And while virtue in these two cases is different, the good citizen must learn and be able both to be ruled and to rule. This is in fact the virtue of the citizen, to know rule over the free from both sides. (3.4, 1277b7–15; cf. 1.13, 1259b31–34 and 2.2, 1261a32–b3)

Aristotle makes it clear that political rule can exist only where the populace consists of men who are free, i.e., sufficiently virtuous that they can rule themselves. They must also be economically middle-class, well-armed, and warlike. They must, in short, be the sort of men who can participate responsibly in government, who want to participate, and who cannot safely be excluded. A populace that is slavish, vice-ridden, poor, and unarmed can easily be disenfranchised and exploited. If power were entirely in the hands of a free populace, the regime would be a pure polity, and political rule would exist entirely between equals. If, however, a free populace were to take part in a mixed regime, then political rule would exist between different parts of the regime. The many and the few would divide power and functions between them. Not only would members of each class take turns performing the different functions allotted to them, the classes themselves would rule over others in one respect and be ruled in another. In these circumstances, then, checks and balances are merely one form of political rule.

In Politics 3.16, Aristotle connects political rule to the rule of law:

What is just is that people exercise rule no more than they are subject to it and that therefore they rule by turns. But this is already law, for the arrangement is law. Therefore, it is preferable that law rule rather than any one of the citizens. And even if, to pursue the same argument, it were better that there be some persons exercising rule, their appointment should be as guardians and servants of the laws. For though there must be some offices, that there should be this one person exercising rule is, they say, not just, at least when all are similar. (1287a15–22)

Aristotle’s point is simple. If two men govern by turns, then sovereignty does not ultimately repose in either of them, but in the rule that they govern by turns. The same can be said of checks and balances. If the few spend money and the many audit the accounts, then neither group is sovereign, the laws are. If sovereignty reposes in laws, not men, the common good is safe. As Aristotle points out, “anyone who bids the laws to rule seems to bid god and intellect alone to rule, but anyone who bids a human being to rule adds on also the wild beast. For desire is such a beast and spiritedness perverts rulers even when they are the best of men. Hence law is intellect without appetite” (1287a23–31). The greatest enemy of the common good is private interest. The laws, however, have no private interests. Thus if our laws are conducive to the common good, we need not depend entirely on the virtue and public-spiritedness of men.

Aristotle would, however, hasten to add that no regime can do without these characteristics entirely, for the laws cannot apply themselves. They must be applied by men, and their application will seldom be better than the men who apply them. Furthermore, even though a regime may function without entirely virtuous citizens, no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens, for the whole purpose of political association is to instill the virtues necessary for happiness.

Notes

1. All quotes from Aristotle are from The Politics of Aristotle, trans. and ed. Peter L. Phillips Simpson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Simpson’s edition has two unique features. First, The Politics is introduced by a translation of Nicomachean Ethics 10.9. Second, Simpson moves books 7 and 8 of The Politics, positioning them between the traditional books 3 and 4. I retain the traditional ordering, indicating Simpson’s renumbering parenthetically. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are from The Politics. Quotes from the Nicomachean Ethics will be indicated as such.

2. A useful commentary on these and other Aristotelian arguments for public education is Randall R. Curren, Aristotle on the Necessity of Public Education (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

3. For a fuller discussion of the value Aristotle puts on liberty, see Roderick T. Long, “Aristotle’s Conception of Freedom,” The Review of Metaphysics 49, no. 4 (June 1996), pp. 787–802.

4. One could add a third category of instrumental goods, but these goods are instrumental to the intrinsic goods of the body, the soul, or both, and thus could be classified under those headings.

5. As for the highest good of the soul, which is attained by philosophy, Aristotle’s flight from Athens near the end of his life shows that he recognized that different political orders can be more or less open to free thought, but I suspect that he was realist enough (and Platonist enough) to recognize that even the best cities are unlikely to positively cultivate true freedom to philosophize. I would wager that Aristotle would be both surprised at the freedom of thought in the United States and receptive to Tocquevillian complaints about the American tendency toward conformism that makes such freedom unthreatening to the reigning climate of opinion. A cynic might argue that if Americans actually made use of their freedom of thought, it would be quickly taken away.

6. On the complexities of the executive role in the Politics, see Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence of Modern Executive Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chs. 2–3.

Introduction to Aristotle’s Politics
Part 2: In Defense of Popular Government

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Part 2 of 2

5. The Good Man and the Good Citizen

Having now surveyed Aristotle’s thoughts on the elements and proper aim of politics, we can now examine his arguments for popular government. When I use the phrase “popular government,” it should be borne in mind that Aristotle does not advocate a pure polity, but a mixed regime with a popular element.

Aristotle’s first case for bringing the many into government can be discerned in Politics 3.4. Aristotle’s question is whether the virtues of the good man and the good citizen are the same. They are not the same, insofar as the virtue of the good citizen is defined relative to the regime, and there are many different regimes, while the virtue of the good man is defined relative to human nature, which is one. One can therefore be a good citizen but not a good man, and a good man but not a good citizen. History is replete with examples of regimes which punish men for their virtues and reward them for their vices. Aristotle does, however, allow that the good man and the good citizen can be one in a regime in which the virtues required of a good citizen do not differ from the virtues of a good man.

The chief virtue of a good man is prudence. But prudence is not required of a citizen insofar as he is ruled. Only obedience is required. Prudence is, however, required of a citizen insofar as he rules. Since the best regime best encourages happiness by best cultivating virtue, a regime which allows the many to govern along with the few is better than a regime which excludes them. By including the many in ruling, a popular regime encourages the widest cultivation of prudence and gives the greatest opportunity for its exercise. The best way to bring the many into the regime is what Aristotle calls political rule: ruling and being ruled in turn, as prescribed by law.

Political rule not only teaches the virtue of prudence to the many, it teaches the virtue of being ruled to the few, who must give way in turn to the many. Since the few aspire to rule but not be ruled, Aristotle argues that they cannot rule without first having been ruled: “the ruler must learn [political rule] by being ruled, just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander . . . Hence is was nobly said that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. And while virtue in these two cases is different, the good citizen must learn and be able both to be ruled and to rule. This is, in fact, the virtue of a citizen, to know rule over the free from both sides. Indeed, the good man too possesses both” (3.4, 1277b7–16).

Aristotle names justice as a virtue which is learned both in ruling and being ruled. Those born to wealth and power are liable to arrogance and the love of command. By subjecting them to the rule of others, including their social inferiors, they learn to respect their freedom and justly appraise their worth.

6. Potlucks, Chimeras, Juries

Aristotle’s next case for bringing the many into the regime is found in Politics 3.11.[1] Aristotle seeks to rebut the aristocratic argument against popular participation, namely that the best political decisions are wise ones, but wisdom is found only among the few, not the many. Popular participation, therefore, would inevitably dilute the quality of the political decision-makers, increasing the number of foolish decisions. Aristotle accepts the premise that the wise should rule, but he argues that there are circumstances in which the few and the many together are wiser than the few on their own. The aristocratic principle, therefore, demands the participation of the many:

. . . the many, each of whom is not a serious man, nevertheless could, when they have come together, be better than those few best–not, indeed, individually but as a whole, just as meals furnished collectively are better than meals furnished at one person’s expense. For each of them, though many, could have a part of virtue and prudence, and just as they could, when joined together in a multitude, become one human being with many feet, hands, and senses, so also could they become one in character and thought. That is why the many are better judges of the works of music and the poets, for one of them judges one part and another another and all of them the whole. (1281a42–b10)

At first glance, this argument seems preposterous. History and everyday life are filled with examples of wise individuals opposing foolish collectives. But Aristotle does not claim that the many are always wiser than the few, simply that they can be under certain conditions (1281b15).

The analogy of the potluck supper is instructive (cf. 3.15, 1286a28–30).[2] A potluck supper can be better than one provided by a single person if it offers a greater number and variety of dishes and diffuses costs and labor. But potluck suppers are not always superior–that is the “luck” in it. Potlucks are often imbalanced. On one occasion, there may be too many desserts and no salads. On another, three people may bring chicken and no one brings beef or pork. The best potluck, therefore, is a centrally orchestrated one which mobilizes the resources of many different contributors but ensures a balanced and wholesome meal.

Likewise, the best way to include the many in political decision-making is to orchestrate their participation, giving them a delimited role that maximizes their virtues and minimizes their vices. This cannot be accomplished in a purely popular regime, particularly a lawless one, but it can be accomplished in a mixed regime in which the participation of the populace is circumscribed by law and checked by the interests of other elements of the population.

Aristotle’s second analogy–which likens the intellectual and moral unity of the many to a man with many feet, hands, and sense organs, i.e., a freak of nature–does not exactly assuage doubters. But his point is valid. While even the best of men may lack a particular virtue, it is unlikely that it will be entirely absent from a large throng. Therefore, the many are potentially as virtuous or even more virtuous than the few if their scattered virtues can be gathered together and put to work. But history records many examples of groups acting less morally than any member on his own. Thus the potential moral superiority of the many is unlikely to emerge in a lawless democracy. But it could emerge in a lawful mixed regime, which actively encourages and employs the virtues of the many while checking their vices. This process can be illustrated by adapting an analogy that Aristotle offers to illustrate another point: A painting of a man can be more beautiful than any real man, for the painter can pick out the best features of individual men and combine them into a beautiful whole (3.11, 1281b10–11).

Aristotle illustrates the potential superiority of collective judgment with another questionable assertion, that “the many are better judges of the works of music and the poets, for one of them judges one part and another another and all of them the whole.” Again, this seems preposterous. Good taste, like wisdom, is not widely distributed and is cultivated by the few, not the many. Far more people buy “rap” recordings than classical ones. But Aristotle is not claiming that the many are better judges in all cases. Aristotle is likely referring to Greek dramatic competitions. These competitions were juried by the audience, not a small number of connoisseurs.

A jury trial or competition is a genuine collective decision-making process in which each juror is morally enjoined to pay close attention the matter at hand and to render an objective judgment.[3] Although each juror has his own partial impression, when jurors deliberate they can add their partial impressions together to arrive at a more complete and adequate account. To the extent that a jury decision must approach unanimity, the jurors will be motivated to examine the issue from all sides and persuade one another to move toward a rationally motivated consensus. A jury decision can, therefore, be more rational, well-informed, and objective than an individual one.[4] The market, by contrast, is not a collective decision-making process. It does not require a consumer to compare his preferences to those of others, to persuade others of their validity or defend them from criticism, or to arrive at any sort of consensus. Instead, the market merely registers the collective effects of individual decisions.[5]

7. Freedom and Stability

Another argument for popular government in Politics 3.11 (1281b21–33) is that it is more stable. Aristotle grants the Aristocratic principle that it is not safe for the populace to share in “the greatest offices” because, “on account of their injustice and unwisdom, they would do wrong in some things and go wrong in others.” But then he goes on to argue that it would not be safe to exclude the many from rule altogether, since a city “that has many in it who lack honor and are poor must of necessity be full of enemies,” which would be a source of instability. Instability is, however, inconsistent with the proper aim of politics, for the good life requires peace. The solution is a mixed regime which ensures peace and stability by allowing the many to participate in government, but not to occupy the highest offices. In Politics 2.9, Aristotle praises the Spartan Ephorate for holding the regime together, “since, as the populace share in the greatest office, it keeps them quiet. . . . For if any regime is going to survive, all the parts of the city must want it both to exist and to remain as it is” (1270b17–22; cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the Carthaginians in 2.9, 1272b29–32; see also 4.13 [6.13], 1297b6).

In Politics 2.12, Aristotle offers another reason for including the populace in government. Solon gave the populace, “the power that was most necessary (electing to office and auditing the accounts), since without it they would have been enslaved and hostile” (1274a4–6). Here Aristotle makes it clear that he values liberty, and he values popular government because it protects the liberty of the many.

8. Expert Knowledge

In Politics 3.11 Aristotle rebuts the argument that the many should not be involved in politics because they are amateurs, and decisions in politics, as in medicine and other fields, should be left to experts. In response to this, Aristotle repeats his argument that the many, taken together, may be better judges than a few experts. He then adds that there are some arts in which the products can be appreciated by people who do not possess the art: “Appreciating a house, for example, does not just belong to the builder; the one who uses it, namely the household manager, will pass an even better judgment on it. Likewise, the pilot judges the rudder better than the carpenter and the dinner guest judges the feast better than the chef” (1282a19–22). If the art of statesmanship is like these, then the best judge of the quality of a statesman is not the few political experts, but the many political laymen who are ruled by him. The judgment of the populace should not, therefore, be disdained.

9. Resistance to Corruption

In Politics 3.15 Aristotle argues that popular regimes are more resistant to corruption. Even in a regime in which law ultimately rules, there are particular circumstances which the laws do not anticipate. Where the law cannot decide, men must do so. But this creates an opportunity for corruption. Aristotle argues that such decisions are better made by large bodies deliberating in public: “What is many is more incorruptible: the multitude, like a greater quantity of water, is harder to ruin than a few. A single person’s judgment must necessarily be corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other such passion, but getting everyone in the other case to become angry and go wrong at the same time takes a lot of doing. Let the multitude in question, however, be the free who are acting in no way against law, except where law is necessarily deficient” (1286a33–38). Aristotle’s argument that the many may collectively possess fewer vices than the few is merely a mirror image of his earlier collective virtue argument. Here, as elsewhere, Aristotle defends popular government only under delimited circumstances. The populace must be free, not slavish, and they must decide only when the laws cannot.

10. Delegation and Diffusion of Power

Politics 3.16 is devoted to arguments against total kingship. One of these arguments can be turned into a case for popular government. Aristotle claims that total kingship is unsustainable: “It is not easy for one person to oversee many things, so there will need to be many officials appointed in subordination to him. Consequently, what is the difference between having them there right from the start and having one man in this way appoint them? . . . if a man who is serious is justly ruler because he is better, then two good men are better than one” (1287b8–12, cf. 1287b25–29).

Since total kingship is unworkable, kings must necessarily appoint superior men as “peers” to help them. But if total kingship must create an aristocracy, then why not have aristocracy from the start?

This argument could, however, be pushed further to make a case for popular government. An aristocracy cannot effectively rule the people without the active participation of some and the passive acquiescence of the rest. As we have seen above, Aristotle argues that the best way to bring this about is popular government. But if aristocracy must eventually bring the populace into the regime, then why not include them from the very beginning?

11. When Regimes Fail

In Politics 4.2 (6.2), Aristotle returns to his list of pure regime types. The three just regimes are kingship, aristocracy, and polity; the three unjust ones are tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Aristotle proceeds to rank the three just regimes in terms of the kinds of virtues they require. Thus Aristotle identifies kingship and aristocracy as the best regimes because they are both founded on “fully equipped virtue” (1289a31). Of the two, kingship is the very best, for it depends upon a virtue so superlative that it is possessed by only one man. Aristocracy is less exalted because it presupposes somewhat more broadly distributed and therefore less exalted virtue. Polity depends upon even more widespread and modest virtue. Furthermore, the populace, unlike kings and aristocrats, lacks the full complement of material equipment necessary to fully exercise such virtues as magnificence.

By this ranking, polity is not the best regime, but the least of the good ones. But Aristotle then offers a new, politically realistic standard for ranking the just regimes which reverses their order. Kingship may be the best regime from a morally idealistic perspective, but when it degenerates it turns into tyranny, which is the worst regime. Aristocracy may be the second best regime from a morally idealistic perspective, but when it degenerates it turns into oligarchy, which is the second worst regime. Polity may be the third choice of the moral idealist, but when it degenerates, it merely becomes democracy, which is the best of a bad lot.

Since degeneration is inevitable, the political realist ranks regimes not only in terms of their best performances, but also in terms of their worst. By this standard, polity is the best of the good regimes and kingship the worst. Kingship is best under ideal conditions, polity under real conditions. Kingship is a sleek Jaguar, polity a dowdy Volvo. On the road, the Jaguar is clearly better. But when they go in the ditch, the Volvo shows itself to be the better car overall.

12. The Middle Class Regime

Aristotle displays the same political realism in his praise of the middle class regime in Politics 4.11 (6.11): “If we judge neither by a virtue that is beyond the reach of private individuals, nor by an education requiring a nature and equipment dependent on chance, nor again a regime that is as one would pray for, but by a way of life that most can share in common together and by a regime that most cities can participate in . . . ,” then a large, politically enfranchised middle class has much to recommend it: “In the case of political community . . . the one that is based on those in the middle is best, and . . . cities capable of being well governed are those sorts where the middle is large . . .” (1295b35–36).

Since the middle class is the wealthier stratum of the common people, Aristotle’s arguments for middle class government are ipso facto arguments for popular government. Aristotle makes it clear from the beginning, however, that he is not talking about a purely popular regime, but a mixed one compounded out of a middle class populace and those elements of aristocracy which are not out of the reach of most cities (1295a30–34).

Aristotle’s first argument for the middle regime seems a sophistry: “If it was nobly said in the Ethics that the happy way of life is unimpeded life in accordance with virtue and that virtue is a mean, then necessarily the middle way of life, the life of a mean that everyone can attain, must be best. The same definitions must hold also for the virtue and vice of city and regime, since the regime is a certain way of life of a city” (1295a35–40).

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes it clear that the fact that virtue can be understood as a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect, does not imply either that virtue is merely an arithmetic mean (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.2, 1106a26–b8), or that virtue is to be regarded as mediocrity, not as superlative (Nicomachean Ethics, 2.2, 1107a9–27). Here, however, Aristotle describes the mean not as a superlative, but as a mediocrity “that everyone can attain.” This conclusion follows only if we presuppose that the morally idealistic doctrine of the Ethics has been modified into a moral realism analogous to the political realism of Politics 4.2.

Aristotle then claims that in a regime the mean lies in the middle class: “In all cities there are in fact three parts: those who are exceedingly well-off, those who are exceedingly needy, and the third who are in the middle of these two. So, since it is agreed that the mean and middle is best, then it is manifest that a middling possession also of the goods of fortune must be best of all” (1295b1–3). Aristotle is, however, equivocating. He begins by defining the middle class as an arithmetic mean between the rich and the poor. He concludes that the middle class is a moral mean. But he does not establish that the arithmetic mean corresponds with the moral.

Aristotle does, however, go on to offer reasons for thinking that the social mean corresponds to the moral mean. But the middle class is not necessarily more virtuous because its members have been properly educated, but because their social position and class interests lead them to act as if they had been.

First, Aristotle argues that “the middle most easily obeys reason.” Those who are “excessively beautiful or strong or well-born or wealthy” find it hard to follow reason, because they tend to be “insolent and rather wicked in great things.” By contrast, those who are poor and “extremely wretched and weak, and have an exceeding lack of honor” tend to become “villains and too much involved in petty wickedness.” The middle class is, however, too humble to breed insolence and too well-off to breed villainy. Since most injustices arise from insolence and villainy, a regime with a strong middle class will be more likely to be just.

Second, Aristotle argues that the middle class is best suited to ruling and being ruled in turn. Those who enjoy, “an excess of good fortune (strength, wealth, friends, and other things of the sort)” love to rule and dislike being ruled. Both of these attitudes are harmful to the city, yet they naturally arise among the wealthy. From an early age, the wealthy are instilled with a “love of ruing and desire to rule, both of which are harmful to cities” (1295b12), and, “because of the luxury they live in, being ruled is not something they get used to, even at school” (1295b13–17). By contrast, poverty breeds vice, servility, and small-mindedness. Thus the poor are easy to push around, and if they do gain power they are incapable of exercising it virtuously. Therefore, without a middle class, “a city of slaves and masters arises, not a city of the free, and the first are full of envy while the second are full of contempt.” Such a city must be “at the furthest remove from friendship and political community” (1295b21–24). The presence of a strong middle class, however, binds the city into a whole, limiting the tendency of the rich to tyranny and the poor to slavishness, creating a “city of the free.”

Third, Aristotle argues that middle class citizens enjoy the safest and most stable lives, imbuing the regime as a whole with these characteristics. Those in the middle are, among all the citizens, the most likely to survive in times of upheaval, when the poor starve and the rich become targets. They are sufficiently content with their lot not to envy the possessions of the rich. Yet they are not so wealthy that the poor envy them. They neither plot against the rich nor are plotted against by the poor.

Fourth, a large middle class stabilizes a regime, particularly if the middle is “stronger than both extremes or, otherwise, than either one of them. For the middle will tip the balance when added to either side and prevent the emergence of an excess at the opposite extremes” (1295b36–40). Without a large and powerful middle class, “either ultimate rule of the populace arises or unmixed oligarchy does, or, because of excess on both sides, tyranny” (1296a3; cf. 6.12, 1297a6ff).

Fifth is the related point that regimes with large middle classes are relatively free of faction and therefore more concerned with the common good. This is because a large middle class makes it harder to separate everyone out into two groups (1296a7–10).

Finally, Aristotle claims that one sign of the superiority of middle class regimes is that the best legislators come from the middle class. As examples, he cites Solon, Lycurgus, and Charondas (1296a18–21).

Conclusion: Aristotle’s Polity and Our Own

If the proper aim of government is to promote the happiness of the citizen, Aristotle marshals an impressive array of arguments for giving the people, specifically the middle class, a role in government. These arguments can be grouped under five headings: virtue, rational decision-making, freedom, stability, and resistance to corruption.

Popular government both presupposes and encourages widespread virtue among the citizens, and virtue is a necessary condition of happiness. Middle class citizens are particularly likely to follow practical reason and act justly, for they are corrupted neither by wealth nor by poverty. Popular participation can improve political decision-making by mobilizing scattered information and experience, and more informed decisions are more likely to promote happiness. In particular, popular government channels the experiences of those who are actually governed back into the decision-making process.

Popular participation preserves the freedom of the people, who would otherwise be exploited if they had no say in government. By preserving the freedom of the people, popular participation unifies the regime, promoting peace and stability which in turn are conducive to the pursuit of happiness. This is particularly the case with middle class regimes, for the middle class prevents excessive and destabilizing separation and between the extremes of wealth and poverty.

Popular governments are also more resistant to corruption. It is harder to use bribery or trickery to corrupt decisions made by many people deliberating together in public than by one person or a few deciding in private. This means that popular regimes are more likely to promote the common good instead of allowing the state to become a tool for the pursuit of one special interest at the expense of another. Furthermore, if a popular regime does become corrupt, it is most likely to become a democracy, which is the least unjust of the bad regimes and the easiest to reform.

All these are good arguments for giving the people a role in government. But not just any people. And not just any role.

First, Aristotle presupposes a small city-state. He did not think that any regime could pursue the common good if it became too large. This is particularly true of a popular regime, for the larger the populace, the less room any particular citizen has for meaningful participation.

Second, he presupposes a populace which is racially and culturally homogeneous. A more diverse population is subject to faction and strife. It will either break up into distinct communities or it will have to be held together by violence and governed by an elite. A more diverse population also erodes a society’s moral consensus, making moral education even more difficult.

Third, political participation will be limited to middle-class and wealthy property-owning males, specifically men who derive their income from the ownership of productive land, not merchants and craftsmen.

Fourth, Aristotle circumscribes the role of the populace by assigning it specific legal roles, such as the election of officers and the auditing of accounts–roles which are checked and balanced by the legal roles of the aristocratic element, such as occupying leadership positions.

If Aristotle is right about the conditions of popular government, then he would probably take a dim view of its prospects in America.

First and foremost, Aristotle would deplore America’s lack of concern with moral education. Aristotle’s disagreement would go beyond the obvious fact that the American founders did not make moral education the central concern of the state. America has neglected to cultivate even the minimal moral virtues required to maintain a liberal regime, virtues such as independence, personal responsibility, and basic civility.

Second, Aristotle would predict that multiculturalism and non-white immigration will destroy the cultural preconditions of popular government.

Third, Aristotle would reject America’s ever-widening franchise–particularly the extension of the vote to women, non-property owners, and cultural aliens–as a sure prescription for lowering the quality of public decision-making in the voting booth and jury room.

Fourth, Aristotle would be alarmed by the continuing erosion of the American working and middle classes by competition from foreign workers both inside and outside America’s borders. He would deplore America’s transformation from an agrarian to an industrial-mercantile civilization and support autarky rather than free trade and economic globalization.

Fifth, Aristotle would be alarmed by ongoing attempts to disarm the populace.

Sixth, he would condemn America’s imperialistic and warlike policies toward other nations.

Finally, Aristotle would likely observe that since genuine popular government is difficult with hundreds of thousands of citizens it will be impossible with hundreds of millions.

In short, if Aristotle were alive today, he would find himself to the right of Patrick J. Buchanan, decrying America’s decline from a republic to an empire. Aristotle challenges us to show whether and how liberty and popular government are compatible with feminism, multiculturalism, and globalized capitalism.

To conclude, however, on a more positive note: Although Aristotle gives reasons to think that the future of popular government in America is unpromising, he also gives reasons for optimism about the long-term prospects of popular government in general, for his defense of popular government is based on a realistic assessment of human nature, not only in its striving for perfection, but also in its propensity for failure.

Notes

1. For useful discussions of the arguments of Politics 3.11, see Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle’s Politics (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), 66–71, and Peter L. Phillips Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 166-71.

2. On the potluck supper analogy, see Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in Ancient Greek Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 222–24.

3. I wish to thank M. L. C. for suggesting the model of a jury trial.

4 . For a beautiful description of the deliberative process of a jury, see John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on Government, in Union and Liberty: The Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, ed. Ross M. Lence (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1992), 49–50.

5. Friedrich A. Hayek’s classic essay “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in his Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), argues that the market is superior to central planning because it better mobilizes widely scattered information. The market is, of course, larger than any possible jury and thus will always command more information. However, if one were to compare a market and a jury of the same size, the jury would clearly be a more rational decision-making process, for the market registers decisions based on perspectives which are in principle entirely solipsistic, whereas the jury requires a genuine dialogue which challenges all participants to transcend their partial and subjective perspectives and work toward a rational consensus which is more objective than any individual decision because it more adequately accounts for the phenomena in question than could any individual decision. It is this crucial disanalogy that seems to vitiate attempts to justify the market in terms of Gadamerian, Popperian, or Habermasian models and communicative rationality. For the best statement of this sort of approach, see G. B. Madison, The Political Economy of Civil Society and Human Rights (New York: Routledge, 1998), esp. chs. 3–5.

 


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jeudi, 26 avril 2012

Platon, encore et toujours

Platon, encore et toujours

par Claude BOURRINET

Est-il une époque dans laquelle la possibilité d’une prise de distance ait été si malaisée, presque iplatocooperativeindividualismorg.jpgmpossible, et pour beaucoup improbable ? Pourtant, les monuments écrits laissent entrevoir des situations que l’on pourrait nommer, au risque de l’anachronisme, « totalitaires », où non seulement l’on était sommé de prendre position, mais aussi de participer, de manifester son adhésion passivement ou activement.

L’Athènes antique, l’Empire byzantin, l’Europe médiévale, l’Empire omeyyade, et pour tout dire la plupart des systèmes socio-politiques, de la Chine à la pointe de l’Eurasie, et sans doute aussi dans l’Amérique précolombienne ou sur les îles étroites du Pacifique, les hommes se sont définis par rapport à un tout qui les englobait, et auquel ils devaient s’aliéner, c’est-à-dire abandonner une part plus ou moins grande de leur liberté.

S’il n’est pas facile de définir ce qu’est cette dernière, il l’est beaucoup plus de désigner les forces d’enrégimentement, pour peu justement qu’on en soit assez délivré pour pouvoir les percevoir. C’est d’ailleurs peut-être justement là un début de définition de ce que serait la « liberté », qui est avant tout une possibilité de voir, et donc de s’extraire un minimum pour acquérir le champ nécessaire de la perception.

Si nous survolons les siècles, nous constatons que la plupart des hommes sont « jetés » dans une situation, qu’ils n’ont certes pas choisie, parce que la naissance même les y a mis. Le fait brut des premières empreintes de la petite enfance, le visage maternel, les sons qui nous pénètrent, la structuration mentale induite par les stimuli, les expériences sensorielles, l’apprentissage de la langue, laquelle porte le legs d’une longue mémoire et découpe implicitement, et même formellement, par le verbe, le mot, les fonctions, le réel, l’éducation et le système de valeurs de l’entourage immédiat, tout cela s’impose comme le mode d’être naturel de l’individu, et produit une grande partie de son identité.

L’accent mis sur l’individu s’appelle individualisme. Notons au passage que cette entité sur laquelle semble reposer les possibilités d’existence est mise en doute par sa prétention à être indivisible. L’éclatement du moi, depuis la « mort de Dieu », du fondement métaphysique de sa pérennité, de sa légitimité, accentué par les coups de boutoir des philosophies du « soupçon », comme le marxisme, le nietzschéisme, la psychanalyse, le structuralisme, a invalidé tout régime s’en prévalant, quand bien même le temps semble faire triompher la démocratie, les droits de l’homme, qui supposent l’autonomie et l’intégrité de l’individu en tant que tel.

Les visions du monde ancien supposaient l’existence, dans l’homme, d’une instance solide de jugement et de décision. Les philosophies antiques, le stoïcisme, par exemple, qui a tant influencé le christianisme, mais aussi les religions, quelles qu’elles soient, païennes ou issues du judaïsme, ne mettent pas en doute l’existence du moi, à charge de le définir. Cependant, contrairement au monde moderne, qui a conçu le sujet, un ego détaché du monde, soit à partir de Hobbes dans le domaine politique, ou de Descartes dans celui des sciences, ce « moi » ne prend sa véritable plénitude que dans l’engagement. Aristote a défini l’homme comme animal politique, et, d’une certaine façon, la société chrétienne est une république où tout adepte du Christ est un citoyen.

On sait que Platon, dégoûté par la démagogie athénienne, critique obstiné de la sophistique, avait trouvé sa voie dans la quête transcendante des Idées, la vraie réalité. La mort de Socrate avait été pour lui la révélation de l’aporie démocratique, d’un système fondé sur la toute puissance de la doxa, de l’opinion. Nul n’en a dévoilé et explicité autant la fausseté et l’inanité. Cela n’empêcha pas d’ailleurs le philosophe de se mêler, à ses dépens, du côté de la Grande Grèce, à la chose politique, mais il était dès lors convenu que si l’on s’échappait vraiment de l’emprise sociétale, quitte à y revenir avec une conscience supérieure, c’était par le haut. La fuite « horizontale », par un recours, pour ainsi dire, aux forêts, si elle a dû exister, était dans les faits inimaginables, si l’on se souvient de la gravité d’une peine telle que l’ostracisme. Être rejeté de la communauté s’avérait pire que la mort. Les Robinsons volontaires n’ont pas été répertoriés par l’écriture des faits mémorables. Au fond, la seule possibilité pensable de rupture socio-politique, à l’époque, était la tentation du transfuge. On prenait parti, par les pieds, pour l’ennemi héréditaire.

Depuis Platon, donc, on sait que le retrait véritable, celui de l’âme, à savoir de cet œil spirituel qui demeure lorsque l’accessoire a été jugé selon sa nature, est à la portée de l’être qui éprouve une impossibilité radicale à trouver une justification à la médiocrité du monde. L’ironie voulut que le platonisme fût le fondement idéologique d’un empire à vocation totalitaire. La métaphysique, en se sécularisant, peut se transformer en idéologie. Toutefois, le platonisme est l’horizon indépassable, dans notre civilisation (le bouddhisme en étant un autre, ailleurs) de la possibilité dans un même temps du refus du monde, et de son acceptation à un niveau supérieur.

Du reste, il ne faudrait pas croire que la doctrine de Platon soit réservée au royaume des nuées et des vapeurs intellectuelles détachées du sol rugueux de la réalité empirique. Qui n’éprouve pas l’écœurement profond qui assaille celui qui se frotte quelque peu à la réalité prosaïque actuelle ne sait pas ce que sont le bon goût et la pureté, même à l’état de semblant. Il est des mises en situation qui s’apparentent au mal de mer et à l’éventualité du naufrage.

Toutefois, du moment que notre âge, qui est né vers la fin de ce que l’on nomme abusivement le « Moyen Âge », a vu s’éloigner dans le ciel lointain, puis disparaître dans un rêve impuissant, l’ombre lumineuse de Messer Dieu, l’emprise de l’opinion, ennoblie par les vocables démocratique et par l’invocation déclamatoire du peuple comme alternative à l’omniscience divine, s’est accrue, jusqu’à tenir tout le champ du pensable. Les Guerres de religion du XVIe siècle ont précipité cette évolution, et nous en sommes les légataires universels.

Les périodes électorales, nombreuses, car l’onction du ciel, comme disent les Chinois, doit être, dans le système actuel de validation du politique, désacralisé et sans cesse en voie de délitement, assez fréquent pour offrir une légitimité minimale, offrent l’intérêt de mettre en demeure la vérité du monde dans lequel nous tentons de vivre. À ce compte, ce que disait Platon n’a pas pris une ride. Car l’inauthenticité, le mensonge, la sidération, la manipulation, qui sont le lot quotidien d’un type social fondé sur la marchandise, c’est-à-dire la séduction matérialiste, la réclame, c’est-à-dire la persuasion et le jeu des pulsions, le culte des instincts, c’est-à-dire l’abaissement aux Diktat du corps, l’ignorance, c’est-à-dire le rejet haineux de l’excellence et du savoir profond, plongent ce qui nous reste de pureté et d’aspiration à la beauté dans la pire des souffrances. Comment vivre, s’exprimer, espérer dans un univers pareil ? Le retrait par le haut a été décrédibilisé, le monde en soi paraissant ne pas exister, et le mysticisme n’étant plus que lubie et sublimation sexuelle, voire difformité mentale. Le défoulement électoraliste, joué par de mauvais acteurs, de piètres comédiens dirigés par de bons metteurs en scène, et captivant des spectateurs bon public, niais comme une Margot un peu niaise ficelée par une sentimentalité à courte vue, nous met en présence, journellement pour peu qu’on s’avise imprudemment de se connecter aux médias, avec ce que l’humain comporte de pire, de plus sale, intellectuellement et émotionnellement. On n’en sort pas indemne. Tout n’est que réduction, connotation, farce, mystification, mensonge, trompe-l’œil, appel aux bas instincts, complaisance et faiblesse calculée. Les démocraties antiques, qui, pourtant, étaient si discutables, n’étaient pas aussi avilies, car elles gardaient encore, dans les faits et leur perception, un principe aristocratique, qui faisait du citoyen athénien ou romain le membre d’une caste supérieure, et, à ce titre, tenu à des devoirs impérieux de vertu et de sacrifice. L’hédonisme contemporain et l’égalitarisme consubstantiel au totalitarisme véritable, interdisent l’écart conceptuel indispensable pour voir à moyen ou long terme, et pour juger ce qui est bon pour ne pas sombrer dans l’esclavage, quel qu’il soit. Du reste, l’existence de ce dernier, ce me semble, relevait, dans les temps anciens, autant de nécessités éthiques que de besoins économiques. Car c’est en voyant cette condition pitoyable que l’homme libre sentait la valeur de sa liberté. Pour éduquer le jeune Spartiate, par exemple, on le mettait en présence d’un ilote ivre. Chaque jour, nous assistons à ce genre d’abaissement, sans réaction idoine. La perte du sentiment aristocratique a vidé de son sens l’idée démocratique. Cette intuition existentielle et politique existait encore dans la Révolution française, et jusqu’à la Commune. Puis, la force des choses, l’avènement de la consommation de masse, l’a remisée au rayon des souvenirs désuets.

Claude Bourrinet


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lundi, 26 décembre 2011

Spiritualità cosmica nell’Ellade arcaica

Spiritualità cosmica nell’Ellade arcaica

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Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La religione ellenica si presenta come un insieme di culti e di riti che intendono trasmettere nella storia e nella vita quotidiana lo stesso impulso spirituale personificato dalla complessa varietà delle figurazioni divine. La sua rappresentazione religiosa è usualmente costituita dalla mitologia, ossia da un complesso di narrazioni di vicende divine che intendono “spiegare” in una prospettiva mito-poetica il significato del mondo o di singoli momenti di esso. I vari cicli mitologici non sono altro che proiezioni drammatizzate di quegli impulsi spirituali, una loro formulazione plastica che tende a restituire una visione “teologica” all’esperienza che i vari aedi, cantori, indovini o estatici hanno contemplato contemporaneamente come vita cosmica e ritmo divino.

 

Questo particolare carattere mitico-rituale ha comportato l’inesistenza di un qualsiasi Fondatore divino dal quale possa essersi originata la religione ellenica o che abbia in qualche modo “riformato” alcuni suoi caratteri fondamenti. Da ciò anche il fatto che la vasta rappresentazione mitologica e il complesso dei rituali non si trovano codificati in un insieme di testi sacri da cui poter sviluppare una dottrina religiosa o presso i quali tale dottrina potesse essere custodita e trasmessa senza alterazione. Tale assenza di libri rivelati ha poi permesso che si sviluppasse nell’Ellade la particolare funzione dei poeti i quali nelle loro opere hanno sostituito ciò che altrove veniva esplicato dagli scribi, esaltando particolarmente ciò che si potrebbe chiamare la “visione mitica” a detrimento di una qualsiasi rivelazione divina che potesse essere codificata e, appunto, “scritta”. Questo carattere fa sì che la religione ellenica si presenti non come un corpus dottrinale al quale aderire o al limite convertirsi, ma come una forma spirituale connaturata naturalmente a quel popolo, una “forma formante” che si invera nelle varie  espressioni di vita e dalla quale si può evadere non con un rifiuto, ma cambiando la stessa identità nazionale.

 

Come ulteriore conseguenza tutto ciò ha comportato il tipico atteggiamento di perpetuazione di usi, costumi e rituali ancestrali, di conservazione di un patrimonio religioso che viene trasmesso come elemento di identità e di custodia di un ordine la cui origine si confonde con quella stessa del popolo ellenico. Da ciò anche il carattere fondamentalmente conservatore di questa religione, presso cui l’aderenza alla tradizione esprimeva l’unico criterio di ortodossia e che rendeva “attuale” e “storica” la lotta per l’ordine tradizionale contro ogni forma di disordine. Questa storicità è una delle peculiarità della religione ellenica ed è determinata dallo stesso scenario mitologico tradizionale. Qui, infatti, la nascita del popolo ellenico va a confondersi con la stessa religione. Le origini nazionali non sono altro che un momento dello svolgimento della genealogia divina, una sua modalità di determinazione storica che ad un certo punto, come sembra indicare in modo specifico il mitologema di Hellenos sul quale torneremo, ha visto il “trapasso” del divino nell’umano di una particolare essenza divina, per di più tesa ad esplicitare la funzione di un ordine cosmico che il nuovo ciclo aperto da Deucalione dovrà realizzare.

 

La funzione del mito all’interno della spiritualità ellenica appare fondamentale. Il termine mythos si ritrova con significati vari all’interno della storia religiosa ellenica con utilizzazioni diverse e spesso persino opposte. Secondo molti esegeti diventa meno evidente rispetto a quanto ritenevano i classicisti dell’Ottocento una derivazione semantica di mythos da myēo, anche se ovviamente tale derivazione continua ad avere una sua forza dimostrativa di non poco rilievo e di forte persuasione. Ultimamente, però, alcuni studiosi appoggiandosi a diverse giustificazioni linguistico-formali, hanno pensato che si possa risalire ad un radicale indoeuropeo *mēudh-, *mudh- col significato speciale di “ricordarsi”, “aspirare a”, “riflettere”. Si avrebbe perciò il mythos quale “pensiero”, ma non riferito al pensare meramente cerebrale che si determina in un discorso logico-esplicativo, quanto piuttosto ad un “pensiero che si rivela”, che viene comunicato da una dimensione superiore a quella del tempo nella quale si consuma la vita umana. In particolare, sarà Omero che in entrambi i suoi poemi ci darà un “pensiero” (= mythos) che viene elaborato, un’idea, un “principio” che deve essere svelato.  Si entra così in un’area sacrale che vede il mito in rapporto strettissimo con il rito, con la dimensione “narrativo-esplicativa” di una condizione spirituale che è possibile esperire nell’atto rituale o nell’ispirazione estatica. E’ l’esperienza del veggente omerico che svela ciò che “ha visto con meraviglia”, quando lo spettatore, la cosa contemplata e l’atto del vedere diventano una thēoria, una “visione” la cui condizione l’aedo omerico esprime sì con la parola (è uno dei significato di mythos), ma con una parola che recita e “rappresenta” l’essere del mondo, tesa più ad incantare l’ascoltatore trasportandolo nel pieno dell’età eroica che a “raccontare” fatti, cosa che dà significato non transeunte all’uso ellenico di recitare brani di Omero durante alcune rappresentazioni rituali.

 

Fra i tanti mitologhemi più antichi dell’Ellade un interesse particolare può avere la constatazione che assieme ad Helios, quali figlie di Iperion e di Tia (“la divina”) troviamo anche Selene ed Eos, l’Aurora celeste. Va detto subito che i miti relativi ad Helios sono giunti in modo frammentario a tal punto che si è autorizzati a pensare che ci si trovi di fronte a cicli diversi intersecantisi e confusi l’un l’altro. Tale per es. la curiosa storia riportata da Ateneo che raccontava del viaggio di Helios fatto al tramonto in una coppa d’oro fino a raggiungere la mitica Etiopia. Quello che può interessare è che etimologicamente “etiopia” deriva dalla radice *aith- col significato di “bruciare” e di ”risplendere”, dato che qui tale radice include il senso di “fuoco che brucia” e perciò “risplende”. Si allude perciò ad una terra dove sì la luce risplende, ma di uno splendore di tipo vespertino, occidentale, evidenziato dal fatto che il viaggio di Helios si svolge al tramonto e che il popolo etiope era ritenuto essere non di razza nera, ma rossa, posta dal simbolismo tradizionale sempre ad occidente, al crepuscolo del percorso del sole.

 

Ancora più ricco di significati è il mito riportato da Omero nell’Odissea, là dove si fa menzione delle due figlie di Helios: Lampetia, “colei che illumina” e Faetusa, “colei che risplende”, le due divinità che custodiscono i 350 buoi del sole nell’isola di Trinacria. Secondo Bâl G. Tilak qui si ha una precisa allusione ad un antico anno di 350 giorni che verosimilmente doveva essere seguito da una notte cosmica di 10 giorni, ossia la durata dell’anno propria ad alcune regioni circumpolari, “là dove si compiono le rivoluzioni del sole”, ricorda ancora Omero (Od. XV, 403 e sgg.). E l’ipotesi acquista maggiore luce ove si consideri che queste due figlie di Helios presentate da Omero come le custodi dell’anno artico, personificano rispettivamente la luce che ne “illumina” l’inizio e la luce che “risplende” al suo compimento, ossia la luce dei due solstizi, quello estivo e quello invernale. Nel mitologhema le due sorelle si trovano ad esplicare la loro funzione di custodia nell’isola di Trinacria che è stata sempre concepita come la proiezione della mitica “terra del sole”. Persino lo stesso simbolo del triskel che graficamente la definisce, secondo le pittografie studiate da Dechélette, non esprime altro che lo stesso movimento del sole considerato nella prospettiva del suo rivelarsi secondo modalità cicliche che si srotolano attorno ad una divisione triadrica dell’anno che ha sostituito quella binaria risalente ad epoche molto più antiche, e ancora non si è stabilizzato nella divisione quaternaria, quella propria all’anno del periodo “classico” dell’Ellade. In un suo aspetto la Trinacria appare come il simbolo della potenza cosmica creativa che si dispiega nel tempo, la sua forza di manifestazione, perciò come uno dei simboli stessi che rivelano come tale potenza si sia inverata in una “terra primordiale”, una “terra originaria”, “solare”.

 

I miti relativi ad Eos, l”’Aurora” o la “luce aurorale”, sono molto più poveri e già risentono dell’influsso della leggenda eroica. Un altro nome della dèa dell’aurora fu Emera, “il Giorno”, che forse vuole esprimere l’idea di un’intera epoca umana. E sono note le storie di questa dèa della luce aurorale in connessione alla Syria, “la terra del sole” di Omero, oppure quelle relative ai suoi rapporti con Kephalonia, “la terra del centro” dove Kephalos, il Caput celeste, il “punto” cosmico di orientamento di una carta stellare molto antica (e comunque precedente  i rivolgimenti celesti cui accennava Aristotele per spiegare il passaggio del sole dal suo primordiale percorso sulla Via Lattea a quello attuale), si era “sposato” con l’Orsa celeste. Secondo questi miti alle origini gli sposi Kephalos e la Grande Orsa (con i suoi septem triones che trascinano il Grande Carro e lo fanno girare perpetuamente attorno al “perno” del cielo, il polo) si trovavano congiunti nello stesso quadrante cosmico secondo una direttrice che doveva risultare perpendicolare all’asse dell’osservatore allocato nella Kephalonia.

 

Dalle confraternite degli aedi itineranti, dei thēologoi e dei cosmologi arcaici, quelli che Aristotele radunava sotto la dizione di prōtoi thēologesantes (“i primordiali thēologoi”), probabilmente sono emerse tutti quei veggenti che si esprimevano attraverso il canto e la poesia sacra e, dunque, anche i due massimi cantori dell’antica Ellade, Omero ed Esiodo. Il caso di Esiodo è molto particolare. Non solo trasmette tutta una serie di elementi mitologici di un passato che rimanda ad epoche difficili da determinare, ma il personaggio appare pienamente consapevole del proprio ruolo di Aedo sacro, un cantore ispirato al quale era stato concesso il dono della poesia (= sapienza) che lo scettro d’oro donatogli dalle Muse sembra aver sanzionato in modo definitivo, dato che è detto che sono proprio loro che gli hanno insegnato “uno splendido canto, mentre pascolava gli agnelli ai piedi del sacro Elicona”, e addirittura in una gara poetica vince l’insegna dell’ispirazione apollinea, il sacro tripode che egli poi dedicherà alle Muse. E’ tutto un mondo che può essere ricondotto a forme di conoscenza ispirate che permettono di risalire oltre il transeunte, al “principio”, là dove le varie figurazioni divine hanno preso forma.

 

Lo stesso Omero può darci indicazioni importanti in questa direzione. Il suo nome, infatti, nel dialetto eolico cumano fu spesso interpretato come “il cieco” e rimanda più che ad un epiteto individuale, ad una attività più generale legata alle ispirazioni divine e alle estasi arcaiche. “Omero” personifica la funzione sacra dell’archegeta delle confraternite degli Aedi, colui che ha ricevuto la capacità di “vedere” oltre i limiti delle apparenze e, come gli indovini guardano al futuro, egli sotto l’ispirazione del dio canta il tempo passato, l’età eroica, “creandone” le espressioni, le gesta, lo scenario. La sua attività rimanda ad una funzione demiurgica tesa ad ordinare la visione ricevuta in uno stato di ispirazione divina e la rivela agli uomini, esattamente come hanno fatto gli Omeridi dell’isola di Chio, quella straordinaria confraternita di cantori la cui fisionomia rimanda agli aedi ispirati che hanno percorso la Grecia in ogni tempo e la cui qualificazione più importante era quella di essere “discendenti” di Omero, più esattamente gli eredi della tradizione dei veggenti omerici.

 

Esiodo ha conservato anche altri mitologhemi che possono essere fuorusciti da una cosmologia arcaica. Nell’enunciazione delle ère che descrivono il processo di impoverimento che dalla pienezza della spiritualità primordiale conclude nell’età del ferro, egli ci dà il senso di un loro rapporto non meramente cronologico, di successione temporale, ma quale espressione di “qualità” storiche, quali cicli che per la loro completezza, per il loro riflettere un determinato tipo di spiritualità rivelatasi in un tempo preciso, “storico”, in sé non sono legati ai cicli successivi. Questo fondamentale disegno unitario delle ère esiodee è rilevabile anche da un altro punto di vista che riconduce il mito riportato da Esiodo alle più arcaiche speculazioni indoeuropee sulle origini del cosmo. Se, infatti, si considera la successione delle età e delle varie razze che incarnano via via i valori spirituali delle singole ère, avremo il seguente quadro. Prima di tutto si avrà la razza aurea caratterizzata da una pienezza biologica propria al tipo di spiritualità di quel “tempo-fuori-del-tempo”, a-cronico, che in sé delinea la condizione di perfezione originaria cui devono tendere tutte le altre razze da lui individuate come specifiche dei diversi cicli temporali che si svilupperanno dopo la scomparsa della razza aurea. Questa razza primordiale appare perciò come una “totalità” all’interno della quale si realizza l’armonia e la giustizia, mentre la sua perfezione  in modo eminente consente l’espressione piena delle tre attribuzioni classificate da Georges Dumézil come funzioni cosmico-sociali [sacerdozio, forza guerriera e fecondità] che nella prospettiva esiodea sintetizzano ogni gerarchia sociale: gli uomini dell’età aurea saranno “buoni”, “guardiani giusti” e “dispensatori di ricchezza” (Erga, vv. 123-126).

 

Dopo la fine dell’età aurea e della razza che ne aveva incarnato l’essenza di luce, si succedono altre ère in una progressione che scivola sempre più verso il disordine e una onnipervadente empietà. Dall’età argentea a quella ferrea si ha perciò la delineazione di uno svolgimento progressivo che inizia da uno stato fanciullesco e puerile, poi diventa una dura e spietata giovinezza (gli uomini dell’età del bronzo nascevano “con una grande forza e mani invincibili spuntavano dagli omeri al loro corpo gagliardo”; Erga, vv. 143-149), si stabilizza per un po’ come l’equilibrata maturità degli Eroi e si conclude infine con l’età del ferro, l’èra della vecchiaia (“quando verranno al mondo gli uomini con le tempie candide fin dalla nascita”; v. 181), il crepuscolo del tempo cosmico ed umano. Dall’alba al tramonto dell’essere cosmico. La figura delineata appare quella di un Macrantropo, il prototipo mitico dell’esistenza che in sé contiene in principio le varie possibilità che si svilupperanno nel corso del tempo. Dal suo sacrificio rituale, ossia dalla sua “scomposizione” in ère cosmiche, si determina l’essere del mondo e degli uomini, mentre le razze che secondo Esiodo si susseguono l’una all’altra appaiono come le modalità diversificate di un tutto unitario, le “membra” dell’essere cosmico che si distende nel tempo e i suoi quattro stadi di esistenza.

 

La concezione di Esiodo non deve essere considerata una sua creazione originale ed individuale, ma va collocata all’interno di teorie cicliche di grande importanza e variamente articolate. La tradizione ellenica, infatti, ci parla di tre successivi cataclismi relativi alla sparizione di Ogygia, al diluvio di Deucalione e a quello di Dardano che avrebbero via via distrutto terre o continenti sui quali regnava l’empietà più profonda. Prescindendo da quelli di Ogygia e di Dardano sui quali ci siamo intrattenuti altrove, qui interessa soffermarci sul diluvio di Deucalione per gli accostamenti e gli sviluppi cui può dar luogo. Esso, infatti, ci riporta al ciclo dei titani per il semplice fatto che Deucalione risulta essere il figlio di Prometeo il quale, a sua volta, era stato concepito dal titano Giapeto e dall’oceanina Climene. Da questa unione era nato anche un secondo figlio di Giapeto, un fratello di Prometeo,  il famoso Atlante considerato il padre delle Esperidi, di Maia e della Plèiadi, ossia tutto un gruppo di esseri divini che si appoggiavano a precise costellazioni celesti poste sempre ad Occidente, mentre la tradizione ci dice che Zeus, a chiusura del ciclo spirituale precedente, pose entrambi i fratelli a presiedere i due poli opposti del mondo. Atlante presidiava l’Occidente e Prometeo l’Oriente, secondo un asse equinoziale che sostituisce il più antico asse solstiziale nord-sud e costituisce una precisa indicazione sull’esistenza nell’Ellade arcaica di dottrine sui cicli cosmici formulate secondo una narrazione che interpretava in termini mito-poetici un’antica tradizione sacra sulla strutturazione dei movimenti celesti.

 

Alla fine dell’età del bronzo, a causa della tracotanza ed empietà di quella razza Zeus volle un diluvio che ne cancellasse ogni traccia. Su consiglio del padre Deucalione e sua moglie Pirrha costruirono un’arca nella quale posero ciò che doveva essere salvato dal diluvio. Dopo nove giorni e nove notti durante i quali il diluvio distrusse la civiltà della razza bronzea, approdarono finalmente sul Parnaso dove finalmente sacrificarono a Zeus e così diedero inizio ad un nuovo ciclo. La titanessa Themis, la stessa che sarà soppiantata da Apollo a Delfi, enuncia in forma di enigma un oracolo che, avveratosi, costituirà l’origine stessa del genere umano. Gli elementi fondamentali del mito si possono considerare:

 

  1. L’arca che custodisce i germi della sapienza dei cicli spirituali precedenti;
  2. Deucalione e Pirrha che per la loro genealogia perpetuano in qualche modo anche aspetti importanti dell’età primordiale e perciò impediscono che ci sia una vera e propria rottura col mondo precedente;
  3. Il sacrificio a Zeus sul monte, l’axis mundi che diventa il luogo originario della nuova civiltà;
  4. L’oracolo di Themis, che permetterà la nascita del genere umano;
  5. La forma di enigma dell’oracolo.

 

Secondo la forma più conosciuta del mito, il figlio della coppia Deucalione-Pirrha (= il “Bianco” e la “Rossa”) scampata al diluvio sarà Hellenos il cui nome etimologicamente può essere ricondotto a “splendere”, “luce”, che secondo Jean Haudry darà come significato “colui che ha il viso solare” e perciò la sua discendenza, quella che formerà il nucleo essenziale delle diverse tribù greche, sarà propriamente il “popolo del sole”. Se ora poniamo mente al fatto che Helios è spesso rappresentato con sette raggi e che in India il settimo Aditya è Surya, il sole, ci si accorgerà che il parallelismo India-Ellade arcaica ha più di un punto di contatto e trova la sua ragione d’essere probabilmente nelle condizioni spirituali originarie dalle quale ha preso forma l’Ellade come noi la conosciamo in piena epoca del ferro.

 

Nell’ambito di questi cicli mitologici antichissimi può porsi anche l’orfismo la cui struttura misteriosofica ricalca forme di spiritualità cosmica del tipo che è possibile rinvenire per es. anche nell’India vedica o in certi aspetti della soteriologia tantrica. Le dottrine orfiche appaiono strutturate già a partire dal VII-VI sec., quando il bìos orphikòs costituirà un riferimento costante nel patrimonio speculativo dei filosofi e persino dei molti ciarlatani, ed è facile trovare quei thēologoi e quegli orfeotelesti accennati da Platone che ci documentano una massiccia presenza orfica nel mondo religioso e nella società dell’Ellade storica.

 

Una versione delle tante cosmogonie orfiche ci presenta quale entità primordiale la Notte dalla quale scaturiscono gli esseri divini, perciò in qualche modo una sorta di originaria scaturigine del tutto. E’ da questo principio che procede l’Uovo cosmico che, simile al Brahmanda indù, col suo scomporsi rende manifesti il cielo e la terra e, soprattutto, Phanes, l’Essere Primordiale “luminoso”, lo “splendente”, l’archetipo universale da cui promana ogni esistente, il Protogonos colui che contiene in sé la stesso i germi della manifestazione universale. Lo straordinario di questa struttura teo-cosmogonica estremamente arcaica è il fatto che tali concezioni furono concepite come supporti di una elaborata misteriosofia che affascinò personaggi come Platone e che appare piuttosto distante dalle usuali convinzioni elleniche sugli dèi olimpici e sulla relativa loro vita rituale. Ma c’è di più. Un’antica testimonianza riportata da Otto Kern (fr. 21a) e sviluppata nelle sue implicazioni escatologiche da Richard Reitzenstein, ci dice che secondo gli orfici l’universo era ritenuto il “corpo visibile” di Zeus, il quale perciò era ritenuto l’inizio, il mezzo e il fine del cosmo. Tale figurazione orfica di Zeus (che evidentemente non ha nulla dello Zeus olimpico) è contemporaneamente “uomo e donna”, un principio androginico dal quale si origina autonomamente per autogenesi il cielo, la terra e gli elementi fondamentali della vita cosmica, il vento, l’acqua, il fuoco, il sole, la luna. Come ha fatto notare Ugo Bianchi, questa concezione deve riflettere idee molto antiche se ancora nel VII sec. Terpandro testimonia la loro vitalità, forse come idee scaturite da forme rituali da riferirsi addirittura al passato indoeuropeo ove si accetti l’ipotesi di Anders Olerud, poi sviluppata da Geo Widengren nel capitolo sul panteismo del suo poderoso manuale di fenomenologia religiosa, sull’arcaicità dell’idea di microcosmo e di macrocosmo e sulla corrispondenza simbolica di queste due sfere in una struttura formale che abbia ben chiari i diversi stati molteplici dell’essere.

 

E’ la dottrina del Macrantropo dal cui sacrificio rituale si origina il cosmo, la stessa che abbiamo visto serpeggiare anche nella visione esiodea dei cicli cosmici e che, formulata in vario modo, si ritrova nelle cosmogonie e nelle dottrine sacrificali di molti popoli indoeuropei. Ma questo è un altro discorso che si intende riprendere in un apposito studio.

 

Per approfondire:

 

F. Vian, La guèrre des Geants. Le mythe avant l’èpoque hellènistique, Paris 1952.

 

N. D’Anna, Da Orfeo a Pitagora. Dalle estasi arcaiche all’armonia cosmica, Simmetria, Roma 2011.

 

N. D’Anna, Il Gioco cosmico. Tempo ed eternità nell’antica Grecia, Mediterranee, Roma 2006.

 

[Tratto, col gentile consenso dell’Autore, da “Atrium” 2/2011].

lundi, 07 novembre 2011

Lucien Jerphagnon: il parlait à l'oreille des anciens

Lucien Jerphagnon: il parlait à l'oreille des anciens

Le grand historien de l'antiquité européenne laisse des livres à lire!

par Guilhem Kieffer

Ex: http://www.metamag.fr/

Morts quasiment en même temps, que valait un Lucien Jerphagnon à côté d’un Steve Jobs ? Rien à Wall Street. Pas davantage en exclamations, pleurs, soupirs. A quelques jours près, il n’a fait ni la une des télé ou des journaux hormis, heureusement, quelques colonnes dans Le Monde ou Le Point. Mais rien sur iPad ou facebook. On a su à peine qu’il était mort. Il n’était pas une icône-marchande. C’était un prof…


Lucien Jerphagnon

Et, en plus, un prof qui s’intéressait à des mondes disparus, dont les apparatchiks orwelliens traquent les ultimes résidus jusque dans nos salles de cours et de bibliothèques : le monde et la pensée romaine, l’antiquité et ses langues. Qu’il pratiquait fort, comme pas mal de nos parents ou grands-parents. N’avouait-il pas avoir « avalé », dans sa jeunesse, les 30 volumes -en latin- des Confessions de Saint Augustin? 

De sa confrontation avec l’histoire et les maîtres antiques, chrétiens ou non, comme Socrate, Platon, Plotin, mais aussi de son intelligence, Lucien Jerphagnon, qui eut le grand philosophe juif, Vladimir Yankélévitch, comme « maître», avait abouti à un enseignement essentiel et pourtant délaissé aujourd’hui. Il le confiait, dans un long entretien, à La Nouvelle Revue d’Histoire en 2006 . « En regardant les philosophes , on a le sentiment qu’ils sont coupés du monde et de leur temps. Ceux qui étudient les philosophes (ndlr : mais on peut appliquer le même raisonnement à l’histoire) le font comme s’ils vivaient dans un éternel présent.

Messager de Delphes

Or, il n’y a pas d’éternel présent, ni d’homme éternel quoi qu’on en ait dit, qui subsisterait toujours semblable en son fond, des cavernes aux satellites habités . Il y a des couches successives, peuplées de consciences diversement conditionnées, des strates qui ont chacune leur vérité et leurs erreurs, leur idée du possible  et de l’impossible, du concevable et de l’absurde et c’est seulement pour la commodité, pour le confort intellectuel que nous englobons toutes ces consciences disparates sous le même concept d’homme. Le temps bouge continuellement sous les yeux d’êtres qui eux-mêmes se transforment
. »




Mais au-dessus de ce fleuve, en mouvement constant, il y a quelques personnages-ponts. Ponts entre les pensées, entre les hommes, entre les époques . Lucien Jerphagnon était de ceux-là . Avec « La…. Sottise ? Vingt-huit siècles qu’on en parle », publié l’an dernier, quelle démonstration plus sagace et ironique pouvait-il donner au grand public? Aux esprits cultivés, ce maître, titulaire de la chaire de la pensée antique et médiévale à l’université de Caen, fournit d’autres exemples de sa plasticité et de son empathie.



Spécialiste de Saint Augustin (entré avec lui dans La Pléiade), il étonna avec une biographie novatrice sur son antithèse, l’empereur Julien (faussement qualifié d’ »apostat ») qui, des siècles durant, « fera l’objet  d’une incroyable cristallisation. » De cet exercice de nomadisme mental, de cet échange intemporel, de cette hygiène spirituelle, Michel Onfray, qui fut un de ses, chanceux, élèves normands, a livré témoignage dans un hommage reconnaissant (Le Point du 22 septembre).

« Quand il arrivait dans la salle, grand et maigre, la moustache d’un officier de la coloniale toujours impeccablement symétrique il sortait son volume de Budé (…) et commençait un spectacle extraordinaire. Seul, il jouait tous les rôles du théâtre antique : il fulminait, susurrait, ricanait, délirait, le tout avec une érudition époustouflante  (…) S’il parlait d’un bordel, c’était avec la caution de Juvénal, d’une partie de jambes en l’air avec celle de Perse, d’une trait d’esprit avec Tibulle, s’il lançait une saillie contre les grands de ce monde, c’était sous couvert de Tacite ou Suétone (…) » Au terme de son one man show, « on avait beaucoup appris, tout compris et, surtout, tout retenu 

De cet agnostique qui, quelques jours avant sa mort, confiait –«j’essaie de faire remonter vers le divin tout ce qu’il y a de divin en moi»- paraîtra, en février, un texte posthume qu’il venait d’achever: « Connais-toi toi-même »… (et tu connaîtras l’univers et les dieux). Une injonction venue de Delphes ! Destinée à chacun d’entre nous.

vendredi, 21 octobre 2011

Nos ancêtres à la conquête de la Méditerranée, il y a 130.000 ans

Nos ancêtres à la conquête de la Méditerranée, il y a 130.000 ans

Ex: http://tpprovence.wordpress.com/

Une découverte archéologique au sud de la Crète bouleverse l’histoire de la conquête des mers et des peuplements des îles méditerranéennes. La nouvelle, annoncée à l’origine par Hesperia

, bulletin de l’Ecole américaine d’archéologie d’Athènes, a été saluée par le magazine Archeology comme l’un des dix événements de l’année 2010.

 

 

3 janvier 2011. Le ministère grec de la culture annonce que des recherches archéologiques menées en Crète, dans le sud de la Grèce, ont livré la première preuve au monde que les ancêtres de l’homme prirent la mer il y a plus de 130 000 mille ans. A l’issue de deux ans de fouilles autour de la localité de Plakias, dans le sud de l’île de Crète, une équipe gréco-américaine a mis au jour des pierres taillées paléolithiques, remontant à 130 000 ans au moins. Ces trouvailles, qui attestent pour la première fois d’une installation d’hominidés sur l’île avant le néolithique (7000 – 3000 avant notre ère), apportent aussi « la plus ancienne preuve de navigation au monde », précise encore le communiqué officiel. Les outils, des « haches », ont été trouvés près de vestiges de « plate-formes marines remontant à au moins 130 000 ans, ce qui apporte la preuve de voyages marins en Méditerranée des dizaines de milliers d’années plus tôt que ce que nos connaissances établissaient jusque là » relève le ministère. Et de conclure : ces découvertes, faites près de la très touristique plage de Prévéli, « modifient aussi l’estimation des capacités cognitives des premières espèces humaines », les outils retrouvés renvoyant à des populations d’ « Homo erectus et Homo heidelbergensis ».

La découverte d’outils de pierre taillée

Cette formidable aventure scientifique commence sur la côte sud de la Crète, près du site de Plakias, où existe aujourd’hui une station balnéaire dont la baie, très ventée, attire – clin d’œil de l’histoire – de nombreux véliplanchistes. On trouve là de hauts reliefs de calcaire forgés par la tectonique des plaques, des terrasses laissées par la baisse du niveau de la mer qu’elles surplombent d’une centaine de mètres, des grottes et des abris rocheux. Ce n’est pas par hasard si l’Américain Thomas Strasser, professeur au Providence College de Rhode Island, aux Etats-Unis, et la Grecque Eleni Panagopoulou, de la direction de la paléoanthropologie et de la spéléologie de la Grèce du sud, ont engagé des fouilles précisément à cet endroit. L’équipe a été guidée par des critères simples, comme la présence d’eau potable et de cavités habitables, critères qui ont déjà permis de localiser des implantations préhistoriques en Grèce continentale.

La baie de Plakias

Au cours de campagnes de fouilles réalisées en 2008 et 2009, les chercheurs découvrent un véritable trésor. Plus de 2000 pierres taillées, façonnées dans du quartz blanc, du quartzite et du chert – une roche siliceuse – dont la taille varie de vingt centimètres pour les plus grands, à moins de un centimètre pour les plus petits éclats. On y trouve des bifaces, des hachereaux, des racloirs, des grattoirs, des perforateurs, des burins. « Notre première réaction a été l’incrédulité, a déclaré Eleni Panagopoulou. Nous étions tout à la fois heureux, stupéfaits et troublés. Puis nous avons dû nous rendre à l’évidence. Car ces outils sont très caractéristiques ».

Restes de haches retrouvés sur le site

L’œuvre d’Homo erectus ou d’Homo sapiens ?

Les pièces mises à jour sont impossibles à dater directement. Mais les couches sédimentaires et les terrasses marines où ils ont été retrouvés laissent présager deux vagues de peuplement. La plus récente, au début de l’holocène, voilà 9000 à 11000 ans, et la plus ancienne au pléistocène, il y a 130 000 ans au moins. Cette phase d’occupation, pense la chercheuse grecque, a même sans doute été « beaucoup plus précoce ». Pascal Depaepe, directeur scientifique de l’INRAP (1) et spécialiste du paléolithique, qui a examiné la facture plutôt grossière de ces vestiges, pense, lui, que les plus anciens pourraient avoir en réalité plusieurs centaines de milliers d’années. Toutefois, précise-t-il, « pour les dater avec certitude, il faudrait pouvoir les associer à des ossements humains qui font défaut ».

Un biface qui daterait de plus de 130 000 ans !

Cette découverte extraordinaire pose bien des questions. Premier mystère : quels représentants du genre humain en furent les artisans ? Si les plus vieux objets lithiques remontent « seulement » à 130 000 ans, ils pourraient bien avoir été façonnés par des néandertaliens ou des hommes modernes, les Homo sapiens. Certes, si l’on en croit la doxa imposée par la science officielle, ceux-ci sont censés n’avoir quitté leur supposé berceau est-africain, où ils seraient nés voici 200 000 ans, il n’y a qu’environ 60 000 ans, pour « conquérir » l’Asie et l’Europe. Dogme quasi religieux, remis en question par nombre de découvertes, ainsi par exemple, ces dents datant de 400 000 ans, trouvées récemment par des chercheurs israéliens, qui auraient appartenu à des Sapiens archaïques. Si, en revanche, les outils ont plusieurs centaines de milliers d’années, ils seraient alors l’œuvre de très anciens cousins, Homo erectus ou Homo heidelbergensis

Les premiers navigateurs !

Un second mystère, plus insondable encore, se pose aux scientifiques. Effectivement, la Crète est séparée du continent depuis plus de cinq millions d’années, sans qu’aucune glaciation ou baisse de niveau n’aient jamais permis de la rejoindre à pied. Les tailleurs de pierre du pléistocène y sont donc obligatoirement arrivés sur une embarcation. Il suffit de lire une carte pour mesurer l’exploit accompli. Même en imaginant des eaux plus basses d’une centaine de mètres, comme lors du dernier maximum glaciaire, il y a 21 000 ans, la bathymétrie (2) montre qu’il leur a fallu parcourir plusieurs dizaines de kilomètres en haute mer, en partant soit de la Grèce continentale, soit de la Turquie, en tenant compte d’éventuelles escales sur les îles de Cythère et d’Anticythère dans le premier cas, de Karpathos et de Kasos dans le second. Depuis la côte libyenne, ils auraient dû voguer sur 200 km, ce qui rend cette troisième hypothèse peu probable.

Le plus vraisemblable, suppose le linguiste Christophe Coupé (3), qui travaille sur les liens entre langue et navigation, est que les premiers marins hauturiers furent « des peuples familiers de la mer, habitués à voyager le long des rivages », qui se sont ensuite enhardis et aventurés plus loin. Evacuons le scénario selon lequel quelques naufragés, emportés par les courants, auraient échoué à Plakias. « Le très grand nombre d’outils trouvés, comme le seuil de population nécessaire à sa survie et à sa reproduction, laisse penser que la colonie devait compter au moins une cinquantaine d’individus » évalue Eleni Panagopoulou. Et qu’il y a donc eu, sans doute, « plusieurs voyages ».

Jusqu’à présent, les paléoanthropologues tenaient pour établi que les premières implantations humaines sur les îles méditérranéennes (Sicile, Sardaigne, Corse) remontaient à une période plus récente. Les colons de Plakias font reculer de plus de cent mille ans, et probablement bien davantage, les débuts de la navigation en Méditerranée, devançant largement les Sapiens qui, il y a 60 000 ans, accostèrent en Australie, où leur présence est attestée par des outils de pierre, mais également des ossements et un bouleversement de l’écosystème fatal à de gros marsupiaux. Ils restent cependant battus par les premiers occupants de l’île de Florès, en Indonésie, où a été mis au jour un outillage lithique datant, lui, de 700 000 à 800 000 ans. Mais le chapelet formé par les îles indonésiennes permettait, lors des pics glaciaires, de passer de l’une à l’autre en franchissant des bras de mer d’une dizaine de kilomètres au maximum.

Pour les professeurs Strasser et Panagopoulou, ces fouilles jettent une nouvelle lumière sur l’histoire « de la colonisation de l’Europe par des hominidés venus d’Afrique ». Dans un article publié par Hesperia, ils écrivent : « L’approche d’un peuplement de l’Europe seulement par la terre doit clairement être repensée (…) il y a peut-être eu des routes maritimes empruntées par des navigateurs sur de longues distances ». Par contre, ils relèvent ne pas pouvoir, en l’état, déterminer d’où venaient les navigateurs paléolithiques de Crète, « une origine africaine ou proche-orientale étant aussi probable qu’une provenance d’Anatolie ou de Grèce continentale ». Encore un effort, Messieurs les chercheurs, pour vous affranchir du dogme de l’out of Africa, et conclure qu’une provenance d’Anatolie ou de Grèce continentale est aussi probable qu’une origine africaine ou proche-orientale !

Jean-François Vilhet, Hyperborée, automne-hiver 2011, n°12.

Notes

(1) Institut national de recherches archéologiques préventives.

(2) Mesure des profondeurs marines.

(3) Chargé de recherche au Laboratoire dynamique du langage, CNRS-Université de Lyon.

Références :

Thomas Strasser, Eleni Panagopoulou, Curtis Runnels, Priscilla Murray, Nicholas Thompson, Panayiotis Karkanas, Floyd McCoy, et Karl Wegmann, « Stone Age Seafaring in the Mediterranean: Evidence from the Plakias Region for Lower Palaeolithic and Mesolithic Habitation of Crete », Hesperia, 79.2, pp. 145-190.

jeudi, 13 octobre 2011

Pericles & the Athenian Ideal

Pericles & the Athenian Ideal

By Troy Southgate

Ex: http://www.toqonline.com/

Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription “Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian”. Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original by Cresilas, ca. 430 BC (Museo Pio-Clementino)

Bust of Pericles bearing the inscription “Pericles, son of Xanthippus, Athenian”. Marble, Roman copy after a Greek original by Cresilas, ca. 430 BC (Museo Pio-Clementino)

There is already much discussion in our circles about the example of Sparta, not least as a result of the recent Hollywood blockbuster 300 [1] which was rather loosely based on the exploits of King Leonidas, but in this article I intend to examine Sparta’s chief rival Athens.

The Athenian statesman, Pericles (495 – 429 BCE) once claimed that his city was an educational role model for the whole of Greece, but how far was this really true?

Pericles’ boast is part of his funeral oration recorded by Thucydides (460 – 395 BCE) in his The Peloponnesian War [2]. The aim of Pericles’ oration is to establish that Athens was a society worth dying for. Thus the speech is designed to exploit in his listeners deep-seated feelings of local pride and identity, inviting them to recall the glory of Athenian growth and prosperity. His verbal tapestry begins by lauding Athenian ancestry, emphasizing the fact that the people’s “courage and virtues have handed on to us, a free country.”

He mentions “the constitution and the way of life that has made us great” and points to certain social improvements such as power being democratically channeled into the hands “of the whole people,” the fairness and “equality before the law” and the fact that, in terms of social classification, status is not determined by “membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses.” Pericles was also careful to mention the prevailing moral ethos which underpinned fifth-century Athenian society, that of sovereign, “unwritten laws which it is an acknowledged shame to break.”

Then Pericles lists what he considered to be the noblest attributes of his native city, with particular reference to the cultural activities that provided “recreation for our spirits.” This tactic was designed to pave the way for a contrasting description of the traditional enemy, Sparta.

Pericles then polemically denounced Spartan militarism and the rigorous training to which it “submitted” its youth, lauding the Athenian educational system by contrast. He also praised Athens for apparently maintaining a confident superiority above and beyond all other Greek states, emphasizing the importance of thought before action.

When Pericles finally describes Athens as “an education to Greece,” he explains precisely why he considers this to be the case. Athens stands for the freedom of the citizen, who is “rightful lord and owner of his own person.” Because of its constitution, Athens has waxed powerful: “Athens, alone of the states we know, comes to her testing time in a greatness that surpasses what was imagined of her . . . future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.” But with greatness comes peril: “it is clear that for us there is more at stake than there is for others who lack our advantages.”

Pericles then offers an inspiring account of the necessity of personal sacrifice. The slain warriors, in whose honor the funeral had been held, were depicted as heroes who had lain down their very lives for the continuation of Athenian culture, heritage and tradition, itself “a risk most glorious.” Pericles then challenges the living to emulate the honored dead, making “up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous .  .  . for men to end their lives with honor, as these have done, and for you honorably to lament them: their life was set to a measure where death and happiness went hand in hand.”

But can Athens really can be considered to have been a role model for the whole of Greece, or was Pericles merely deluding  himself and his contemporaries? Let us examine the historical record.

Pericles is renowned for the prominent role he played in the democratization of the Athenian political system, which itself had “been fixed by Cleisthenes (570 – 507 BCE) and further reformed after the battle of Marathon” (J. B. Bury, A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great [3] [Macmillan, 1951], 346).

After overthrowing Thucydides and assuming the leadership of the people, Pericles and Ethialtes (d. 461 BCE) set about reducing the power of the judiciary in the Areopagus. At this time, the archons or chief magistrates were appointed by lot, but only from a select number of pre-elected candidates. Pericles abolished this system with the result that the archons themselves became “appointed by lot from all the eligible citizens [who now] had an equal chance of holding political office, and taking part in the conduct of political affairs” (Bury, 349). This system was also extended to the Boule, or Council of the Five Hundred.

In addition, Pericles effectively dismantled the hereditary powers of the traditionally oligarchic Areopagus completely, restricting its activities in order to redefine its role as little more than a “supreme court for charges of murder” (A. R. Burn, Pericles and Athens [4] [English Universities Press, 1964], 46). In 462 BCE, Pericles also initiated a scheme whereby jurors and those holding offices of state received payment for their services to the city, “a feature which naturally won him popularity with the masses” (Bury, 349).

This very popularity, in fact, had been deliberately engineered by Pericles himself in order to counteract the large support that Cimon (510 – 450 BCE), an accomplished naval hero, was able to command from the Athenian nobility. Although Pericles was himself an aristocrat, he “decided to attach himself to the people’s party and to take up the cause of the poor and the many instead of that of the rich and the few, in spite of the fact that this was quite contrary to his own temperament”(Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens: Nine Greek Lives [5] [Penguin, 1960], 171).

Indeed, Thucydides attacked Periclean reforms and labeled them “democracy in name, but in practice government by the first citizen” (Plutarch, 173). So what began as Greek democracy under Cleisthenes around 500 BCE had become a dictatorship under Pericles by 430 BCE.

Despite all the speculation surrounding Pericles motives for initiating democratic reforms, in terms of her constitution and statecraft Athens undoubtedly stood far ahead of her rivals.

One measure of the seriousness of Athenian democratization was the introduction of new political technologies, such as allotment-machines, water-clocks, juror’s ballots, and juror’s tickets.

Another sign of Athenian political acumen is the transfer of the headquarters and treasure of the Delian league from Delos to Athens in 454 BCE. The Delian League was a crucial alliance of 150 Greek city-states established prior to the Peloponnesian wars to defend Hellas from the Persians. The transfer of its headquarters to Athens gave the Athenians enormous political and economic influence over the member states.

Sparta had an entirely different political structure. In Bury’s words, Sparta was imbued with a “conservative spirit.” The Spartan constitution, unlike its continually revised and reformed counterpart in Athens, had remained virtually the same since its inception.

Sparta had a mixed constitution with monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. Sparta was ruled nominally by kings, an order going back to the times of Homer. The aristocratic element was the Council of Elders, or Gerusia, which consisted of thirty men who were elected for life and chosen by acclamation in the general assembly of citizens. Membership was described as a prize for virtue. However, the Spartan Assembly of the People, or Apella, contained only males over thirty years of age who decided matters of state purely on the basis of a particular speaker receiving the loudest cheers from those in attendance. Theoretically, the Spartan constitution was democratic, but if the elders and magistrates did not approve of the decision of the majority, they could annul the proceedings by refusing to proclaim the decision.

The Athenians were always very keen to stress the political differences between themselves and their Peloponnesian rivals. Many island states — often artificially created by colonial means — usually followed the example of Athens rather than Sparta. Athenian democracy, unlike the American variety, was not spread around the world at gunpoint. Instead, the states that adopted the Athenian system seemed genuinely inspired by her example.

Sparta, on the other hand, had few imitators, and the states that did resemble Sparta did not appear to imitate her. So as far as Athenian politics was concerned, at least, Pericles was right to claim that Athens was the educator of Greece.

Athens was an example to Greece in politics. But what about the economic and cultural realms?

According to Plutarch, Athens became fantastically wealthy after Themistocles (524 – 459 BCE) had directed the revenue of the city’s lucrative silver mines at Laurium towards the construction of a strong navy, including a new fleet of triremes, which made possible the reconquest of Athens after its inhabitants had been forced to flee from the invading Persians.

When Athens became host to the treasury of the Delian League in 454 BCE, Pericles used its funds for the rebuilding of Athenian temples, claiming they had been destroyed by the Persians in the common cause of Greece, thus it was appropriate that they be rebuilt from the common funds.

In 449 BCE, a pan-Hellenic Congress was proposed to raise funds for further projects. This plan met with fierce opposition from Thucydides among others. According to Plutarch, Pericles answered his critics by declaring that “the Athenians were not obliged to give the allies an account of how their money was spent, provided that they carried on the war for them and kept the Persians away.” Pericles had effectively plundered the common treasure of Greece and turned it into the adornment of Athens.

Athenian trade also began to flourish during the rule of Pericles, and Themistocles’ fortification of the Piraeus made Athens one of the greatest ports in Greece. The decline of merchant cities in Ionia also contributed greatly to the Athenian economy.

But the most striking developments in fifth-century Athens took place in the cultural sphere.

Although Greek philosophy began in Ionia, it flourished in Athens. Because of her wealth, political power, and cultural refinement, she attracted the best minds from all over Greece. The Sophists, in particular, contributed much to the development of political theory, rhetoric, and logic and stimulated the thought of Athens’ native geniuses Socrates and Plato.

Athens is also renowned for her great architecture, a matter in which Pericles himself played a prominent role. Pericles enlisted Pheidias (480 – 430 BCE) to be the director of his building program, assisted by such skilled architects as Callicrates, Ictinus, Coroebus, and Metagenes. Among their projects were the Parthenon, the Temple of Athena, the adornment of the Acropolis, the Odeon, the Concert Hall, and the temples of Eleusis and Hephaistos.

When Pericles was attacked for his lavish use of public funds, he offered to pay for the construction work himself, if he could take all the glory. This did the trick. Even Pericles’ most zealous critics wished to share in his renown, so they insisted that he complete the buildings at public expense.

Pericles’ construction projects were remarkable not merely for their expense, but also for their artistry, craftsmanship, and good taste, which no other Greek states were able to match, least of all Sparta. In fact, C. M. Bowra wrote that the “remains of Sparta are so humble that it is hard to believe that this was the power which for many years challenged and finally conquered Athens” (Periclean Athens [Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1971], p. 180). But although Pericles’ construction program clearly was an “education” to the rest of Greece, it was no safeguard against eventual Spartan conquest.

What we call ancient Greek drama is better deemed ancient Athenian drama. The great tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripedes were Athenians, as were the comic playwrights Aristophanes and Menander. Sparta had its share of talented poets — among them Tyrtaeus during the mid-seventh century BCE — but they could not compete with the new trends being set in Athens. As Bury put it, when a stranger visited Sparta he must have experienced “a feeling of being transported into an age long past, when men were braver, better, and simpler, unspoiled by wealth, undeveloped by ideas” (p. 134).

The social status of women in Athens was far lower than it was in Sparta. Athenian women took no part in public life and were instructed solely in domestic arts. In his Funeral Oration, Pericles said that women should merely aim “to be least talked about by men, whether they are praising you or criticising you.” In Sparta, however, women were permitted to engage in gymnastic training and “enjoyed a freedom which was in marked contrast with the seclusion of women in other Greek states” (Bury, p. 133). So as far as respect for women was concerned, Athens could not really claim to have exported an policy worthy of emulation, although Ionia also shared the fundamental Athenian weakness of excluding women from education.

Religious and sporting festivals were much the same throughout Greece and, although it is always the Athenians who are remembered for their gods and sporting heroes, most other Greek states were equally advanced.

Thus when Pericles declared that Athens was “an education to Greece.” he was, on the whole, making an accurate observation. This is not to say that Athens was superior to Sparta in every respect, of course, and her democratic system left much to be desired.

Although other Greek states shared some Athenian political, social and economic principles, it remains the case that Athens gave birth to some of the finest Greek accomplishments. These accomplishments, moreover, provided key elements for the development of European art, architecture, drama, philosophy, rhetoric, and politics for 2500 years. Thus Athens continues to serve not only as an “education” for Greece, but for the world.


Troy Southgate is from Crystal Palace in South London and has been a Revolutionary Nationalist activist and writer for almost 25 years. He has also been involved with more than twenty music projects. He is a founder of National Anarchism and author of Tradition and Revolution (Aarhus, Denmark: Integral Tradition).

samedi, 24 septembre 2011

The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East

Robert Drews - The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the Aegean and the Near East

 



When did the Indo-Europeans enter the lands that they occupied during historical times? And, more specifically, when did the Greeks come to Greece? Robert Drews brings together the evidence--historical, linguistic, and archaeological--to tackle these important questions.

Reviews:
"Into the ever-tangled and speculative debate on Indo-European origins comes this excellent book: lucid, critical, and refreshingly sober."--D. F. Easton, The Classical Review
"The fact that [a] pattern of localized Near Eastern takeovers coincides with the inception of chariot warfare, coupled with his carefully documented hypothesis that Proto-Indo-European-speaking (PIE) peoples in Armenia were responsible for the development and spread of chariot warfare, serves as the backdrop to Drews's innovative scenario for the arrival of the Greeks.... Such complete Near Eastern analogies involving archaeology, mythology, and linguistics, for example, have been rarely applied to support theories of PIE dispersal.... His research serves the critical function of provoking new views of a long-standing problem."--Susan N. Skomal, American Journal of Archaeology

Endorsement:
"An archaeological and linguistic whodunnit of the most fascinating sort, courageously tackling a much-argued problem from several disciplines at once.... No one dealing with the dispersal of the Indo-Europeans can ignore this book."--Elizabeth Wayland Barber, Occidental College


Afbeelding en tekst: Princeton University Press.